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Summary
The study concentrates on the introduction and background motive of technology 
related change of copyright law as reflected mainly in the Berne Convention due to 
the technological and economic necessities experienced in the early 20th century. The 
purpose of this study is to understand a development which has led to the adaptation 
of licensing regimes that are not based on traditional exclusivity approach.
Voice recording, broadcasting, rebroadcasting, and photocopying serve as main 
examples of the development. Also the impact of internet and mobile technologies 
are discussed. The method is based on institutional theory of law, and makes broad 
use of both economic analysis and historical documentation.
The problem of the legislator’s choice on how to structure copyright law between 
the two alternatives, exclusive property or liability approach, has risen constantly 
throughout the 20th century. The main conflict of interest seems to be between 
the exclusive right of the copyright holder, and the interests of users, that is, both 
the commercial and end users. The secondary use of copyright material is a rapidly 
growing form of copyright use. This creates controversies arising in that particular field 
of commercial use.
Exclusivity is often regarded as the essence of copyright. However, the development 
of communication technology has allowed new forms of use that are not as well 
directly controllable by the relevant parties as was the publishing and sale of books. 
The new technology-enabled phenomenon is mass use in its different forms. Mass use 
means use of copyright protected works in large quantities in a manner that is either 
impossible or prohibitively costly to trace, identify and bill. This development which is 
common to practically all technological innovations of the 20th century questions the 
accuracy of the exclusivity approach to copyright.
This study explores technology related change of the copyright institution, and how 
copyright is developing from a system based on exclusivity towards a system of 
compensation increasingly adopting elements of compulsory - that is, involuntary - 
licensing and its variants. Secondly, on a more general level, the study attempts to 
formulate a conclusion concerning the impact of technological change on copyright.
Exclusivity remains the theoretical and logical starting point of copyright legislation and 
nearly any analysis of copyright, scientific or within legal practice. Anyhow, the 20th 
century development has introduced a new set of regulations attempting to limit overly 
powerful legal positions and thus to protect interests relating to development of new 
technologies and businesses. This has largely taken place by some form of compulsory 
licensing. The broad use of platform fees is an illustration of this development in its 
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extreme. The origin of this development is in the belief to scientific progress and 
innovation in the early 20th century (the development motive).
The study suggests that a more coherent approach towards copyright may be reached 
by studying copyright as a system of compensation, rather than a system of full control 
of the use of copyright protected matter. This also corresponds to the evolving set 
of beliefs of the copyright ideology. Exclusivity has not disappeared from the overall 
picture, but shall be reserved to those forms of use where it is applicable. That is, 
where copyright is directly controllable by the author or other copyright holder without 
prohibitive overall consequences as to other right holders, users, businesses, or the 
society.
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CHAPTER ONE: 
Theoretical Framework. 
The Interaction of Law and Economic Activity 
in the Copyright Environment
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I. 1. Introduction
There are several separate paths of copyright criticism that can be identified in the 
contemporary debate.1 According to a recent analysis by Paul David, firstly, there exists 
the reactive “free and open access” movement promoting alternative ventures and 
business models that make copyright less critical as a means of protecting intellectual 
investment. It is reactive being a response to the defensiveness of the printing and 
media industry against the rapid development of the Internet. The basic argumentation 
of this movement is illustrated in the works of Professor Lawrence Lessig from Stanford 
University.2 We could call this “fundamental criticism”.
Secondly, there is a “moderate” line of thinking that is troubled by the abuses of the 
copyright regime but sees the need for some form of intellectual property protection 
in modern society. Scholars belonging to this category argue for an alternative in the 
“legal liability” approach for the “absolute property rights” protection. This may be 
called “practical criticism”.3
Thirdly, according to David, outside the academic schools, the media companies 
tend to emphasize secrecy and private contracting with the help of digital rights 
management technologies to meet their protection needs.4 This could be called the 
“technological approach”; it is not as much a line of academic argumentation but a 
straight-forward way adapted by business companies to protect their investments to 
intellectual property.
This study concentrates on the introduction and background motive of technology 
related change of copyright law as reflected in the Berne Convention due to the 
technological and economic necessities experienced in the early 20th century. 
Although the focus is on the early 20th century, the recent development towards 
platform fees will also be discussed, along with the Northern European innovation, 
“extended collective licensing”. The problems and method of approach will place this 
study, within the categories identified by Paul David, closest to the second one, that 
is, in our words “practical criticism”. A distinction to the traditional line of copyright 
studies anyhow comes from the element of dynamism; the purpose of this study is to 
understand a development which has led to the adaptation of licensing regimes that 
are not based on traditional exclusivity approach.
The problem of the legislator’s choice on how to structure copyright law between 
the two alternatives, exclusive property or liability approach, has risen constantly 
throughout the 20th century. Even today, the main conflict of interest seems to be 
between the exclusive right of the copyright holder, and the interests of users, that 
is, both the commercial and end users. The secondary use of copyright material is 
a rapidly growing form of copyright use. This creates controversies arising in that 
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particular field of commercial use. Problems in this area arise mainly because of 
technological development, which provides us with the theme of the study, that is, 
how the international community has solved these technology related controversies in 
copyright legislation. 
I. 1. The Research Question
Copyright is in the Berne Convention defined as the exclusive right of the author to 
decide on the various forms of use of the copyright protected work.5 The basic business 
model corresponding to this is the publishing of books, which may stay relatively well 
controlled by the author or the publisher provided that international measures for 
piracy exist.
In authoritative definitions, exclusivity is often regarded as the essence of copyright.6 
However, the development of communication technology has allowed new forms 
of use that are not as well directly controllable by the relevant parties as was the 
publishing and sale of books. The new technology-enabled phenomenon is mass use 
in its different forms. By mass use is meant use of copyright protected works in large 
quantities in a manner that is either impossible or prohibitively costly to trace, identify 
and bill. This development which is common to practically all technological innovations 
of the 20th century questions the accuracy of the exclusivity approach to copyright.
This study explores technology related change of copyright institution, and how 
copyright is developing from a system based on exclusivity towards a system of 
compensation increasingly adopting elements of compulsory licensing and its variants.7 
WIPO Glossary defines compulsory licensing as “a special form of permission to be 
granted obligatorily, in most cases by competent authorities or also through authors’ 
organizations, under specific conditions for specific kinds of uses of works”.8 This 
definition includes the basic idea of allowing use of copyright protected work against 
payment without the need for permission from the author.
Secondly, on a more general level, the study attempts to formulate a conclusion 
concerning the impact of technological change on copyright.9
The research question is defined in this introductory section. Some refinements to the 
research question and certain elements will be developed and added later, in particular 
with regard to the discussion concerning the copyright motives. 
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I.1.1. Understanding the Change of the Copyright Institution
Copyright law in its present form is a complicated entity comprising on the one hand 
national laws and on the other international conventions that have been developed 
over one hundred years to enable harmonization between national copyright systems. 
Already at first sight, the overall development seems largely influenced by technological 
development. Technological novelties have raised new economic and legal issues and 
challenged the conventional copyright doctrine that had developed over centuries and 
got its manifestation in the first Berne Convention text in 1886. The development of 
technology is however not as such the sole influencing factor, since other historical 
events have also contributed to the development of international copyright law. 
And even more importantly, no technology as such in its infancy seems to have had 
the necessary momentum to directly necessitate changes in international copyright 
conventions. New technology must first gain economic importance as a precondition 
for contributing to legal change.10 The technological interaction with copyright law is 
manifest in the compulsory licensing regimes. Therefore, the history and functions of 
the compulsory licensing is the main theme of this study.
Another important factor for understanding copyright is its ideological background. 
The judgment in the Magill –case, (EEC High Court 6 April 1995), illustrates the 
complexity of values in the copyright field (inserts and emphasis: MH):
“28. However, the Court of First Instance took the view that, while it was plain 
that the exercise of an exclusive right to reproduce a protected work was not 
itself an abuse, that did not apply when, in the light of the details of each 
individual case, it was apparent that the right was being exercised in such a 
ways and circumstances as in fact to pursue an aim manifestly contrary to the 
objectives of Article 86. In the event, the Court of First Instance continued, the 
copyright was no longer being exercised in a manner which correspond to its 
essential function, within the meaning of Article 36 of the Treaty, which was 
to protect the moral rights in the work and to ensure a reward for the creative 
effort, while respecting the aims of, in particular, Article 86.”
We can see that certain sections refer to conflicting interests that have to be weighed 
against each other.11 These include the protection of moral rights, ensuring reward for 
the creative effort, and yet adapting to the necessities of public interest and, in this 
case, the interest to maintain competition between companies in a certain market. 
The interpretation of this material requires an historical context in order to grasp the 
content of the conclusion. The copyright doctrine as reflected in the 1886 Berne text 
was created over centuries as the development of the trade and political circumstances 
required new elements to be added to the copyright legislation. This necessitates the 
understanding of how the copyright system has changed during its existence.
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One of the main purposes of this study is to identify the main beliefs behind the 
traditional copyright doctrine and especially the exclusivity or property right nature 
of copyright as reflected in the early 1886 version of the Berne Convention. It is our 
purpose to investigate how technological changes have necessitated a change in the 
beliefs behind the traditional exclusivity doctrine towards a right to compensation and 
towards the introduction of the industry emphasized development motive.
A practical positivist approach to law – as a starting point – uses the method of 
literary criticism and tries to draw interpretational conclusions on the basis of the 
official material: statutory law, background materials such as committee preparations, 
major court cases, opinions of scholars, etc. The material is then interpreted and 
systematized. This method would not however say too much of the development 
of the international copyright protection in its totality, that is, the dynamic aspect of 
copyright development.12 Another possibility, not uncommon in copyright discussion, 
a natural law approach would require a normative or moral focus, and could likely lead 
to recommendations based on some moral judgment or conviction, whether open 
or “hidden” in the normative assertions.13 But even this would only lead us to the 
question, what are the moral convictions to choose from, and how to evaluate one 
over the other. This method could probably reveal more of the researcher than of the 
research object.
Traditional jurisprudential interpretation normally takes place through a legal 
examination of certain, isolated case or cases. Approaching a totality of norms that has 
developed during a lengthy period of time provides a challenge beyond the isolated 
interpretational interest. The question becomes, how can we better understand the 
development of the legal or institutional framework, and are we able to identify the 
background motivation or motivations of the changes of copyright law on a more 
general level. What happens and why when a new technology shakes the foundations 
of copyright.
The understanding of the development leading away from the traditional exclusivity 
doctrine of copyright necessitates a dynamic approach14, that is, studying several 
relevant technologies that have had an impact to the change of copyright law during 
a lengthy period of time. This includes on the side of pure legal argumentation also 
economic and historical assertions. Even the philosophical background of copyright 
ideology – the “mutual beliefs” of the copyright system - must be reviewed in order to 
correctly form the “big picture” of copyright as a legal institution.15
Approaching copyright legislation in an international framework provides an additional 
challenge from the viewpoint of political or legal philosophy. The foundations of 
a legal system have in those disciplines traditionally been anchored to a justifying 
factor – be it the basic norm, rule of recognition, sovereign, Leviathan, or a moral 
judgment based on natural law considerations, even divine revelations.16 These models 
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correspond to the national state circumstances, but less in international, convention 
based context. Models based on norm hierarchy also logically lead to the problem of 
infinite regress, which has inspired varying solutions.17 In an international setting, it 
becomes increasingly difficult to create sovereign-based theories on the legitimizing 
factor of international order. The international legal instruments are of a different 
nature than the traditional law of a national state: rather than being commands of a 
sovereign, the norm base increasingly seems to be arranged on a contractual basis, 
that is, conventions.18
Approaching change in an international setting requires therefore a method that allows 
a more flexible and dynamic approach to legal research. It also requires a different 
concept of law in relation to either positive or normative theories.
These flexible and dynamic variations of legal theory have recently been developed 
by several scholars. I shall only name five, Kaarlo Tuori and Eerik Lagerspetz, Neil 
MacCormick together with Ota Weinberger, and Douglass C. North. Tuori’s theory 
on critical positivism contains a dynamic aspect seeing law as a field of interaction 
with several interactive layers of development. Tuori is influenced by Habermas’ 
theory of communicative action, and hermeneutics, which also takes into account the 
background motivation of legislation.19 Both Lagerspetz and North have contributed 
to the dynamic – not necessarily evolutionary – theories, the former in the area of 
political and legal theory, and the latter in the area of the history of economic activity. 
MacCormick and Weinberger have laid important elements for the foundations of the 
institutional theory of law.
Neither law as a command of a sovereign, nor law as a deductive result of a moral 
statement seem – intuitively - to provide a sufficient starting point to approach the 
problem of technology-oriented change in an international legal framework. For these 
reasons, the theories of institutions as developed by both Lagerspetz and North, have 
been chosen as an ontological basis for the analysis of the mechanisms of change in 
international copyright legislation.
Lagerspetz builds his theory of law as a conventional praxis on the basis of mutual 
beliefs. Mutual beliefs form conventional facts, which, in a legal framework, may 
become legal institutions. North operates, in his interpretation of the development 
of economy, with “mental models”, which create the constraints individuals have in 
their interaction with others – the institutions. It seems initially, that both approaches 
have very much in common.20 Both scientists use game-theoretical approaches, if in a 
slightly different setting.
From Lagerspetz’s analysis we may conclude that the method of understanding 
institutions becomes historical in nature, because mutual beliefs, conventional facts 
and institutions, develop through lengthy periods of time.21 - It becomes, not only 
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recommendable, but necessary, to understand the historical background of a legal 
instrument to correctly assess its nature as an institution.
I.1.2. The Impact of Technology on Copyright
Beside the basic theme, the development of compulsory licensing and its variants, this 
study also discusses a second theme, which admittedly is of a more hypothetical and 
speculative nature, that is, the impact of technology on copyright on a general level.22 In 
this field of research, the division carried out by North becomes crucial. North sees that 
there are basically two fields of force that affect the economic development as a whole: 
the institutional framework, and the development of technology. North has continued 
the work of Joseph A. Schumpeter in the analysis of the reasons of economic change. 
The framework of Schumpeter’s theory of economic development is however still 
relevant for illuminating the various problems relating to techno-economic interaction, 
and the role of the entrepreneur as an agent of economic change.23
Having made the basic assumption of the nature of norms as institutions, the second 
research question, ”the impact of technology on copyright”, becomes, how has the 
institutional framework of copyright interacted with technological development. This 
has very much to do with how the members of the society originally formed their 
beliefs concerning copyright.
This study attempts to show that the classic motives of copyright protection do not 
provide a one-sided or biased framework for the interpretation of copyright law as 
such, but rather a system of mutual beliefs that allows for the creation and maintenance 
of relatively balanced and flexible totality.24 Even other interested parties besides the 
right-holders - like both the commercial and private users of copyright protected works 
– are either protected in various ways, or may benefit from the system in some manner. 
The motives play a central role in the legal-economic argumentation that takes place in 
the copyright legislation. Our basic assumption on altruistic motives is rather skeptical; 
economic arguments seem more accurate, decisive and may challenge the existing 
doctrine and the balance of motives. The reason for adding balancing instruments into 
the copyright system – such as compulsory licensing – has not been initiated on the 
basis of the rights of users, but on the basis of the interest of the commercial use of 
the copyright protected material. This suggests that the interests of the end users may 
in several ways depend from the legal position of the commercial users.25
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I. 2. Methodology
According to Weinberger26, because of the enduring influence of Kelsen’s “Pure 
Theory” of Law”, some legal theorists firmly believe that the juristic approach to law 
involves only understanding and interpretation of valid law and that all reflections 
concerning the social circumstances in which the legal system operates fall outside the 
subject matter of jurisprudence and belong rather to other disciplines like sociology 
of law or legal history. This debate has its roots in the philosophical question of the 
relation of the “is” and the ”ought”, where “is” represents a facts-based scientific 
approach familiar with the natural or physical sciences, whereas the study of law means 
discussing the normative side of human action, that is, what the member of society 
ought to do.27 The problem is raised partly because, according to Tuori, “concepts are 
not normatively innocent”; a lawyer cannot be logically impartial when observing the 
legal system.28
Weinberger however rejects this Kelsenian “purity”. He strongly advocates the 
conviction, that every approach to the law which leads to greater understanding of 
the law and to the explanation of its essence and its social role, is “juristic”:29
“Legal science without consideration of social reality – which corresponds to the 
existential aspect of the norm – is thus unthinkable.”
According to North30,
“Writing history is constructing a coherent story of some facet of the human 
condition through time. Such a construction exists only in the human mind. We 
do not recreate the past; we construct stories about the past. But to be good 
history, the story must give a consistent, logical account and be constrained by 
the available evidence and the available theory.”
Also Tuori finally rejects the logical “vicious circle”, suggesting “immanent critique” 
as an alternative, that is, critique from within the system.31 In the following study, 
the methodological “purity” is not necessarily the prime target, but to offer a “cross-
analysis” of an important area of legal development and the legal-economic interaction 
in that field.32 Logical constraints originating from mathematical sciences should not 
block meaningful, coherent and consistent storytelling and identifying patterns of 
legal behavior.
Warren J. Samuels has described the institutionalist method of studying law and 
economics in the following manner:33
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“Our principal goal is quite simply to understand what is going on – to identify 
the instrumental variables and fundamental issues and processes – in the 
operation of legal institutions of economic significance, and to promote the 
development of skills with which to analyze and predict the performance 
consequences of alternative institutional designs.”
The method of this study is not inasmuch the systematization and interpretation of legal 
material in the traditional sense, and neither is it pure law and economics, but rather 
understanding a legal institution from different perspectives. This is a requirement for 
a proper institutional analysis of the essence of copyright. The perspectives include 
legal documents (laws, convention texts and their background documents, case 
law, legal commentary etc.) but also economic argumentation along with historic 
assertions. Even the mapping of the philosophical background of copyright is essential 
to cover the “mutual beliefs” connected to copyright law. The purpose, in the words 
of Weinberger, is to approach the law in a way that leads to greater understanding of 
it and its essence and social role. In short, to see “what is going on” concerning the 
development of copyright in the direction of a liability rule. 
Then why not abandon legal argumentation and documents altogether? In studies on 
law, this is clearly not possible. Furthermore, the choice of legal documentation as the 
main source material reflects the author’s belief in the possibilities of practical criticism 
within the copyright system. To point out how law should be amended is the hard 
way that rarely leads to concrete results. But to point out how law can or even better, 
how it must be understood within the correct institutional frame is a more direct way 
to encourage change.
The research question is, firstly the development towards and the features of compulsory 
licensing, and secondly, what has been the impact of technology on copyright, 
or more precisely, how did the international framework of copyright interact with 
technological development when sound recording and broadcasting were introduced. 
Several steps have to be taken in order to expand the traditional “narrow” mode of 
legal methodology.34 Interpretation of copyright history is necessary for understanding 
the development of the copyright institutions. Both technological interaction with the 
economy and law’s interaction with the economy are likewise necessary elements of 
study reflecting the economic reality behind the study object.35 A study must also 
be based on a chosen concept of law, which in this study rests on the institutional 
approach. We must however be aware of the risks of seeing a predetermined logic in 
human or societal behavior.36
First of all, we need a concept of law that corresponds with the needs to approach 
both international legislation and the dynamic aspect of technological development. 
This concept of law will be built on the idea of law as a conventional fact having its 
basis on the mutual beliefs (Lagerspetz) – or mental models (North) - of the actors. 
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Since the target is the interpretation of international copyright law, in which area the 
most important instrument is the Berne Convention, the approach to law as law being 
created to correspond mutual beliefs is prima facie appropriate. 
Secondly, it is our firm belief and hypothesis based on experiences of the average 
course of events in the copyright arena, that the direction of development – so to 
speak – is rather from technological change towards changes in legislation, and 
only rarely in reverse.37 We need an understanding of the reasons behind economic 
development. We especially need to have a basic understanding, how technology 
shaped the economic development in relation to new media. It is not our intention to 
neglect the fact that law may encourage the development of technology in a certain 
direction, or facilitate innovation by creating the “rules of game”. The point is merely 
that a law cannot command or order a specific invention to happen, or even dictate 
the popularity of an innovation.38
Thirdly, we need to understand the basic issues of legal-economic interaction, which 
includes some basic assumptions behind law and economics -discipline. The ideas of 
some of the classic writers of that discipline – Richard A. Posner, Ronald Coase, Milton 
Friedman – shall be approached in order to grasp an understanding of the problems 
of legal-economic interaction – why rights exist and why they matter in an economic 
setting. Or do they matter? The question of legal-economic interaction may also be 
seen as part of a larger framework, the question of institutional change in an economic 
setting.39 The starting point is that from a micro-economic viewpoint, copyright law 
is about regulating the negotiation positions of the parties. A right does not only 
facilitate transactions, but affects resource allocation.40
Fourthly, and as a consequence of our chosen concept of law and as a tool for 
understanding technology-initiated changes in copyright, we need to define the most 
common values behind copyright. These are the main values, beliefs, or even “mental 
models” (the concept developed by Douglass C. North), behind the development of 
copyright law. These are called “copyright motives”, and may be seen as a system of 
mutual beliefs behind copyright. A belief may not be verifiable or falsifiable as such, 
but its existence in the copyright debate is a fact.
Having completed the discussion on the nature of copyright motives, we shall cover 
the development of the Berne Convention in order to evaluate the way technological 
development has changed the traditional and exclusivity-based copyright doctrine, 
and draw conclusions. This will also mean a slight return to legal interpretation as the 
basic tool for legal analysis: according to Tuori, legal dogmatics provides a necessary 
jurisprudential “preliminary understanding” of the research field, which enables us 
to discuss in terms of facts and the law.41 The Berne Convention and its background 
materials are read in light of the tools of interpretation. The discussions revealed in the 
General Reports are important, as well as the authoritative comments of scholars. Some 
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economic facts of the respective fields of communication are discussed to indicate that 
when reaching the Berne stage, the new businesses already had developed and gained 
economic gravity. This happened repeatedly both in the case of sound recording and 
broadcasting. In addition, the parallel and simultaneous development in the United 
States would suggest a pattern in legislation.42
As we shall see, international law is largely inspired by national solutions. This interface 
is however not examined broadly, as that would require a relatively large scope of 
national legislation to be covered along with the Berne Convention. The references 
to national legislation are therefore less systematic but are taken into account in such 
important events as the development of the author’s right during the pre-international 
era, and compulsory licensing. Some examples of national law are covered to illustrate 
that different legal systems have faced similar issues and attempted to solve them in 
ways resembling each other.
In this study, one of the purposes is to indicate a legal-economic pattern of legislative 
behavior.43 It is clear that this kind of invariance is not something that can be logically 
deducted from a set of documents. Neither is the intention to provide a pure law and 
economics analysis, as both the ideological and historical background are also vital in 
mapping the copyright as a legal institution. In short, we might call it a serious attempt 
at “what’s going on”; it is a “story about the past”, based on available evidence, 
attempting consistency and logical account.44 It is still necessary to be aware of the 
risks of any intention to see some predetermined logic in historical events that simply 
was not there at the time of the events.45
I.2.1. On Terminology
Unless otherwise expressly stated, the term “copyright” is used in this study as also 
comprising “the author’s right”, which means that generally no distinction between 
the Anglo-Saxon or European tradition is made on the concept of copyright. 
“Neighboring rights” are discussed in their context, historically the term appears first 
in the mid 20th century discussion. Out of sheer reluctance to always having to refer 
separately to “copyright” and “neighboring rights”, when discussing general issues 
of the intellectual property, the term “copyright” is sometimes used to refer to the 
entire problem area, including neighboring rights. It is however believed that this will 
not cause serious problems in understanding the basic line of argumentation of this 
study.46 – The term “copyright doctrine” is, unless otherwise indicated, referring to the 
strong author’s right exclusivity that is illustrated in the Berne Convention 1886 text 
and the preparatory documents.47
For the purpose of this study, the focus is on technologies assisting or enabling any 
relevant – that is, legally relevant - use of copyright protected material. The most 
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important examples are sound recording and broadcasting. The most common 
acts enabled by the development of media technology are fixation, reproduction, 
transmission, retransmission, making available of fixations, distribution, communication 
to the public, broadcasting, and public display.48
Since the development of the communication technology is a continuous process, the 
list will in practice never be exhaustive in relation to the future forms of uses enabled 
by technology. The technology may well be simple or complicated, high tech or low 
tech, digital or analogue. The essential point is, for the purpose of this study, whether 
the new technology has had practical consequences in enhancing the possible copying 
of copyright protected work.
I.3. Institutional Theories of Law
Institutions as devices for human interaction have been discussed both in legal and 
economic disciplines. In order to form a general understanding of the problem, we shall 
discuss and compare some institutional theorists, Douglass C. North concerning mainly 
the institutional interpretation of economic history, and Eerik Lagerspetz concerning 
the foundations of a legal system.49 As North emphasizes economic change, and asks 
why economic development chooses different paths, and why certain clearly inefficient 
institutions manage to survive for centuries, Lagerspetz approaches from a more static 
point of view discussing institutions in relation to the classical works of political and 
legal theory.
Although both theorists are important for the purposes of this study, their role is 
slightly different: As North covers the interaction of technology and economy – or the 
institutional framework – his work is essential in relation to technological and economic 
interaction. Lagerspetz focuses on the foundations of the legal system, which makes 
his theoretical framework important in legal-economic interaction. However, both are 
important when the choice of the definition of law and legal framework are made. 
I.3.1. The Prisoner’s Dilemma
Lagerspetz has discussed the game-theoretical origin of concepts, institutional facts, 
and the law. The interest is in reducing the uncertainty involved in human interaction 
in a society. People do not often know what the preferences of others are, or, they do 
not know whether the others know their preferences.
The Prisoner’s Dilemma means a situation where two parties make choices that affect 
each other, but they do not have information of the other’s behavior or preferences, 
that is, they lack the opportunity to cooperate.50
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     Player 2
    denies   admits 
  denies  2,2  10,1
Player 1 
  admits  10,1  5,5
The numbers present the value of the players’ choices. For the sake of our example, we 
have chosen numbers to reflect years of imprisonment. In this situation, as the players 
do not have information about the others’ behavior, they will eventually choose the 
selfish choices and end up at a lower level of optimality.51
The game is “played” in the following manner: players 1 and 2 are both suspects for 
a crime they have committed together.
If both players deny the charges, they will end up with the lowest punishment (2, 2). 
However, if player 1 denies the accusation, and player 2 admits it, player 1 risks being 
acquitted for 10 years as player 2 will end up with only 1 year’s imprisonment. And 
this naturally goes vice versa.
If they both would admit to the charges, they would end up at position (5, 5), which 
is the second best alternative. Uncertain of the other party’s denial, and facing the 
possible consequences of the other party admitting, they both end up admitting to the 
charge. This represents a lower level of optimality, that is, (5, 5) instead of (2, 2).
However, if the game is not one-off, that is, it may continue, and especially, if the 
players’ do not know if the game will continue, the players risk being “punished” for 
their selfish choices.52
In the situations (coordination games), where cooperation would produce better 
results than individual, selfish choices, or where a selfish choice can later be punished, 
the players share a common interest in finding some commonly agreed solution and 
are usually content to follow any course of action as long as they know that it will be 
followed by others. Such common practices are conventions, that is, means for solving 
coordination problems. Conventions are practices followed mainly because there is 
the mutual belief that they are generally followed.53 Conventions form the basis of 
institutions such as language, money, and law.54
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I.3.2. Institutions
According to Douglass C. North, institutions are the rules of the game in a society, or, 
the humanly devised constraints shaping human interaction. They structure incentives 
in human exchange, whether political, social, or economic. Institutions reduce 
uncertainty by providing a structure to everyday life.55 This uncertainty arises due to 
incomplete information with respect to the behavior of other individuals in the process 
of human interaction.56
Institutions define and limit the set of choices of individuals. Organizations also provide 
a framework for human interaction, but they must be separated from institutions.57 “If 
institutions are the rules of the game, organizations are the players.”58
Concerning the assumptions related to individual behavior, North makes an interesting 
deviation from the neo-classic assumption of “homo economicus” being a rational 
maximizer of self-interest. Making choices is not only dictated by rational self-interest, 
but also “shared mental models”:59
“Individuals with common cultural backgrounds and experiences will share 
reasonably convergent mental models, ideologies and institutions and 
individuals with different learning experiences (both cultural and environmental) 
will have different theories (models, ideologies) to interpret the environment.”
It is noteworthy that North’s definition of “shared mental models” bears a resemblance 
to Lagerspetz’s definition of “mutual beliefs” as a basis for conventional facts and 
institutions.
Organizations are agents of institutional change. The foundation for economic theory 
is laid on a theory of human behavior.60 – It is striking that Lagerspetz, without an 
economic approach at all, applies the same behavioral considerations of the foundations 
of a political and legal system.
According to North, and highlighting a central theme for our study, institutions, 
together with the technology employed, determine the transaction and transformation 
(production) costs that make up total costs.61 Developing the argumentation of 
Schumpeter, North sees entrepreneurs as the central agents of change:62
“Incremental change comes from the perceptions of the entrepreneurs in 
political and economic organizations that they could do better by altering the 
existing institutional framework at some margin.”
Change is path-dependent.63 Subsequent breakthroughs in one technology, unknown 
to the players originally, may result in monopolist domination.64 One of the important 
conclusions of North in his theory of institutional change is that technological change 
and institutional change are the basic keys to societal and economic evolution.65
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North asks whether a single model can account for both technological and institutional 
change. His answer is negative:66 “The perceptions of the actors play a more central 
role in institutional than in technological change because ideological beliefs influence 
the subjective construction of the models that determine choices.”
Concerning our second theme, the study on the impact of technology on copyright 
does not attempt to create a single model to describe the change, but for the 
purpose of this study, the areas of influence have been separated into two interfaces: 
technological-economic, and legal-economic. It is our belief that the influence of 
technological change on a legal framework can best be described in this manner.
Eerik Lagerspetz also approaches the problem of institutional facts from a behavioral 
or game-theoretical aspect:67
“There are things which exist and facts which hold only if the relevant 
individuals believe that they exist or hold and act according to these beliefs.”
Lagerspetz does not claim that our concepts are just conventionally agreed ways of 
classifying our perceptual world. He claims that the entities themselves may have a 
merely conventional existence.68
The standard notion of mutual belief includes a series of reiterated beliefs ascending 
to infinity. Lagerspetz’ definition is the following:69
 It is mutually believed in a population S that p iff (if and only if)
 1. everyone in S believes that p
 2. everyone in S believes that everyone in S believes that p
 And so on ad infinitum
Mutual beliefs form the basis of conventional facts.70 As a general epistemic 
transparency in a society is impossible, our knowledge about the beliefs and actions 
of others is always a subject of substantial uncertainty. The role of conventions in life 
is to diminish this uncertainty.71 Game-theoretically, the situation that the members of 
society are trying to solve through mutual beliefs is the classical “Prisoner’s Dilemma”. 
Mutual beliefs enable the development of cooperative strategies in societal action.72 
A rule is not necessarily a conventional fact. It can exist because it is defined as a rule 
by another rule. Since this however leads to the problem of infinite regress (there must 
be a higher norm to justify lower, and an even higher to justify the higher norm etc.), 
the ultimate rules, which define other rules, must exist conventionally.73
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Concerning institutional research, Lagerspetz emphasizes, as North does, the historical 
method:74
“My thesis is that this situation (i.e. the use of money) constitutes the social fact 
– the fact that the referred objects are money. It we want a further explanation, 
it must be a historical one. How did the members of the society originally form 
their beliefs?”
Therefore, applying this thought to copyright research, understanding copyright as an 
institution requires a study of historical development of it, or at least the study of the 
origins of the common beliefs regarding copyright.
Thus, from North we are able to see the division of two important forces affecting 
economic development, the institutional framework and the development of 
technology. Economic development is a product of the interaction between these two 
elements. From Lagerspetz we learn, that law and institution are based on mutual 
beliefs and conventional facts, and that a modern legal system – “unlike the primitive 
command – obedience –system described by Hobbes and Austin”75 - contains reflexive 
and symmetrical relationships. To understand the essence of copyright institutions, a 
historical method is necessary.76
I.4. Schumpeter on the Interaction of Technology and 
Economy
I.4.1. The Technology Drive and the Ability to Establish a Business
In order to approach the second research question, the impact of technology on 
copyright, and realizing the interrelations of legal and economic disciplines, we must 
first discuss the general effects of technological development on the economy. A useful 
tool for this approach is Joseph A. Schumpeter’s theory on economic development77, as 
his focus is on the “entrepreneurial” change; not only the ability to create inventions, 
but also the ability to establish a business, that is, commercial innovation.78 This is the 
core issue regarding the pressure to change the law as a consequence of technological 
development – for example to change copyright law.
In his book “The Theory of Economic Development”79, Joseph A. Schumpeter studied 
the difficult question of a scientific approach towards change, that is, economic 
change. A change as a subject of scientific study is a “moving target”, and requires 
several questions to be asked and answered. It is also interesting that regardless of 
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the possibility of a quantitative analysis of Schumpeter’s theory, it is firmly based on 
behavioral assumptions regarding the entrepreneur as an agent of change.
It must be noted that the common perception of Schumpeter’s views is largely based 
on “Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy”, whereas the focus of interest here lies in 
the earlier work “Theory of Economic Development” with a different emphasis.80
First of all, Schumpeter wants to draw a distinction between an empirical approach and 
“metaphysical” explanations; the latter being how he sees any attempt at searching 
for a “meaning” of history, or any kind of linear development of mankind.81 Two facts 
remain: historical change, and the “unsolved but not insoluble” problem of being 
unable to adequately explain a given historical state of things from the preceding 
state. Because of the fundamental dependence of the economic aspect of things on 
everything else, it is not possible to explain economic change by previous economic 
conditions alone.82
Later, in “Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy”, Schumpeter redefined “creative 
destruction”:83
“(...) the problem that is usually being visualized is how capitalism administers 
existing structures, whereas the relevant problem is how it creates and destroys 
them.”
The core problem of the second research question, that is, ”impact of technology on 
copyright” could hardly be summarized better.
I.4.2. Identifying the Mechanism of Change
Schumpeter is not interested in the concrete factors of change, but in the method by 
which these work, that is, with the mechanism of change.84 The theory of an economic 
system’s tendency towards equilibrium provides the means of determining prices and 
quantities of goods.85 Schumpeter is however interested in the “revolutionary” change 
– “the problem of economic development in a very narrow and formal sense”:86
“By “development” therefore, we shall understand only such changes in 
economic life as are not forced upon it from without but arise by its own 
initiative, from within.(...) Development in our sense is a distinct phenomenon, 
entirely foreign to what may be observed in the circular flow or in the tendency 
towards equilibrium. It is spontaneous and discontinuous change in the channels 
of flow, disturbance of equilibrium, which forever alters and displaces the 
equilibrium state previously existing.”
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Schumpeter does not believe, that customers are the driving force of economic change. 
On the contrary, the changes in the channel of the circular flow and the disturbances 
of the centre of equilibrium appear in the sphere of industrial and commercial life, 
not in the sphere of the wants of the consumers of final products. Innovations in 
the economic system do not as a rule take place in such a way that first new wants 
arise spontaneously in consumers, and then the productive apparatus swings around 
through their pressure. “It is however the producer who as a rule initiates economic 
change, and consumers are educated by him if necessary; they are, as it were, taught 
to want new things (...)”.87
Development means carrying out new combinations of productive means. New 
combinations are as a rule embodied in new firms that generally do not arise out of the 
old ones but start producing beside them. Development proceeds in five phases:88
-the introduction of a new product
-the introduction of a new method of production
-the opening of a new market
-the conquest of a new source of supply or raw materials
-the carrying out of the new organisation (of any industry)
According to Schumpeter, the creation of new combinations of productive means 
primarily requires credit. And, “those who lend and borrow for industrial purposes do 
not appear early in history”.89
Needless to say, Schumpeter’s description would suit almost any form of new media 
technology in its infancy. His description of a general course of events in economic 
change leaves little doubt as to the applicability of his ideas in relation to media and 
copyright industries.
I.4.3. Leadership
The social environment reacts negatively against the one who wishes to do something 
new. Using North’s definition of institutions, the existing institutions provide constraints 
that shape human action90. Even a deviation from a social custom such as dress code 
or manners arouses opposition, let alone graver cases where money is involved. “In 
manners economic this resistance manifests itself first of all in the groups threatened 
by the innovation, then in the difficulty in finding necessary cooperation, then in 
the difficulty in winning over consumers.” Schumpeter concludes, as recognition 
of the importance of the entrepreneurial spirit, “there is leadership only for these 
reasons”.91
Economic leadership must be distinguished from invention. As long as inventions are 
not put into practice, they are economically irrelevant. And to affect improvement is 
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an entirely different task from inventing it: “It is therefore, not advisable, and it may be 
downright misleading, to stress the element of invention as much as many writers do.” 
Innovation to have economic importance therefore requires not only the rights related 
to it, but also to be established as a part of business.92
Schumpeter’s main idea concerning the relationship of invention and innovation 
seems to be that the former is an invention of primarily technical nature that in itself 
contributes little to commercial success. What is crucial from the economy’s point of 
view is the impact of the commercial “innovation”. Edison’s invention of the sound 
recording device was naturally important, but the commercial innovation to use it for 
voice archives was clearly unsuccessful. So, an invention needs to be properly adapted 
into a business innovation, and then established as part of an economic reality.93 
For the purpose of this study, the recognition of the legal rights and status of record 
producers, movie producers, broadcasting companies etc. in legislation, are seen 
in the sense that Schumpeter described, as acts of establishment. They have taken 
place under serious pressure, and have originally been opposed in the international 
congresses modifying the Berne convention. Through successful implementation, their 
business models have been established as part of the copyright law. According to 
Schumpeter, “the appearance of one or a few entrepreneurs facilitates the appearance 
of others, and these the appearance of more, in ever-increasing numbers”.94
Schumpeter later expanded his theory into a broader analysis of economic development. 
Rejecting some of Marx’s basic theoretical assumptions, such as the surplus value 
theory,95 he anyhow shared Marx’s conviction of the economic interpretation of 
history.96
There are grounds to discuss “two Schumpeters”, the early one emphasizing 
entrepreneurship, radical innovation, and creative destruction, whereas the later one 
sees that certain conservative elements of economic activity are in fact productive 
for enhancing and maintaining technological development.97 The ability to establish 
a business is not enough: for the business to have longevity, a need to keep it alive 
is also required. Inconsiderate exploitation of a monopolist position cannot endure in 
capitalism, unless maintained by public authority. ”Outside the field of public utilities, 
the position of a single seller can in general be conquered – and retained for decades 
– only on the condition that he does not behave like a monopolist.”98
Although the theories and conclusions of Schumpeter have mainly stood the test 
of time and contradictory arguments, the connection between innovations and the 
need for large corporate size (monopoly powers) has been questioned and rejected 
by modern science; the modern approach is more appropriately, a “subtle blend” of 
competition and monopoly, (..) with the role of monopolistic elements diminishing 
when rich technological opportunities exist.99
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I.4.4. The Mechanism of Change from Copyright Perspective
It is common that new technologies create opportunities for entrepreneurial businesses. 
The creation of these businesses will later lead to legal uncertainties if not conflicts, 
and will be finally solved at the legislative level. In copyright disputes, it is not at all 
difficult to identify the social and economic pressure for change, and both the interests 
of the entrepreneur and the encumbent – whether it is a company or an authors’ 
organization.
Gallagher has suggested, referring to the application of a dynamic approach to 
copyright:100
“Whenever new media technologies are invented, users are presented with 
alternative ways of copying existing copyright works and copyright law is 
challenged by an external shock resulting in a ‘user-biased’ copyright balance.”
Analyzing dynamic competition and positions of companies both in the sense of a 
lifecycle and market position offers a tool for grasping, “what’s going on”. Also, the 
entrepreneur’s ability to affect the legislation in a favorable manner is an essential 
part of the development of any communication industry. Schumpeter described the 
abilities that have been needed in creating modern media industries.
From copyright history, the main technological events have always challenged the 
existing doctrine. The phonogram industry opposed heavily the authors’ exclusive 
right concerning the recordings of their works, which led to the acceptance of national 
compulsory licenses in the 1908 Berlin revision of the Berne Convention. During the same 
period, another deviation was made due to technological pressure, as the authorship 
of cinematographic works was opened to corporate entities rather than just natural 
persons. This pattern of legislative action, especially concerning compulsory licensing, 
was the main solution concerning technologies such as broadcasting, photocopying, 
and cable and satellite. Almost all these events permanently changed the economies 
and competitiveness of media, and also, consequently, the legal doctrine of copyright 
exclusivity.
I.5. On Legal-Economic Interaction
The purpose of this section is to give a short overview of the relations of rights in the 
economy. The intention is to walk through some methodological assumption of law and 
economics, and then continue to discuss issues of legal-economic interaction. This will 
by no means offer a complete account of the vast spectrum of legal-economic studies 
but will rather seek to orientate towards the issues of legal-economic interaction in 
copyright environment.101
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Economics and jurisprudence as separate disciplines have similarities: both can be 
seen as sciences studying society, and thus the social dimension of human behavior. 
Legal issues – as part of the institutional framework - are naturally vital to economic 
conditions. The basic concepts of how to approach human behavior have converged in 
recent decades: for example, both in a legal and economic framework, the institutional 
analysis has revealed the importance of “mental models” or “mutual beliefs” as a 
basis for these disciplines. In economics, the “homo economicus” is rather seen as 
an elimination of human qualities necessary for the purposes of quantitative analysis, 
rather than a full account of the human behavior with broad explanation power. 
Similarly, in jurisprudence, “the sovereign” seems rather to be a system of beliefs than 
a logical tool to justify the existence of binding norms.102
I.5.1. General Remarks
The purpose of this study requires depicting the role of rights in an economic activity. As 
the methodological choice is rather based on the idea of broadening understanding of 
legal and economic interaction, this study is not per se devoted to the discipline of law 
and economics. As the most important works regarding legal-economic interaction 
have been written in that discipline, in the following some basic problems of law and 
economics are discussed.
The roots of the modern concept of the interaction of law and economics can 
be traced back to Adam Smith, who presented the first important analysis of the 
functioning of the markets.103 An important philosopher of legal-economic issues was 
Jeremy Bentham, who saw human nature as rational and motivated by self-interest. Of 
European thinkers, Max Weber was interested in the interaction between the economy 
and society. However, it is justified to say that the law and economics –school of 
thought is mainly North American.
The start of modern law and economics is mainly attributed to the works of Ronald H. 
Coase and Guido Calabresi.104 One of the most famous representatives of the economic 
analysis of law is Richard A. Posner, who is commonly regarded as a representative of 
the Chicago school.105 An important figure is also Milton Friedman, who is a strong 
critic of government intervention and has also adapted a strict methodological view 
concerning positive microeconomics.106 – Although in the Nordic countries Law and 
Economics –studies are a fairly recent phenomenon, the tradition of Scandinavian 
Realism was interested in the dichotomy of law and power. Some of those studies 
identified similar interaction in terms of law and power, as is discussed in terms of law 
and economics.107 Kalle Määttä, Pekka Timonen, Vesa Kanniainen, Mikko Välimäki, 
and Max Oker-Blom have applied law and economics in various areas, such as 
environmental law, tax law, copyright, patent and criminal law, and innovation related 
regulations.108
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The school of law and economics has its origins in the 19th century American legal 
realism, which started by opposing the then dominating legal formalism.109 The realism 
school saw that law is not a self-sufficient logical science, and that scholars should not 
seek to be self-sufficient but to understand the social ends that the law necessarily 
serves. The realists had an instrumentalist view of the law and recognized the interaction 
of legal decisions and economic changes. The amendments in law are more often than 
not consequences of changes in economic conditions and thinking.110
The law and economics school is often seen as polarized between the Chicago school 
and its alternatives – the main alternative being the institutionalist school. The Chicago 
school is described as representing “the mainstream law and economics”, with the 
intention of recognizing and analyzing the economic effects of legislation on the 
basis of the efficiency analysis of the economy. One of the core assumptions is that 
legislation has negative effects on economic efficiency if and when it obstructs the 
allocation of resources to the most efficient use, that is, to those who value these 
resources the most. Another core assumption is the supremacy of the free market 
economy, which assumption is based on the neo-classic economic science. The parties 
operating in the market are assumed to be rational, fully informed and equal, among 
which the interaction always leads to optimal results.111
The Chicago approach might also be described as a straightforward application of 
microeconomic or price-theoretic analysis to the law. Individuals are rational maximizers 
of their satisfactions in their non-market as well as market behavior, individuals respond 
to price incentives in non-market as well as market behavior, and legal rules and legal 
outcomes can be assessed on the basic of their efficiency properties. According to 
Posner, economics is the study of rational behavior under the condition, that there 
exists a scarcity of resources in relation to demand.112 “Economics is a great simplifier 
of law.”113
The institutionalist school has its roots in the German tradition of the economy as 
public economy, and emphasizes the importance of the role of the state rather than 
the “invisible hand” of the market. The research method typical of the institutionalists 
has been described by Warren J. Samuels in the previously quoted manner.114
“What is going on” crystallizes the dynamic approach: what is the status right now is 
important in the traditional legal-economic analysis, but where we are coming from 
and whereto going, is the essence of a study of the dynamics of change. - If Chicago 
is for deduction, the prime argument being efficiency, the institutionalists are for 
induction.115 Chicago school looks for a good theory, and has to set limiting factors, 
whereas the institutionalists are looking for good descriptions, and not attempting to 
reveal the “laws of nature” with regard to the legal-economic sphere.
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The Chicago school limits its studies as a rule to rational behavior, perfect competition 
and symmetric distribution of information between the parties, whereas the 
institutionalist school recognizes opportunistic behavior, imperfect competition and 
asymmetric distribution of information. The institutionalist might say, there is no way 
one can prove that efficiency is the most important let alone the sole value in legal-
economic studies or decision-making. Rights do not exist because they are efficient 
or rational, or make sense, but because they are upheld by the government. Not only 
“price-taking”, but also “rights-taking” are important.116
Probably the most famous representative of the institutionalist approach, Douglass 
C. North, sees that the main difference of the method in comparison to neo-classical 
economics is to study actual – not hypothetical – behavior:117
“Put simply, what has been missing is an understanding of the nature of human 
coordination and cooperation.”
Domeij criticises the traditional model approach of the law and economics, and 
concludes that measuring individual gains against the community (or monopolistic) 
losses of the community is not comprehensible.118 In his study concerning pharmaceutical 
patents, Domeij has also chosen a different approach, studying the effects of possible 
alternative allocations of resources, and whether they are based on agreement or 
hierarchy.119
The neo- institutionalist school shares the basic assumption of the importance of the 
interaction between the legal system and the economy, but the belief in the ideal 
nature of the free market is not as widely shared as within the mainstream law and 
economics. Regulation is seen as necessary to ensure the functioning and security of 
the market. The efficiency analysis is just one tool to be used in the analysis, along 
with consideration of the parties’ interests and general arguments on justification and 
fairness. The goal is not only a search for the most efficient solution, but a broader 
analysis of the markets and the interdependencies of law and the economy.120
Mercuro and Medema see as the “building blocks” of the neo-institutionalist agenda, 
the following: first, the individuals are assumed to rationally pursue self-interest, subject 
to constraint. These include the definition (as well as existence) of property rights and 
transaction costs, as well as the recognition of the limited computational capacity of 
the human mind. The second building block is the idea of wealth maximization, the 
search for institutional structures that enhance society’s wealth-producing capacity.121
Public choice theory may be defined as the economic analysis of non-market decision-
making, including political decision-making.122 Public choice –school is concentrating 
to the explanation and understanding of the legislation process and the choices of the 
legislator.123 The legislator, who could also be observed as “a politician”, is seen as a 
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rational maximizer of self-interest, whose primary goal is to ensure the continuation of 
his own position. To preserve the position, the politician must work for the goals and 
needs of his support- and reference group. Other participants in the legislation process 
share these same basic drives, position, power, and economic benefits. At the centre 
stage is also the rational ignorance of the voter.124
The homo economicus –branch of public choice theory is also interested in examining 
the economic consequences of bureaucratic decision-making. Bureaucrat fills in the 
gaps of legislation. Public choice theory also looks at the interrelationship among the 
bureaus of the government, bureaucracy and the surrounding special interest groups, 
and bureaucracy and the legislature.125 
I.5.2. Coase’s Concept of Rights
In his ground-breaking article ”The Problem of Social Cost” Coase discusses the actions 
of business firms that have harmful effects on others.126 According to Coase, the 
traditionally suggested courses of action - the company causing the harm compensating 
for the harm - usually lead to undesirable results.127 Coase argues, that in a situation 
where the transaction costs of the parties are assumed to be zero, the parties will 
reach the optimal result, which maximizes the value of production, independently of 
the legal positions.
Basically, the party causing the harm (A) will compensate the other (B) for the loss 
of production, or alternatively, B will pay for A to limit or cease the harmful activity. 
The result depends on the value of the activity to the parties. As a starting point, the 
one who values his activity most compensates the other – and this leads to a maximal 
utilization of the resource.
Coase is naturally discussing an ”ideal” case, in which several assumptions and limitations 
are made, starting from zero transaction costs. These restrict the applicability of the 
ideas to practical circumstances. In this ideal case, arguably, the original organization of 
rights has no effect in relation to the optimal economic outcome. From these starting 
points he is able to claim, ”the reasoning employed by the courts in determining legal 
rights will often seem strange to an economist because many of the factors on which 
the decision turns are, to an economist, irrelevant.”128
I.5.3. The Role of Rights in the Economic System
If the economic optimum is not dependent on the rights’ position, are rights then 
irrelevant? If so, why are rights sought however, and companies and other interest 
parties are lobbying heavily to obtain new rights and stop competitors or counter 
parties from getting any? Why do states grant rights to some but not to others? What 
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do they represent in the economic context, other than exceptions to the otherwise 
sound economic theory?
According to Posner, the creation of individual property rights is a necessary rather 
than a sufficient condition for the efficient use of resources: the rights must also 
be transferable, since efficiency requires a mechanism by which a property can be 
transferred to more productive use.129 According to Domeij, via market exchanges, a 
decentralized form of coordination is achieved. “The combination of property rights 
and the opportunities to contract about those property rights reduces the need for a 
centralized authority coordinating activities”.130 
Property rights are usually described as containing three basic elements: exclusivity, 
transferability, and enforceability.131 A right means a right to do something with the 
property, and the right to stop others from doing something that infringes the property 
right. Self-evidently, a right does not require that the owner of the right has to use the 
right rationally. Should however this claimed irrationality bring about greater conflicts, 
as in the case of monopolistic behavior (misuse of dominant position), society is usually 
equipped with the means to enforce counterbalancing measures.132 Even property 
right as a human right may come second compared to the interests of free market 
competition.133 – Rahnasto bases his policy suggestions for limiting exclusivity on three 
conditions: lack of competition in licensing, non-negotiable allocation effects, and 
transaction costs combined with the irrationality of private behavior (italics MH).134
From a practical point of view – which admittedly is an unfair basis for criticism of 
Coase’s theoretical approach – it seems that Coase is an advocate of the transferability 
of rights, and sees the role of rights from this perspective: enhancing transactions. 
He seems to think – and this is one of the core arguments of his essay - that court 
decisions do not sufficiently take this possibility into account. This is however where 
individual immunity and economic efficiency conflict: nobody is under any obligation 
to sell his right in order to maintain efficient resource allocation.
This is why the conflicts may escalate into full-scale court cases. The parties do not 
accept efficient solutions for several reasons – emotion, principles, subjective valuation 
– and see a lower risk in a court case than in free handling, conditioned by the market. 
In the terminology of North, we could talk of “mental models”, which may be incorrect 
or not corresponding to the (economic) facts.135 A court case may even be a part of the 
negotiation process, to get a “benchmark” for the contemplated agreement.
Coase draws attention to the fact that although we speak of ”owning land” and 
using it as a factor of production, the more precise analysis is that the land-owner in 
fact possesses the right to carry out a circumscribed list of actions. These rights are 
not unlimited. It may be possible to exclude some people from using his land, but not 
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necessarily all. The building right may be limited, or the choice of crops or drainage 
system:136
”If factors of production are thought of as rights, it becomes easier to 
understand that the right to do something which has a harmful effect (such 
as the creation of smoke, noise, smells, etc.) is also a factor of production. (...) 
The cost of exercising a right (of using a factor of production) is always the loss 
which is suffered elsewhere in consequence of the exercise of that right – the 
inability to cross the land, to park a car, to build a house, to enjoy a view, to 
have peace and quiet or to breathe clean air.”137
To conclude, it seems justified to say that rights are important in Coase’s analysis 
because a system of transactions necessarily requires the definition of rights in order 
to be an enforceable system and therefore to lay down the cornerstone of the market 
economy.138 The market mechanism is necessary for efficient resource allocation.
According to Demsetz, on a general level, it is impossible not to have a property rights 
system:139
“Those who speak of abolishing the property rights system make no sense 
unless what they really mean is abolishing private property rights in favor of 
state property or vice versa (…)”
Concerning copyright, in particular, rights with their background nature on intrinsic 
values – like the moral rights in the international copyright system – provide a challenge 
to the market economy, due to their non-assignable nature. In copyright, the right of 
paternity may not normally be assigned, and the same largely applies to the right 
of respect. The market for the transaction of these rights may be formed, but will 
probably be a difficult and long process. Therefore, human rights as a whole provide a 
challenge to law and economics, due to their personal and non-assignable nature.140
I.5.4. The Individual Parties’ Point of View in Coase’s Context
Critics of Coase have pointed out that the assumptions of transparent information, zero 
transaction costs, and the lack of strategic behavior in negotiations, are assumptions 
remote to the economic practice.141 This remark is both relevant and slightly unfair, as 
Coase does not attempt to discuss real circumstances. However, in this study we shall 
briefly evaluate the basic standing point of the Coase theorem from an additional 
(critical) point of view, that is, what is the role of rights in transactions from the 
parties’ game-theoretical point of view. First of all, it seems that the point Coase is 
making applies very well to a situation where a lesser economic interest is protected 
by law against a greater economic interest. The role of rights even in this situation is 
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not necessarily irrelevant, as the popular interpretation of the Coase theorem would 
suggest.142 But if the situation is the opposite, will the result be different?
Coase gives an indication of the problem in his article sections III (“The Pricing 
System with Liability for Damage”) and IV (“The Pricing System with No Liability for 
Damage”)143, discussing the damage issue of raising cattle and cultivating land. Coase 
argues that both cases (liability or no liability) provide the same ultimate result.144 The 
rationale of the former paragraph (liability of the rancher) is the following:
“I think it is clear that if the cattle-raiser is liable for damage caused and the 
pricing system works smoothly, the reduction in the value of production 
elsewhere (emphasis: MH) will be taken into account in computing the 
additional cost involved in the increasing of the size of the herd.” 
In the second paragraph, there is, however, a reservation as to the symmetry of the 
situation (no liability for the rancher):
“(…) the farmer would only be willing to pay this sum if it did not reduce his 
earnings to a level that would cause him to abandon cultivation (emphasis: MH) 
of this particular tract of land.”
Therefore, it seems at least initially that the situations are different judging from the 
parties’ level: whereas in the first case the farmer is entitled to receive full compensation 
for the loss of production, in the latter case, he suffers either the additional cost of 
maintaining the production (paying the cattle herder to reduce his activity) or the loss 
of the production altogether. So, judging Coase’s text from the parties’ perspective, 
the situation is different in these cases.145
As Posner points out, the initial assignment of rights may affect the relative wealth of 
the parties. This, however, does not undermine Coase’s conclusion that efficiency is 
unaffected by the initial assignment of rights if transaction costs are zero.146
As the purpose of this study, however, requires an understanding of the functioning 
of legal rights in an economic environment, we are entitled to make yet another 
comparison of the economic outcomes of different legal positions. 
I.5.4.1. Coase on Coase: A Critical Observation on the Coase Theorem
There are several versions and interpretations of the famous “Coase theorem” 
available. Although not introduced as such by Coase himself, the theorem is based 
on the aforementioned article “The Problem of Social Cost” in which Coase further 
developed some of the ideas already presented in his earlier works.147 The term 
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“Coase theorem” was apparently first used by Georg Stigler who defined it as follows: 
“…under perfect competition private and social costs will be equal.”148 The theorem 
has even given rise to quite wide interpretations as to whether legal rules have any 
function at all.149
Coase himself has returned to the theme several times. In the introduction of the book 
“The Firm, the Market and the Law”, he once again explains the background idea in 
the following manner:150
“I showed (…), that if transaction costs were assumed to be zero and the rights 
of the various parties well defined, the allocation of resources would be the 
same in both these situations.”
Coase continues to present the basic cases, which may be called Case 1 and Case 2:
Case 1:
“In my example, if the cattle-raiser had to pay to the crop-farmer the value of 
the damage caused by his cattle, he would obviously include this in his costs.”
Case 2:
“But if the cattle-raiser were not liable for damage, the crop-farmer would be 
willing to pay (up to) the value of the damage to induce the cattle-raiser to stop 
it (…)”
Coase continues the sentence to the following conclusion, which, however, is more 
complex than it may appear prima facie:
“(…) so that for the cattle-raiser to continue his operations and bring about this 
crop damage would mean foregoing this sum, which would therefore become 
a cost of continuing to raise cattle. The damage imposes the same cost on the 
cattle-raiser in both situations.” (italics: MH)
This conclusion calls for a critical analysis of the situation. Let us assume that the value 
of ranching that does not cause damage is A. The value of the part of the ranching 
that causes the damage is X. The value of farming is E. The ranching causes damage 
to the farmer worth Y.
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Case 1: rancher is liable
In Case 1 the rancher must pay Y to the farmer in compensation for the damage or 
stop the production X. Therefore, his production is worth A+X-Y.
There are basically three alternatives: a) X>Y b) X<Y or c) X=Y.
Case 1a: the value of ranching X is greater than the damage to farming
In Case 1a, the rancher may compensate any amount up to X, and the compensation 
makes economic sense to the rancher in comparison to ceasing to produce X. In other 
words, against compensation of Y and some amount up to X-Y, the rancher is able 
to produce A+X-Y. For the sake of clarity, this position is described here as A+. This is 
beneficial for the rancher, as the alternative – stopping X – would cost more. 
The farmer’s position will stay neutral or improve. The farmer receives Y compensation 
for his loss Y, which equals 0. However, the compensation may exceed Y by (X-Y), 
that is, finally E+(X-Y)=E+. The farmer has in fact an opportunity to benefit from the 
surplus value of the rancher’s production X.
The expressions A+ and E+ essentially mean that the final outcome is dependent on 
the outcome of the negotiation between rancher and farmer. 
Case 1b: the value of farming is greater than ranching X
In Case 1b, the rancher must pay Y to the farmer which amount exceeds the value of 
the damage-causing production X. Therefore, either the rancher suffers this loss, or - 
as advisable - stops X, because the damage Y caused by X is more expensive.
The position of the rancher is that he will reduce his production to level A.
The position of the farmer will stay intact (E).
Case 1c: the values are equal
In Case 1c, the rancher compensates farmer by an amount that equals respectively 
damage Y and the damage-causing production X, or alternatively, stops X.
The rancher’s production will therefore stay at level A+X-Y = A, since X=Y.
The farmer’s position will stay intact (E), in either of the alternative situations.
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Case 2: the rancher is not liable
In Case 2, the value of the ranching would still be A, the value of the damage-causing 
part X, and the amount of damage Y.
What happens if the rancher is not liable for the damage?
To answer this question requires, as with Case 1, the inspection of three separate 
cases: either a) X>Y, b) X<Y or c) X=Y.
Case 2a: the value of ranching X is greater than the damage to farming
First of all, in Case 2a (X>Y), the rancher could continue the production and continue 
to cause damage worth Y to the farmer, since the rancher has no liability concerning 
the damage Y. Concerning the position of the farmer, it is not economically rational 
to offer a sufficient amount to the rancher in order to have him stop producing X. 
Therefore, the rancher’s production value would remain at A+X.
In Case 2a the farmer would suffer Y, that is, end up at E-Y.
Case 2b: the value of ranching is lower than farming
In Case 2b (X<Y), if the farmer wants to stop the rancher from causing damage Y, the 
farmer will offer to pay the rancher an amount (up to) Y. After this, the rancher agrees 
to reduce his production level and stop the production X that is causing the damage 
Y.
The rancher reduces his production to the level of A-X, but against Y compensation, 
which leaves him in the position (A-X)+Y, or A+(Y-X).
Now, since in Case 2b the value of the particular damage-causing part of the ranching 
X is lower than the damage Y, this means that Y-X>0. The rancher has no reason to 
accept anything else but to end up at a value of production A+.
The farmer’s loss is up to Y in comparison to the starting position, and he will end up 
at position E-.
Case 2c: the values are the same
In Case 2c, the rancher will stop production X against equal compensation Y. Therefore, 
he will end up at a level of A+X-X+Y = A + Y.
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The farmer is no longer harmed (Y), but he will have to compensate fully (X), which 
equals Y. His loss is therefore Y, and his final position E-Y. Alternatively, and leading to 
the same conclusion, he could allow the rancher to continue producing X and suffer 
the damage.
Conclusions
Following this logic, it is difficult to see how these two basic cases (liability – no liability) 
would be symmetric. The damages or gains to the parties are not the same in these 
different situations.
Looking at the most obvious cases, where the values of the damage and the production 
causing the damage are the same, that is, Cases 1c and 2c, first, if the rancher is liable, 
he will pay for the damage fully or stop the damage-causing production. Both parties 
will stay intact. If the rancher is not liable, the farmer will either suffer the damage or 
offer to fully compensate the rancher for stopping his damage-causing production. 
In this case, the farmer will clearly suffer Y either by damage or compensation equal 
to the damage, and the rancher benefits A+Y. But were not these Cases 1c and 2c 
supposed to be symmetrical?
      Rancher  Farmer
   Case 1a (X>Y)  A+(X-Y)=A+ E+(X-Y)=E+
Rancher liable  Case 1b (X<Y)  A  E
   Case 1c (X=Y)  A  E
   Case 2a (X>Y)  A+X  E-Y
Rancher not liable Case 2b (X<Y)  A+  E-
   Case 2c (X=Y)  A+Y  E-Y
Comparing the other parities (Cases 1a and 2a, and Cases 1b and 2b respectively), we 
see the same pattern: liability changes the parties’ economic positions. Being under no 
liability to compensate for the damage improves the position of the damage-causing 
party, and weakens the position of the damage-suffering party. Comparing Cases 1a 
and 2a equally illustrates this, as does the comparison of Cases 1b and 2b. 
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This also indicates that a legal right not only has the character of enabling transactions, 
if clearly defined, but it may also act as a protective device against the threat of 
negative economic compromise, that is, ending up at a lower level of production 
value. The allocation of resources does not seem immune to the allocation of legal 
rights. Therefore, on the basis of this example – which however is rather thorough and 
initially offered by Coase - it is not possible to confirm the symmetry of the liability and 
non-liability cases.
Another point raised by this example is that the bargaining that Coase discussed in 
“The Problem of Social Cost”, evidently can only take place when the legal distribution 
of rights comparatively differs from the economic distribution of resources, that is, 
the initial position is not efficient (Case 1b). This is the case, where the law protects 
the lesser economic interest. If the law protects the more important or equal interest, 
there is basically no cause for bargaining, and the legal position can be said to be 
efficient.
Yet another question could be imposed on Case 1b. Is the outcome of bargaining 
really efficient? This problem is clearly illustrated in the example put forward by Cooter 
and Ulen. In their example, the activities of the rancher impose damage on the farmer. 
The rancher is liable for this. If the cost for building a fence would be 50 USD to farmer, 
and the rancher’s cost 75 USD, it is economic for the parties to agree that the rancher 
pays 62.50 USD to the farmer for building the fence, and thus, the surplus or gain is 
divided by the parties.151
But is this an efficient solution? The building of the fence costs optimally only 50 USD. 
The rancher ends up paying 12.50 USD extra simply because the farmer has a right and 
the economic position to demand this, not because this sum would somehow improve 
the overall productivity.
This is also a crucial point for the main themes of this study, as here the issue of 
compulsory licensing kicks in. If the farmer would be forced by a third party, that is, a 
public authority or arbitration board, to accept the compensation of 50 USD instead 
of the commercially negotiated 62.50 USD, the rancher would only pay the actual cost 
of the fence building. Compulsory licensing could therefore be used to fix the price at 
the economic optimum.
This is, however, not the only or even primary possibility in setting the price level in 
compulsory licensing. The compulsory licensing regime may offer the decision maker an 
ample amount of discretion as to whom it may target subsidies or whether, for example, 
only a cost-based remuneration scheme is allowed. Therefore, it offers the possibility 
or risk to provide economically both optimal and in-optimal solutions, depending on 
the point of view taken.152 The application of compulsory licensing reflects a general 
mistrust to the outcome of free negotiations due to the restrictions or inadequacies of 
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the markets or its participants. From the basis of our “party viewpoint” analysis, we 
are clearly able to claim, that legal rights may give ground for such behavior.
I.6. Copyright and Legal - Economic Interaction
The right to ownership of property is one of the most important cornerstones of 
the legal system, and has been widely studied by important classic works of legal 
and political philosophy. The debate is perpetual as the basis of economic production 
develops along with technology, and requires evaluation of the institutional framework 
of economic activity. According to Drahos, during the era of feudalism, the core property 
issue was land ownership, whereas in modern society, the core is the ownership of 
information.153
The protection of property is closely related to the production of goods or added value 
in society. Initially, the means of producing added value and thus improving society’s 
welfare will enjoy a high level of legal protection in any society. The development 
of legal norms may be interpreted and explained in various ways and from different 
angles. But whatever the chosen analytical approach to law is, if the relation of the 
legislative process to the production of economic values is overlooked, only half of the 
story will be told. This is why the interaction of law and economics plays a crucial role 
in studying the legal circumstances of any economic production.154
As a rule, the development of information technology constantly provides easier 
methods for access to broader choice, and at lower price level. The ‘choke point’155 
- or point of control - to protect the incumbents’ interests may be maintained legally 
to resist change for quite some time (e.g. broadcasting monopolies or programming 
quotas), but history seems to indicate that new technologies with broader choice 
will eventually break through. The ability of technology to constantly reduce the 
transaction costs especially related to transportation of goods, and transformation 
costs, has not and will not cease, and will continue to shape the economy and society.156 
Although this “technology optimism” is not completely flawless and leaves room for 
criticism, it is, however, relatively clear that this mechanism of reducing transaction and 
transformation costs is the engine of technological development, and contributes to 
economic development. The institutional framework of course has an important effect 
on the possibilities of realizing the potential offered by technological development.157
Any study on copyright will encounter and identify the historical argumentation that 
favors the strongest possible copyright protection based on an approach emphasizing 
the human rights aspects of copyright. A great deal of idealism based on altruism 
seems to have been related to the copyright legislation and the “mental models” 
behind it. The protection of the achievements of the human creative spirit is one of 
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the noblest of causes. However, when economic production of added value fuelled by 
emerging technological opportunities seeks new forms of legal protection, idealism 
may turn into a camouflage argument for the lobbyers.
Discussing the law, we necessarily discuss enforceable sanctions. It seems that the 
Internet reduces transaction costs related to the distribution of music, and as a side 
effect also enables piracy. Now, is the real problem in this situation the insufficiency 
of law? That is, should the music industry be entitled to reduce their own transaction 
and transformation costs by the aid of the Internet and yet maintain previous prices 
and thus make a higher margin? Or should the industry change course and let the 
customers benefit from the reduced transaction costs. Another point is system-
related: a law that cannot be enforced should not be a law, because otherwise we 
are questioning the accountability and legitimacy of the legal system as a whole by 
maintaining inapplicable laws.
But there might also be a paradoxical problem in the opposite direction: let us assume, 
that the technical means of controlling copyright protected works are the strongest 
possible and as effective as conceivable. Then, what happens to fair use, or other 
related public policy tools? Fair use – or free private use in the European vocabulary 
- has intentionally been allowed by society, as part of its information policy, and also 
due to the consideration of efficiency as to what extent society sees a call for public 
control. But proprietary technical systems might deprive the legislator of the ability to 
control and allow for the free use of information in their jurisdictions.
As discussed before, technological success is mainly due to its ability to bring about 
reduced transportation and manufacturing costs, which enables the creation of new 
business opportunities and new activity in the information goods marketplace. The 
creation of well functioning licensing practices – as part of the institutional framework 
of copyright - has brought success to the content businesses. The Internet seems to 
bring about a new challenge, but is this challenge in fact much different from the earlier 
historical breakthroughs of new important information or copying technology?158 That 
is, are we only once more discussing the same issues, reduction of transaction and 
transformation costs, as when sound recording or radio came about, or when VCRs 
and cable and satellite distribution broke ground?
An important lesson in discussing the interaction of technology and the law is that 
one should not only try to understand the lessons of history, but also, on the basis 
of the analysis, make an effort towards the present and the future, and ask, “what is 
going on” – as Warren J. Samuels suggests – and make an attempt to see, what are 
the central trends in the current development. The power struggle of the information 
economy is global and perpetual, and must be studied critically. This is not possible by 
means of legal dogmatics alone, but requires an approach that takes into account the 
production structures of the information society.
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I.6.1. The Players and the Game
According to Einhorn, no clear definition of a copyright market has ever been stated. 
For instance, market harm may be difficult to identify as the market is all the time 
evolving. Establishing standards for copyright market can be a “tall order”.159
The approach to copyright market in this study is based on the idea of copyright as 
a pre-set negotiation position of the parties. The purpose of the copyright law is to 
affect the balance, either maintain or change, depending on the novelty or maturity 
of the business. Copyright affects through interfaces between the operators in the 
market.
At first sight, it seems justified to say that the main interests represented in the field of 
copyright are the following:
-the author’s/producer’s investment interest
-the public interest, as both the informational needs of the general public, and 
the controlling interest of the political establishment
-the enabling and encouraging of the development of copying technology
-the author’s right as a human right
On a broader scale one might also claim, that the history of copyright has been a 
battlefield of finding a proper balance in the copyright legislation of these partly 
colluding and partly colliding interests. It is not vastly exaggerated to claim that 
technology pushes forward copyright development. We may also use the language 
of Lagerspetz and North, and call these “the mutual beliefs” or “mental models” 
of the basic interests in the field of copyright. The history of international copyright 
protection indeed seems an endless chain of efforts to adjust the legislation to cope 
with the economic and societal issues raised by constantly emerging new copying 
technologies.160
Gallagher divides the market into four elements: owners, secondary creative users, 
secondary productive users, and consumers.161 The division applied in this book 
however concentrates on the relation between copyright holders and productive 
users, which is the main interface for compulsory licensing.
The importance of the technological development to the history of copyright is 
highlighted by the continuous emerging of new technologies, which on the one hand 
have increased the possible usage of creative works, and on the other raised concerns 
on the sufficient protection of legitimate copyright interests. These stages or levels of 
technological breakthroughs may be listed as follows:
-initial stage: live performance, public display of a work, musical concert, theatre
-printing: reproduction of printed work
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-sound recordings: the fixation of musical performance (mechanization)
-photography
-cinema
-broadcasting (voice and image)
-photocopying
-VCR, musical cassettes for copying
-satellite and cable distribution
-the Internet
-mobile communications
In the advent of every new form of communication, the international copyright 
conventions have needed amendments to address the changing reality of business 
practices and the bargaining positions of the relevant parties. It is our belief that the 
game that starts when copyright conventions are changed, fulfills the essential criteria 
of the “Prisoner’s Dilemma” situation162, and is Pareto-optimal from the point of view 
of the players, that is, compulsory licensing from the author’s perspective is better 
than fair use.163
This study concentrates on those changes and their technological impacts, which can 
be seen as the most important and profound concerning the changes of the scope and 
structure of international copyright legislation. These are: sound recordings, movies/
cinema, broadcasting, and the Internet. Others are dealt with on a more general level. 
Mobile technology is discussed from the point of view of possible challenges to the 
existing system of international copyright protection. It is our claim that mobility in 
communications will become a great “integrator” of different, if not nearly all of the 
previous, forms of the use of copyright protected material. 
I.6.2. Some Notes on the General Importance of Technological 
Development in Cultural Industries
It must be emphasized that since the research object is copyright this necessarily means 
studying from microeconomic rather than macroeconomic perspective, that is, focusing 
on the rights holder/user dichotomy. However, some notes on the macroeconomic side 
of copyright and technological development may give some light as to the magnitude 
of the problem area. 
Bengt Domeij has in his thesis approached the question of the overall economic effects 
of technological development. Domeij refers to studies showing that 80 per cent 
of all economic growth between 1909 and 1949 (per an hour of work, agriculture 
excluded), resulted from technological development and not because of an increase in 
the use of capital. Another study has led to the conclusion that after the Second World 
War, research and development has increased the GNP by approximately one per cent 
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per year, this being one half of the average annual economic growth. Studies indicate 
that out of the national economic growth 75 per cent is caused by technological 
development.164
With regard to the cultural industries (broadcasting, publishing, music, movies165) 
and computer programming, studies exist concerning the economic importance of 
those industries in the national economy.166 Evaluations on the general importance of 
technological development in these areas are rather meaningless, as most of these 
cultural industries may per se be claimed to be, in fact, products of relatively late 
technological development.167
According to Towse, the cultural industries are the products of technical developments 
of sound recording, movies, video, television and computers, which are, among other 
things, like the development opportunities of global trade, responsible for the ‘superstar 
phenomena”168, that is, the huge incomes for the “top 100” pop stars in the world. 
This phenomenon has developed as a consequence of technological inventions, and 
their economic establishment in the business landscape. This is also a consequence of 
the globalization of modern media technology.169
How the importance of technology can be approached as a separate phenomenon 
seems to have very much to do with the lapse of time and the perspective chosen. 
Printing was a technological breakthrough in the 15th century, as well as sound 
recordings in the late 19th century. From the contemporary view, they are however 
old technologies with established norms and business practices, and not as much 
regarded as modern technological innovations. Therefore, rather than trying to define 
what is new and what is old technology, it is more appropriate for the purposes of 
this study to discuss the technological breakthroughs of new innovations in their time 
enabling the creation of new business models and finally being transformed into legal-
economic reality.
So, as an initial conclusion, it is quite clear that the importance of technological 
development has been and is immense in the copyright related areas, which stand in 
their present form mainly due to the development of new copying and distribution 
technologies and their interaction with the institutional legal framework of copyright.
As discussed earlier, Schumpeter does not see the pure technological invention as 
being of much importance without economic gravity that is gained by successful 
implementation. According to Schumpeter, the objective of technological production 
is determined by the economic system. Technology only develops productive methods 
for goods in demand. Economics is interested in existing needs and means, and 
may create them, whereas technology is interested in “the basic idea of methods”. 
Economic logic prevails over the technological.170 – A decade ago, neither the Internet 
nor mobile communications were mass successes, and if asked, no broad demand for 
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these products would likely have existed. We may assume that when new technology 
brings about new means of production, the needs may be identified simultaneously in 
the economic environment. 
Schumpeter describes the mechanism of technological and economic interaction:
“The people who direct business firms only execute what is prescribed for them 
by wants or demand and by the given means and methods of production. 
Individuals have influence only in so far as they are consumers, only in so far 
as they express demand. In this sense indeed every individual takes part in the 
direction of production, not only the one to whom the role of director in a 
business has fallen, but everyone, especially the worker in the narrowest sense.”
He goes even further to claim, in no other sense is there a personal direction of 
production. The means of production and the productive process have in general no 
real leader, or rather the real leader is the consumer.171
When discussing the impact of technology on copyright, we therefore necessarily 
discuss a complex field of legal-economic interaction. The evolutionary path of the 
legal-economic system is derivative of the legal-economic policy choices that are made 
over time.172 These are, on the other hand, influenced by business interests. It seems 
that as the technological change may challenge the legal doctrine (that is, established 
market conditions and legal norms), it is the economic leadership that contributes to 
the change of the legal doctrine.
I.6.3. Copyright and its Enforcement
To be meaningful, copyright must not only be transferable and enable excludability, 
but also be enforceable. A right means something that one is able to do (or leave 
undone), and others cannot stop it. Copyright means a negative right to stop others 
from doing something:
“The production of a man’s brains may be protected if, and to the extent 
that, the law will recognize that they are private property. A thing cannot be 
described as property unless one has a legal right to stop others from using 
it, either absolutely or (at any rate) on condition that a suitable payment is 
made.”173
On the other hand, for the purposes of this study, rights are not rights because they 
are pre-existing in some metaphysical sense, or because of some moral conviction in 
the line of “Natural Law” scholars174. Rather, rights exist because they are protected 
by the government.175
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In the early days of print, an individual author could himself to some degree effectively 
control his own copyright, that is, not let others copy his work.176 This was due to the 
initial investment needed, and the possibility of controlling the market.177 However, 
when technological development has enabled copies of printed work to be widely 
distributed, even globally and electronically, the direct control of copyright is lost. 
Technological development thus brings about the need for society to lay down proper 
sanctions for unauthorized copying or distribution of unauthorized copies, since it is 
beyond the author’s immediate control.
According to Ricketson178:
“Collective management will not usually be relevant at the point at which rights 
are initially exploited by an author, for example, at the time the initial publishing 
contract for a book is signed or the initial agreement to commission a work of 
music or art is made.”
It is justified to point out that this – that is, the possibility of immediate control - 
was beginning to falter before the Berne Convention was created in 1886 due to 
cross-border piracy. But the actual mass use issues brought about by technological 
development were only to emerge during the 20th century.
I.6.4. The Choke Point
When the technology for producing copies is expensive, as in the case of printing, 
recording, or broadcasting, a natural ”choke point” – that is, a point of control or 
exclusion - exists179: since the investor/producer controls the investment, and it is not 
easy to introduce competition, there is at least an initial reasonable certainty that 
copyright is effective. The creation of a choke point can either take place through 
technology or enforceable legislation. This becomes the main issue in the execution 
of copyright. “The choke point” is also an essential precondition for the actual 
enforceability of copyright, and provides a bargaining position for the rights holder.
The choke point can be created in basically two ways that do not rule out each other: 
either you control the means of production in a way that allows you to keep a natural 
strong control over your work (“broad shoulders”180; either a technical or other de facto 
control), or the legislation grants you a certain enforceable right to your intellectual 
property, and sufficient means for the execution of the rights.181
When the threshold for the access to the copying technology is low and the price for 
copying is also low, the choke point is lost, and copyright becomes difficult to enforce 
or even totally unenforceable.182 The development of the copying technology has, for 
the past half a century, followed this path, introducing cassette copying, photocopying 
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and later – and most importantly - digital copying. It could be claimed that from a 
technological point of view, the control of the use of the copying technology has 
since shifted towards the user, as if the user in fact today is the investor for copying 
technology in the form of computers and software. The copyright institutional 
framework has had to adjust to this and introduce mass use licensing (e.g. compulsory 
licensing) and platform fees. These innovations are already far from the original idea of 
copyright exclusivity. Also in comparison to the 19th century, the investment required 
for copying technology is today very modest.
I.6.5. Public Good and the Neighborhood Effect
Economists have described the key aspects of public good in a variety of ways, 
including “non-rival”, “supply jointness”, and “undepletability/non-excludable”, each 
referring to the phenomenon that the good may be consumed by any number of users 
without an additional user’s consumption depleting the supply or prejudicing another 
user’s consumption.183 Copyright subject matter possesses this undepletability and 
thus contains some public good characteristics. Once a work of authorship is created, 
the cost to the author of one person’s consumption of that copyright good is zero.184
In earlier economic theory, public goods have been defined also as non-excludable, 
but modern theory divides public goods into excludable and non-excludable. All public 
goods share an undepletable quality, but some are more amenable to exclusion than 
others. In some areas, the costs of exclusion are high, such as national defense or clean 
air. In others, practical, technical, legal, or other means may, although giving rise to 
costs, enable either the effective exclusion from the benefits of the public good or the 
enforceability of payment for use.185
According to Ordover and Baumol186:
“Knowledge (information) is quite unlike any other productive asset because 
of its public good character, with all the well-known problems of such goods. 
Low diffusion costs for the knowledge asset suggests that public policy 
should encourage its widespread use, and hence suggest that there should 
be a minimal amount of property right in the asset. But if the owner of the 
knowledge asset has only minimal property rights, she may not be able to 
appropriate the initial investment costs. As a result, the initial investment may 
not be undertaken. This argues for public policies that make inclusion cheap, to 
the detriment of diffusion.”
The public good character of information thus illustrates the dichotomy between 
investment incentive, and the interest for the widest possible use or access of the 
information.
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Concerning public good characteristics, the role of government regulation is important, 
as the government may try to tackle the recouping of investment versus free access -
dilemma. Milton Friedman has compared different types of highways and public parks 
in a manner that is interesting also from a copyright point of view. According to him, 
covering the costs of general access roads, involving many points of entry and exit, 
would be extremely expensive if a charge were to be made for the specific services 
received by each individual. This high cost would be due to the necessity of establishing 
tollbooths or the equivalent at all entrances.187
It is important to compare this line of thinking to the dichotomy of the platform levy 
and digital rights management discussion. The solution applied, for example, in the 
EU Infosoc Directive188 is to accept the principle of fair use in case a levy mechanism is 
implemented, but the availability of the DRM (Digital Rights Management) alternative 
has to be taken into account. Economically, the crucial question in the future will be the 
cost of these alternative systems. This is clearly a comparable case to Friedman’s.189
If Milton Friedman’s analysis were ‘translated’ into Lester Thurow’s terminology, we 
might start with the notion, that the efficient copyright control requires a choke 
point. Too many choke points however make the cost of control prohibitive, making 
bargaining impossible. In a similar situation, concerning highways, Friedman suggests 
a gasoline tax instead of road tolls, although this method does not allow the payment 
to be identified in relation to the particular use. The lack of the ability to correctly 
allocate taxation provides the following theoretical problem: if taxed gasoline is used 
on roads with a separate payment, the tax should be refundable for this part.190
However, in the case of the long-distance turnpikes with a high density of traffic and 
limited access, the situation is different; the cost of collection is small, and because 
of alternative routes, there is no serious monopoly problem.191 Therefore, as Friedman 
says, no reason exists why these should not be privately owned and operated.192 
This would provide an analogy to the copyright legislation in the early era, that is, 
printing.
According to Friedman, both monopoly and the neighborhood effect – someone 
imposing obligations on others or using their investments – may produce a situation 
where the market does not operate optimally and government intervention may be 
needed to “enforce the rules of the game”.
It seems justified to say that the problem of the “choke point” emerges when the 
technology concerning the dissemination193 of copyright protected works enables a 
wide amount of untraceable individual use and does not allow economically efficient 
means for tracing the use, that is, when the cost of tracing becomes prohibitive. In this 
situation, using Friedman’s example, the government (legislator) is likely to intervene 
and create an arrangement simulating taxation: either compulsory licensing or a 
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friends are somehow unable to coordinate your actions.”, or Mark Roe’s “strong-from path 
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(ibid. p. 19).
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74 ibid. p. 24.
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Schumpeter rejoined academia in 1909. While teaching at Czernowitz (now in the Ukraine) he 
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the Austrian Minister of Finance - unfortunately, presiding over the hyperinflation of the period, 
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by the interaction between individuals and the economy as a whole. 
(source: http://cepa.newschool.edu/het/profiles/schump.htm).
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is the most suitable market structure for the encouragement of technological development. 
Kuoppamäki interprets Schumpeter as stating that technological development is only 
possible in a world of large business corporates. However, Schumpeter’s Theory of Economic 
Development, does not always seem to confirm this assumption, as innovation takes largely 
place outside large corporations. On the other hand, in Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy 
(8th impression, London 1959, p. 106), there is a shift in this direction, as Schumpeter sees 
the “large-scale establishment or unit of control” acceptable as a “necessary evil” inseparable 
from economic progress. See Kuoppamäki, pp. 151-152. – On Schumpeter as one of the 
founders of evolutionary economics, see e.g. Lahti. Gary Hamel is often mentioned as one of 
the most important neo-Schumpeterians. See also Menell p. 134 on Schumpeter. – Criticism on 
Schumpeter, e.g. Määttä II p. 41.
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80 The common perception of “older” Schumpeter is reflected in e.g. Määttä II p. 41 and 
Välimäki II p. 71.
81 ibid., p. 57.
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84 Schumpeter II, p. 61. See Landes – Posner III pp. 14-19, discussion on the possibility to create 
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89 ibid., p. 70.
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91 ibid., p. 87. – As an example of “neo-Schumpeterian” studies of entrepreneurial innovation, 
see Lahti. 
92 Schumpeter II, pp. 88-89. - We may see certain parallels of this thought in the works of 
certain writers quoted above, discussing the dual nature of copyright: the right is not enough 
without the enforcement (establishment). Lester Thurow’s concept “the choke point”, illustrates 
that rights alone without the ability to enforce them are not enough. Drahos and Braithwaite use 
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-the innovation process may be seen to have three levels: invention, innovation, and the act 
of establishment. It is important to distinguish between invention and innovation, as the first 
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economically.
-Domeij has made a distinction between technology-push and demand-pull (pp. 27-28). 
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remote teaching, receiving spoken messages. After more than one century, it is highly interesting 
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the price of a product on the basis of the production costs, whereas modern marginal utility 
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- The theory of concentration – the tendency of the capitalist process to increase the size both 
of industrial plants and of units of control – does not, according to Schumpeter, deal with such 
economic phenomena as monopoly or oligopoly (p. 33). The theory of immiseration, as well as 
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richer, poor growing poorer” (p. 65). – Schumpeter however largely accepted Marx’s result that 
capitalist evolution will destroy the foundations of capitalist society (p. 42), but offered his own 
explanations for this development. Economic progress becomes depersonalized and automated, 
bureaus replacing individual action (p. 133). The concept of ownership becomes alienated (p. 
142). A central element in this is Schumpeter’s theory of vanishing investment opportunity (pp. 
111-120). 
96 Schumpeter I, p. 11.
97 It is not at all inconceivable that Schumpeter’s own experiences between these two important 
books – two World Wars, hyperinflation, bankruptcy – may have led him to emphasize the 
importance of stabilizing factors in economy. 
98 Schumpeter I, p. 99.
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xii-xiii., Määttä – Pihlajamäki pp. 2-4, Timonen I and II, Kanniainen – Määttä, Määttä. 
105 Timonen II, pp. 101-103. The basic starting point for the development of the school of 
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economic development, see Mercuro - Medema pp. 102-104.
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8/2002, 34/2000.
134 Rahnasto p. 114. – Mähönen p. 57 sees the primary function of property rights to enhance 
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135 North, Shared Mental Models p. 1.
136 Coase p. 44. 
137 N.B.: this idea – although from a different perspective - is not too remote to e.g. Peter 
Drahos’ assumption that in the modern production, immaterial rights become more essential 
than tangible property.
138 Coase p. 8. See also Domeij, p. 25, a reference to Bruun on the foundations of the patent 
right: the essential purpose of the patent system is to guarantee an exclusive right, and therefore 
a character of assignable property, on the basis of innovation, which right further enables 
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139 Demsetz p. 145.
140 TRIPS excludes moral rights, see discussion later. See Rose-Ackermann, an attempt to analyse 
moral rights from an economic perspective.
141 See e.g. Riis pp. 37-38. Landes – Posner III p. 34, from a game-theoretical point of view: 
“The problem is that there is never a single price: it is always a range, and each party is eager 
to engross as much as possible of the range for himself.” The concept “transaction costs” was 
introduced in Coase’s early article from the year 1937 “The Nature of the Firm” (Coase IV).
142 Riis p. 37. Einhorn p. 14. Criticism on Coase, see Cooter-Ulen pp. 90-91, who categorize 
the issues of Coase theorem into four mainstreams: the “long run” argument, the “invariance” 
argument (the use of resources is not necessarily invariant in relation to the allocation of rights), 
the endowment effects (evidence suggests that people may demand a higher price to sell a right 
than they would to buy a right), and social norms (that is, bargaining may not be the proper 
approach socially). 
143 Coase pp. 2-10. 
144 Coase p. 8: “(…) the ultimate result (which maximizes the value of production) is 
independent of the legal position if the pricing system is assumed to work without cost.” 
145 Landes – Posner III, p. 35: ”Therefore we do not say that the allocation of resources is 
unaffected by whom the property right is assigned to; such assignment will have wealth effects 
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(…) will not be affected.” 
146 Posner, p. 56.
147 Coase pp. 1-44.
148 Coase III p. 14.
149 Einhorn p. 14: ”(…) disputants could be trusted to efficiently resolve commercial disputes 
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150 Coase III p. 13
151 Cooter-Ulen pp. 85-88.
152 Calabresi-Melamed p. 1089: reflections on the party viewpoint concerning the problem of 
“entitlement”: “(…) the fundamental thing that law does is to decide which of the conflicting 
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153 Drahos, pp. 349-350. 
154 Holyoak – Torremans pp. 12-13: “Through property rights externalities can be internalized; in 
other words, the subject of the right is brought under the control of the owner of the property 
right. These rights will only develop when the cost of this internalization is smaller than the gains 
of it.”
155 Thurow; “Choke point” is a point of control of the use of copyright protected material 
necessary for the functioning of the copyright system.
156 The terms “transaction costs” and “transformation costs” are used in the sense defined in 
North, pp. 5-6, that is, respectively, exchange and production costs.
157 North has discussed widely the problem of persistent inefficient institutions and 
technologies, see e.g. North, pp. 132-133: “The traditional historian’s focus on the Industrial 
Revolution and technological change as the key utopia is (…) deficient because much of the 
world has failed to realize the potential benefits of technology.”(…) “What was left out of 
the analysis was why the potential was not reached, and why there is such an enormous gap 
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158 Hugenholtz – Guibault - van Geffen, p. 10: “It is safe to say that the advent of the sound and 
video recording equipment had (...) the same impact on the protection of copyrighted works as 
the advent of the Internet today.”
159 Einhorn p. 19, 21.
160 Koktvedgaard p. 48.
161 Gallagher pp. 87-88.
162 Prisoner’s Dilemma is the core concept of game theory, illustrating the problem of insufficient 
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163 Cassler p. 251.
164 Domeij p. 25, Menell p. 134.
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vocabulary concerning the inclusion of the cultural industries in cultural policy in 1972. A 
unifying feature of the cultural industries is that at their core is creativity protected by copyright, 
ibid. p. 35.
166 Citigroup Smith Barney, “Piracy in the Entertainment Industry”, estimates the global movie 
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European Economy”, Final Report 20 Oct 2003, prepared for European Commission.
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– Posner II, who see a tendency in copyright literature to reduce the copyright problem to the 
trade-off between “incentive” and “access”.
170 Schumpeter II, p. 14.
171 ibid., pp. 21-22.
172 Mercuro - Medema, p. 114.
173 Laddie, p. 1. Landes – Posner p. 12: “A property right is legally enforceable power to exclude 
others from using a resource (…).”; Their comment on p. 20: “Charging a price for a public 
good reduces access to it (a social cost), making it artificially scarce, but increases the incentive 
to create it in the first place”, may however invite a counter-question, will copyright make 
un-wanted songs sell? – Calabresi – Melamed p. 1089: “Having made its initial choice (on 
entitlement), society must enforce that choice.”
174 On Natural Law, see e.g. Lagerspetz pp. 115 (“Hobbes’ logic and Natural Law Theories”). 
Kant’s theory as a version of Natural Law, p. 120.
175 Mercuro - Medema, p. 116. – On a “natural law” type of exclusivity approach, see e.g. 
Sorvari.
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177 As we shall see in the example of the early Venetian printers in the late 15th century, the 
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178 Concerning direct control versus collective management, see Ricketson II, p. 31. 
179 Thurow, p. 185. – See also Brennan, p. 110: the choke point as a tangible platform of the 
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180 Calabresi – Melamed p. 1091, speak of “large Marshall” and “small Taney” to illustrate the 
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those who pay. However, every good is excludable at some cost. -Non-rivalrous: consumption 
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good.
184 Brennan pp. 100-102. Välimäki II p. 51 (on computer programming): ”The starting point for 
analysis is the economic theory of information. The assumption is that software can be described 
as a good, which is initially costly to produce but then cheap to reproduce. This means that the 
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185 ibid. pp. 101-102.
186 Ordover-Baumol p.14.
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cost” (Coase), and “externality” (among others Rahnasto) seem to be rather similar concepts 
covering the same phenomena; negative effects of economic activity to third parties (society). 
– On the same problem, see also Calabresi.
188 Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the 
harmonization of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society 
(2001/29/EC).
189 Cost efficiency is crucial, but the European Commission Report ”The Management of 
Copyright and Related Rights in the Internal Market”, p. 10, brings an additional perspective 
concerning the public policy goals for private use: “Arguably, the widespread deployment of 
DRM’s as a mode of fair compensation may eventually render existing remuneration schemes 
(such as levies to compensate for private copies) redundant, thereby justifying their phasing 
down or even out. At the same time, DRM’s do not present a policy solution for ensuring the 
appropriate balance (italics: MH) between the interests involved be they the interests of the 
authors and other rightholders or those of legitimate users, consumers and other third parties 
involved (libraries, service providers, content creators…)(…).” 
190 ibid.
191 ibid., p. 202. 
192 ibid., p. 203. – Posner’s example on US water utilities is similar, although places emphasis 
on profit motive rather than practicalities (Posner, p. 40): “In the eastern states, where water 
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CHAPTER TWO: 
The Justification Of Copyright And The 
Copyright Motives
68
II.1. The Justification of Copyright
Copyright justification has two important legal elements, the economic and the 
human rights element. The latter emerged during the Era of the Enlightenment as 
part of a greater philosophical mainstream, and represents the interest to protect the 
work of a human spirit. The economic element is based on the idea of profit motive 
as an incentive for creative work. The profit motive has its roots in the philosophy of 
property and links copyright to the tradition of political philosophy.194
Discussing the origins of property right, Richard A. Posner gives an example of a 
dynamic analysis of the plausible cause of the birth of property rights: A farmer plants 
corn, fertilizes it, and erects scarecrows, but when the corn is ripe his neighbors reap 
it and deprive him of its use. The problem according to Posner is that the farmer has 
no legal remedy against his neighbors’ conduct since he owns neither the land that 
he sowed nor the crop. Unless there exists a defense, the cultivation of land will be 
abandoned as useless and other ways of subsistence will be chosen, such as hunting. 
The example suggests that legal protection of property rights creates incentives to 
exploit resources efficiently195: 
“without property rights there is no incentive to incur these (investment) costs 
because there is no reasonably assured reward for incurring them”.
Here we approach the legal-economic interface; several questions concerning the 
actual affect of a legal right in relation to market power will arise. Should we assume 
that were the farmer an exceptionally strong individual, or belonged to a family 
enjoying respect in the community, would he still need a property right? Or would he 
rely merely on either his physical power or social status, without the need for a legal 
rule to back up his position? If his “property” were to have no economic importance, 
that is, market power, or any expectation of such, would anyone care a jot for his 
property rights whether they existed or not?
When we later discuss the role of rights in economic activity, we realize that both 
the enforcement and the fact that the right has to have factual –economic or other - 
importance belong to the essence of a right. A right cannot be irrelevant. Concerning 
piracy in its many forms, we realize that a right without means to enforce it is insufficient 
to restore a balance. Therefore, the dynamic view of law must be complemented by 
the element of enforcing power. A powerful man can sell TV formats even without 
legal backing.
The study of copyright may rely on several basic assumptions as to the nature of 
copyright. Copyright may be seen as having justification based on natural law, utilitarian 
principles, or economic (efficiency) evaluation.196
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The natural law justification is commonly perceived as inherited from the Enlightenment 
and especially the philosophical work of John Locke, and his idea of private property, 
in particular. The utilitarian tradition is related to Jeremy Bentham. The justification 
based on economic effects has also a long tradition of advocates and is nowadays 
mostly related to the school of law and economics.197
A typical natural law argumentation with a strong human rights undertone might 
be seen in the words of the great Victor Hugo, who may be regarded as one of the 
founders of international copyright protection:
“You feel the importance and necessity of defending property today. Well, 
begin by recognizing the first and most sacred of all properties, the one which 
is neither a transmission nor an acquisition but a creation, namely, literal 
property... reconcile the artists with society by means of property.”198
Utilitarian justification is based on the assumption that intellectual property rights are 
afforded in order to encourage private creativity. This assumption is based on the 
economic theory that any investment requires structural safeguards to protect the 
investment against changing circumstances and against the attack of new products 
and technologies. A common view is that “(…) inventors and authors produce at 
socially inoptimal level if there is no protection and it is socially desirable to strengthen 
protection in order to increase the supply of works and inventions.”199
Economic justifications are based on cost-benefit theories.200 The basic question is, 
whether the benefit from allowing or condemning a particular practice would exceed 
the social costs caused by the same practice. The goal of the cost-benefit theories is 
the most effective allocation of resources.201 The difference to the utilitarian approach 
might be characterized as the difference of the angle: as in the utilitarian theory, 
economic incentive is seen to support individual creativity and thus society, the cost-
benefit theory adopts a “value-chain” perspective, that is, which part of the chain 
should be encouraged for an optimal result from society’s point of view. This approach 
bears some similarity to competition law, that is, opening the bottlenecks of the 
economic value chain.
Economic efficiency is arguably a difficult concept, and the attitude towards economic 
approach may vary greatly even among famous representatives of the law and 
economics school. Landes and Posner202 state optimistically that “throughout (…) we 
shall be examining cases, doctrines, and principles from the standpoint of whether 
they are efficient in an economic sense, and, if not, how they might be changed to 
make them efficient”. This would indicate that such a task is far from being impossible 
or even difficult. Calabresi203 has however a more modest approach: in his list of the 
“myths” regarding tort law and the costs of accidents, he adds the belief that there is 
“an inexorable economic law that dictates the “right” way to allocate accident losses”. 
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Building the Mont Blanc tunnel is not efficient in an economic sense, whereas banning 
prostitution would probably from a strictly economic viewpoint be an inefficient 
solution:
“Just as economic theory cannot decide for us whether we want to save the life 
of a trapped miner, so it cannot tell us how far we want to go to save lives and 
reduce accident costs”.
Although copyright is not about saving lives, it is an area where the balancing of 
different societal interests is necessary. The economic argumentation is an important 
element of this totality, but not necessarily the only criteria.204
The analysis of property as an institution will bring about the game-theoretical analysis: 
it is of importance that the game has rules for facilitating predictable behavior.205 
Lagerspetz has described a game-theoretical example, where the coordination 
provides the best results and the players know it. Lagerspetz shows in a form of a 
calculus, under what conditions the players would be likely to choose a third-party 
solution, basically to avoid transaction costs.206
This study carries with it some ‘copyright scepticism’ since, rather surprisingly, it seems 
that not much empirical knowledge of the actual value-adding economic effects of 
copyright exists. The value of the copyright protected product is created in the market. 
A product can have a zero market value or a huge market value and enjoy similar 
copyright protection. To judge the value of copyright we should be able to investigate, 
what would be the value of the production without copyright protection. Ruth Towse, 
who has discussed the phenomenon from a legal-economic point of view, is critical of 
the rather common utilitarian assumption:
“We still cannot say with any conviction that intellectual property in general, 
and copyright law is particular, stimulates creativity (...) and we still know very 
little about its empirical effects.” 207
In fact, the “superstar phenomenon”208 suggests that copyright has little to do with 
the success of an artist, in comparison to the other elements creating market value. 
“But though much is made of the role of copyright in ensuring royalty earnings for 
artists, the majority of them again earn little from these sources.”209 It is an industry 
where “twenty fail for one that succeeds”.210
Towse states: “It is expected that these (performer’s) rights are valuable to performers 
but the question of “what are they worth?” is an empirical one that no one has attempted 
to answer.”211 Considering the amount of intense debate concerning practically any 
change in the copyright law, this is a rather embarrassing finding. Copyright, however, 
seems to represent at least a symbolic value to the right-holders, especially authors 
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and performers, creating a status that indicates recognition in society.212 Continuing 
our discussion on the example given by Posner, an author becomes a member of the 
copyright family when having copyright. The copyright family on the other hand enjoys 
respect in the community.213
However, from a game-theoretical point of view, if the creation of the copyright market 
as such is an achievement of the copyright law, then the positive effect is evident.
From the point of view of law and the economy, the law provides an institutional 
framework for the market transactions, although does not in itself regulate the levels 
of payment. The intention of the protection is to improve the right-holders’ bargaining 
power.214 As copyright embodies the power to alter the balance between what is 
private and what is public, what must be paid for and what is freely available, the 
economic approach of copyright analysis would be, who gains or loses financially from 
changes in the law.215 - We believe that the situation might be even more complex than 
that, since the changes do not often have a direct effect on the economic distribution 
between different interest parties, but through the shifts of balance in the negotiation 
positions, which have to be “played out”. Therefore, copyright is largely not about 
allocating resources at the level of law, but “pre-negotiating” the legal positions of 
the parties. Whether the result will lead to a different allocation is not directly a matter 
regulated by law, but the reallocation may or may not take place in negotiations 
concerning the actual market power and licensing of the product.
II.1.1. Challenges to Classic Justifications: 
the Fundamental Criticism
The mainstream of the fundamental criticism of copyright questions the necessity of 
copyright as an institution, and has a philosophical background in the tradition of the 
general ideas of property rights and also the criticism against private ownership of 
property.216 As in practical criticism, the idea of balancing legal positions in the field of 
copyright is necessary for this line of argumentation. However, when practical criticism 
concentrates on the economic and business interests, the fundamental criticism has a 
strong human rights tendency:
“A system that requires the violation of other property rights, for example, 
the right to determine the peaceful use in one’s own home of one’s own 
videocassette recorder or to purchase blank tapes without paying royalties to a 
third party, is no system of rights at all.”217
The basic justifications of copyright as a system of incentive to creation were challenged 
in the US Supreme Court case Eldred v. Ashcroft, which concerned the “Sonny Bono 
Act”, that is, the prolonging of the copyright protection period from 50 to 70 years. 
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The argument of the plaintiff, represented by Professor Lawrence Lessig, challenged 
Congress’ constitutional mandate to prolong the copyright protection on several 
grounds, but mainly concentrating on the issue whether prolonging it encourages or 
discourages the development of creative arts and sciences.218
The plaintiff’s case was supported by a line of first-class academics and economic 
scientists claiming that prolonging it did in practice not provide additional incentive for 
creativity due to a calculation of the present value of the added income. The academics 
also took up the issue of derivative works, saying that the market of derivative works 
was harmed by prolonging the copyright protection period. By derivative works the 
academics meant works based on earlier works, whose copyright protection was 
about to expire but would be prolonged due to the legislative change.219
Although the issue regarded the prolonging of the copyright protection period, the 
decision has inspired a wider discussion on a general level, whether copyright serves 
as an incentive in the first place, or whether the effects are mostly detrimental. The 
fundamental criticism is often associated with the “open-source” or “free software” 
schools, and is not building on the traditional copyright of literary and artistic works, 
but rather on the programming community regarding mainly the appropriateness of 
copyright protection for software.
Mikko Välimäki has in his recent thesis questioned intellectual property protection 
from the basis of open-source licensing. Open-source has, according to Välimäki, its 
roots deep in the academic world and stems from the academic practice of sharing 
information without the necessity to cling to proprietary rights.220
II.1.2. Practical Criticism: Compulsory Licensing as a 
Challenge to Exclusivity
Copyright as a property rights system has, however, several variations as to what 
extent, certain activity is within the author’s sole control (exclusive right), whether the 
arrangement of the use is allowed through limitation or exceptions221 (e.g. compulsory 
licensing), or whether copyright contains an element of “intrinsic value” (moral rights). 
This division into three elements of copyright is one of the leading themes of this 
study.
In tort law, a similar division has been applied to laws on economic rights. Although 
in tort law, the starting point is different from copyright, that is, the wrongdoing of a 
party222, a comparison can be made to the distinction of the different types of legal 
rules. This could be illustrated by the three alternatives (property rule, liability rule, 
inalienability) of regulation described by Calabresi and Melamed:223
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“An entitlement is protected by a property rule to the extent that someone 
who wishes to remove the entitlement from its holder must buy it from him in 
a voluntary transaction in which the value of the entitlement is agreed upon by 
the seller (MH: copyright exclusivity). (…) Whenever someone may destroy the 
initial entitlement if he is willing to pay an objectively determined value for it, an 
entitlement is protected by a liability rule (MH: compulsory licensing). (…) An 
entitlement is inalienable to the extent that its transfer is not permitted between 
a willing buyer and a willing seller (MH: moral rights).”
In evaluating the system further, we will encounter the basic logical difference of 
property and liability rules as stated by Landes and Posner224:
“(…) property rights are efficient when transaction costs are low, and liability 
rules are efficient when such costs are high.”
This division is reflected in the logical structure of the copyright system225:
“Rights management can be done either individually or collectively. Exclusive 
rights (MH: “property rights”) are traditionally managed individually by 
rightholders themselves, who license them to commercial users such as 
publishers or producers, or intermediaries, such as publishers, producers 
or distributors. (…) Remuneration rights (MH: “liability rights”) are usually 
managed by collecting societies that function as rightholders’ trustees.”
One of the main areas of interest from the “practical criticism” standpoint is compulsory 
licensing and related issues. As a practical way of seeking a proper balance of interests 
within the copyright regime, compulsory licensing has been seen as an answer or at 
least an intermediate solution for tackling market inefficiencies arising from too strong 
an emphasis and probable misuse of property rights.226 
Closely related to the problem of compulsory licensing is the more academic discussion 
on whether it would be more appropriate, depending on the respective circumstances, 
that copyright should rather be seen as a liability than a property rule.
II.1.3. The Justification of Copyright in the Nordic Tradition
Although the scope of the study is international, and the issues discussed bear no 
connection to any particular national legal system, it is relevant to note some distinctive 
features of the Nordic copyright thought. The broad Nordic cooperation in preparing 
copyright laws has had a positive impact on the development of a more or less distinct 
Nordic tradition in copyright jurisprudence227. The basis of this brief discussion on 
Nordic tradition is Mogens Koktvedgaard’s influential “Immaterialretspositioner” 
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(Copenhagen 1965), which studies exclusive rights granted in legislation, and their 
relation to competition law.228
First of all, the Nordic tradition is based on strong exclusivity, although the copyright 
acts in the Nordic countries – prepared in cooperation – recognize compulsory 
licensing in certain cases. The exclusivity principle is especially important concerning 
moral rights.229
According to Koktvedgaard, the interests behind intellectual property legislation may 
be divided into two main categories: firstly, protection of personal, creative effort. The 
motivation of this is twofold: it has a societal bearing, and an element of fairness: an 
effort must be rewarded.230 
Secondly, intellectual property rights protect the possession of a customer-base, or 
another type of commercial position. When protection of an intellectual property right 
is introduced into law, the formulation of the right takes place in close relationship 
with the nature of the interest and with society’s overall values.231
Koktvedgaard makes a distinction between collective and individual intellectual 
property. The latter represents values (copyright, moral rights) other than commercial, 
while the former is more subject to competition law scrutiny (trademark law).232
As for copyright, and especially the protection of literary and artistic work, the 
foundation is esthetic, “the human experience of the esthetic phenomena as 
particulars”.233 Therefore, in Koktvedgaard’s system, copyright belongs to the (mainly) 
non-economic sphere of intellectual property interest.234
This also illustrates in a broader sense the sentiment present in the Nordic discussion, 
which tends to emphasize the human rights motive of copyright.235 - In the case of 
Koktvedgaard, it is however important to note that he did not study the actual human 
rights linkage to copyright.
II.1.3.1. A Note on the Finnish Copyright Studies
In the Finnish tradition of copyright, the first thorough study is T.M. Kivimäki’s 
“Tekijänoikeus” (1948), which contains broad reference to the contemporary German 
copyright studies.236 Kivimäki, like the Finnish legal system on the whole in the 1920s 
and 1930s, was deeply influenced by German jurisprudence, which had a strong 
emphasis on conceptualism.237
However, shortly after the Second World War, Finnish legal scholars became more 
influenced by the Scandinavian Realism School, the famous representatives of which 
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were Axel Hägerström, Vilhelm Lundstedt, Karl Olivecrona and, concerning especially 
the basic concepts of copyright, Alf Ross.238 The strong Scandinavian influence led 
also to joint preparation of copyright legislation in the Nordic countries.239 An example 
of the turn towards increasing Nordic interaction in legal science is Hans Saxén’s 
“Förlagsavtalet” (1955), although it still had considerable German influence.240
The studies of copyright law in the Finnish tradition have lately been concentrating 
on some – usually one – new or otherwise important technological phenomenon, 
and its legal environment. The increasingly globalizing setting of copyright has had an 
important influence. For the latest Finnish theses with a copyright theme the following 
scholars must be mentioned241: Rainer Oesch (thesis on the protection of photograph, 
1993), Marjut Salokannel (thesis on protection of audio-visual products, 1997), and 
Brita Herler (Internet marketing, 2001; Herler’s main discipline is economics). Ilkka 
Rahnasto (2001) had however a different approach, applying competition law in 
the analysis of copyright and patent law. At present, several young researchers are 
preparing theses on copyright or copyright related issues, such as database rights242, 
digital rights management (DRM), and copyright versus patent or competition 
law. Perttu Virtanen, Katariina Sorvari and Mikko Välimäki published their doctoral 
dissertations in 2005.243
It has so far been characteristic of the copyright studies in the Finnish tradition that they 
have mainly studied the legal environment of one particular means of production of 
copyright goods. The studies describe the technological phenomena and its copyright 
interpretations, implications, and relations to history and economy.
The intention of the present study is however to explore, inter alia, whether common 
patterns exist when the international community adapts new technology to the 
copyright framework. Thus, the nature of the study is not so much concentrating on 
one technological breakthrough, as going through the history of all major changes 
and drawing conclusions from the development in general.244
II.2. The Copyright Motives: The Ideological 
Background of Copyright 
When technology and its impact on copyright are discussed in this study on a more 
general level, the approach is to point out a typical pattern of legislative behavior.245 It 
is not the intention to claim that the actions of the legislator would be predetermined, 
nor that they could be forecast with much precision. It is not the belief of the writer 
that the result of the legislation process can be deduced from a fixed set of premises. 
But there are certain tendencies in the power-struggle of legislation that can be 
pointed out that are present during the discussion on the formulation of the law, and 
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which may be identified from the legislative documentation: the Berne Convention, 
the conference documents (especially the general reports), and legal commentary. 
For the purposes of this study, the “behavioral” tendencies are called “motives”. This 
categorization is done in order to enable an analysis of what has happened and why 
at the level of law, when new technological means of information production develop 
into business models. The purpose is to discuss, in Schumpeter’s words, the mechanism 
of change.246
Lawyers interpret the law, and rarely study a development of a legal institution from 
a dynamic aspect. To make a leap from the legal perspective – interpretation and 
systematization – to a quest of possible invariance concerning the development of 
copyright law, that is, patterns of legislation, is a difficult task and the results may easily 
be proven less contradictory or inadequate.247 The attempt to try to point out a typical 
pattern of legislative behavior is however possible, at least if certain preconditions are 
taken into consideration.248 First of all, it is worth repeating that it is not the intention 
to claim that the actions of the lawmakers would be predetermined.249 Secondly, it 
is clear that the results of a legislation process can hardly ever be deduced from a 
fixed set of premises. But we do believe that there are certain tendencies or patterns 
in legislation that can be pointed out. These patterns are present in the formulation 
of the law, and they may be identified from the legislative documentation. These 
patterns of argumentation could be called “mental models” or “mutual beliefs”, but 
for the purposes of this study, we have chosen the word “motive”.250 The motives are 
simplified categories of most common copyright arguments, that is, they represent the 
mainstream of copyright argumentation.
To formulate a “motives –based” approach to law, one needs two basic elements: 
firstly, there has to be a basic assumption of the core motives of human behavior 
in the first place, that is, a preliminary understanding of the actions of people in 
society. Secondly, on the basis of the first assumptions, a division of the copyright 
main motives is created. This is also largely based on a preliminary understanding of 
the core copyright issues developed during the research process of this study, i.e. the 
experience that the main categories or copyright motives are useful in mapping and 
understanding the copyright environment. The method in this sense could be called 
hermeneutic.251
II.2.1. Bertrand Russell on Motives of Human Action
Concerning the mental models of copyright, a short introduction on the general 
questions of the motivation of human action is appropriate. As the theory of institutions 
as conventional practices suggests, very much of the analysis of legal-economic 
patterns is also an analysis of human behavior under certain circumstances. Bertrand 
Russell discussed the motives of human action in the article ”The Springs of Human 
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Action”, printed post Second World War.252 His starting point, although hypothetical, 
is the following, displaying an idea of ”scientification” of political science:
”If politics is to become scientific, and if the event is not to be constantly 
surprising, it is imperative that our political thinking should penetrate more 
deeply into the springs of human action. All human activity is prompted by 
desire. There is a wholly fallacious theory advanced by earnest moralists to 
the effect that it is possible to resist desire in the interests of duty and moral 
principle. I say this is fallacious, not because no man ever acts from a sense of 
duty, but because duty has no hold on him unless he desires to be dutiful. If you 
wish to know what men will do, you must know not only, or principally, their 
material circumstances, but rather the whole system of their desires with their 
relative strengths.”
Russell divides desires into politically unimportant, and politically important. The latter 
are divided into primary and secondary. ”In the primary group come the necessities of 
life: food and shelter and clothing. When these become very scarce, there is no limit 
to the efforts that men will make, or to the violence that they will display, in the hope 
of securing them.”
Russell continues by stating, that man has certain desires which are infinite and can 
never be satisfied, ”and would keep him restless even in Paradise”. These can be 
labeled acquisitiveness, rivalry, vanity, and love of power.
Acquisitiveness is a motive that has its origins, as supposed by Russell, in a combination 
of fear and the desire for necessities. Russell gives many examples of this and concludes: 
”But whatever may be the psychoanalysis of acquisitiveness, no one can deny that it 
is one of the great motives – especially among the powerful (...). However much you 
may acquire, you will always wish to acquire more; satiety is a dream which will always 
elude you”.
Russell sees acquisitiveness as the mainspring of the capitalist system. It is however 
not the most powerful motive after hunger. Much stronger is rivalry.253 ”Over and over 
again in Mohammedan history, dynasties have come to grief because the sons of a 
sultan by different mothers could not agree, and in the resulting civil war universal ruin 
resulted. The same sort of things happens in modern Europe. The world would be a 
happier place than it is if acquisitiveness were always stronger than rivalry”.
Vanity is a motive of immense potency. ”Look at me”, is one of the most fundamental 
desires of the human heart. Russell offers an example of an Italian renaissance 
princeling, who on his deathbed was asked whether he had any regrets in his life. He 
remembered a simultaneous visit of the Emperor and the Pope to visit his tower. On 
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that occasion, ”I neglected the opportunity to throw them both down, which would 
have given me immortal fame.”
Vanity grows with what it feeds on. ”It is scarcely possible to exaggerate the influence 
of vanity throughout the range of human life, from the child of three to the potentate 
at whose frown the world trembles. Mankind have even committed the impiety of 
attributing similar desires to the Deity, whom they imagine avid for continual praise.”
There is however one motive, which outweighs them all. That is the ”love of power”. 
Love of power is closely related to vanity, but is not the same. Vanity is satisfied with 
glory: it is easy to have glory without power. ”The people who enjoy the greatest glory 
in the United States are film stars; but they can be put in their place by the Committee 
on Un-American Activities, which enjoys no glory whatever”. Power, like vanity, is 
insatiable. ”And as it is especially the vice of energetic men, the casual efficacy of love 
of power is out of all proportion to its frequency. It is, indeed, by far the strongest 
motive in the lives of important men.”
Russell contributes some positive achievements on love of power. Pursuit of knowledge, 
advances in scientific technique, and political reforms, may all be motivated by love of 
power. ”A great general may, like Alcibiades, be quite indifferent as to which side he 
fights on, but most generals have preferred to fight for their own country.”
Other, less important (secondary) motives according to Russell are the love of 
excitement –for example, pleasure of gambling or alcohol - fear and hate, and altruism. 
Concerning ideologies, Russell states ”(...) the ideologies are merely a way of grouping 
people, and that the passions involved are merely those which always arise between 
rival groups.”
Concerning altruism as a motive, first of all, Russell does not deny that altruism may 
exist. Sympathy may be a genuine motive. ”We do not approve of treating orphans 
as they are treated in Oliver Twist”. He is however of the opinion that other motives, 
inspired by self-interest in different forms, are more powerful.254
On the whole, Russell sees that politics is more concerned with herds than individuals. 
Passions that are important are those that may be felt by the members of the herd 
alike. ”The broad instinctive mechanism upon which political edifices have to be built 
on is one of co-operation within the herd and hostility towards other herds. (...) If men 
were actuated by self-interest, which they are not – except in the case of a few saints 
– the whole human race would co-operate.”
However, Russell sees that there are only few occasions, where men can rise above 
selfishness, and many cases where men fall below ”enlightened self-interest”. ”And 
among these occasions on which people fall below self-interest are most of the 
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occasions on which they are convinced that they are acting from idealistic motives. 
Much that passes as idealism is disguised hatred or disguised love of power.”
Concerning the general patterns of legislation, it is important to remember Russell’s 
view on political decision-making:
”When you see large masses of men swayed by what appear to be noble 
motives, it is well to look below the surface and ask yourself what it is that 
makes these motives effective.”
It is easy to be taken by the facade of nobility. Russell ends his ”psychological query” 
by emphasizing the need of intelligence for making the world happy.
II.2.2. The Motives of Copyright
For the purposes of this study, some conclusions may be drawn from Bertrand Russell’s 
essay.
First of all, love of power is an important motive behind all legislation. Also vanity 
is an important part of rights taking, as it informs society of the importance and 
status of the rights-holder. We may regard vanity as an important social factor and, 
in relation to copyright, vanity as a motive is close to Ruth Towse’s aforementioned 
view of the copyright functions.255 However, as love of power and vanity are rather 
general motives by nature, and applicable to all walks of life, we shall not discuss them 
further. Instead, a particular connection to copyright may be observed concerning the 
following motives.
As a basis for the capitalist economy, and thus also concerning copyright, acquisitiveness 
plays an important role as a key motive for copyright legislation. We may call this in a 
more straightforward manner ”the profit motive” of copyright. The profit motive, first 
of all, works in favor of the rights-holder.
Rivalry may be seen in the context of Joseph Schumpeter’s theory on economic 
development. Competition is a strong force and motive for the entrepreneur. Rivalry 
may, in the case of oligopolist competition, even override acquisitiveness when rivalry 
leads to the death-struggle of an industry. Rivalry is, as suggested by Schumpeter’s 
theory on economic development, the key factor of economic development, and 
also a perpetual source of debate in copyright legislation concerning the future of 
various copyright industries. Society (or international community) may decide to favor 
the commercial user of copyright and thus increase competition. This means that the 
legislator’s power is used to create incentive for the copyright user’s business, not only 
for the author. This we can call the development motive.
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Altruism is a suspicious motive: according to Russell, it either rarely exists or alternatively, 
is used as camouflage for other, self-centred motives. Altruistic motives can be reduced 
to economic market failures.256 However, in some areas of copyright legislation there 
seems to be a genuine discussion concerning fundamental human rights or intrinsic 
values. In this discussion, altruism may occasionally work as an undercover argument 
to, for example, profit motive257, but contain also elements that may not easily be 
reduced to self-interest. Examples of these are the moral rights. Intrinsic values are also 
displayed in the discussion concerning the rights of the individuals of the greater public 
in relation to copyright protected work. The important question of whether ”fair use” 
is a right, illustrates this element. We might call this ”the human rights motive” of 
copyright.
Discussion on the copyright users’ (human) rights has developed during the latter part 
of the 20th century, and has currently been especially vocal in the works of Professor 
Lawrence Lessig.258 We may call this the public interest motive, as a closely related 
motive to the human rights motive, but with an opposite end-user perspective.
From the previous brief analysis, we may recognize some basic elements that are vital 
for the purposes of this study.
Judging based on the historical documents and thoughts of copyright scholars that 
form the roots of modern copyright thinking and international legislation, it seems 
justified to say that the copyright legislation is affected by several basic motives. The 
motives represent mutual beliefs among the copyright society of the factors that are 
important in relation to copyright legislation.259 They may also be described as the 
mainstream of argumentation in copyright legislation.
Copyright motives are debated whenever amendments to the legal copyright 
instruments are made. The main motives of copyright are the following:
-the profit motive: the protection of investment, and the author’s financial 
interest
-the development motive: the encouragement of the development of new 
technologies
-the human rights motive: the protection of the author, especially moral rights
-the public interest motive: the adjustment of the rights of others (education, 
freedom of speech, rights of minorities, etc.) to balance the public interests 
within copyright legislation
There may be many equally justifiable ways of approaching this problem area260, but 
this division is to the writer’s understanding a reasonably broad yet compact way 
of having defined the basic guidelines of the forces behind the development of the 
copyright legislation. The division of motives is also needed in the latter part of the 
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study when conclusions and suggestions related to the development of copyright are 
made.
The quote from the Magill case could thus, as a hypothesis, be complemented in 
the following manner (the Magill case, EEC High Court 6 April 1995) (inserts and 
emphasis: MH):
“28. However, the Court of First Instance took the view that, while it was plain 
that the exercise of an exclusive right to reproduce a protected work was not 
itself an abuse, that did not apply when, in the light of the details of each 
individual case, it was apparent that the right was being exercised in such a 
ways and circumstances as in fact to pursue an aim manifestly contrary to 
the objectives of Article 86 (the idea of balancing representing public interest 
motive). In the event, the Court of First Instance continued, the copyright 
was no longer being exercised in a manner which correspond to its essential 
function, within the meaning of Article 36 of the Treaty, which was to protect 
the moral rights in the work (the human rights motive) and to ensure a reward 
for the creative effort (the profit motive), while respecting the aims of, in 
particular, Article 86 (the development motive).”
As incomplete and subject to criticism as this example may be, the ideas of moral 
rights, reward for creative effort, competition, and the overall concept of balancing 
different motives in the public interest, seem to illustrate the core motives of copyright, 
and indicate the applicability of the motives framework as a basic tool for further 
study of the development of copyright protection. Although derived on the basis of 
assumptions, the outcome is relatively clear and even practical.
II.2.3. The Profit Motive – Protection of Investment and Incentive 
to Creativity
The profit motive is an important part of the Western democratic and economic 
system and has been discussed by many leading Western thinkers.261 The profit motive 
in its purest form may be seen as both an interest and incentive to make money 
legitimately.
If we share the Marxist assumption that production is the foundation of society’s 
superstructure, including legislation, we are quite likely also to believe, like Drahos, 
that in the information society, intellectual property becomes the prime resource. The 
intellectual property rights, as rights for the exploitation of information, increase the 
control and trade of information.262
82
The profit motive protects economic interests: either the current income or the prospect 
of future income. The profit motive was central in affording the printing privileges, 
which were given in order to protect the investments of the printers by controlling 
entry into the printing business.
As a logical basis for the profit motive, we might regard the basic assumption of 
Posner that without the protection of investment in a certain activity, the investment 
will not be made in that activity, but will be used in some other area. If a crop is 
not protected, the farmer will turn to hunting. Another assumption behind the profit 
motive is the tendency towards economic efficiency, which is an essential component 
of rational choice.263
The profit motive is also important concerning the need for legal protection of certain 
forms of intellectual activity. One may consider the difference between computer 
software and photography.264 It is not at all self-evident that computer programming 
would easily and logically fit into the copyright system, the problem being similar with 
photography. Both raise similar issues, how to differentiate between, what is processed 
by man’s intellect and what by machine, and the general applicability of the copyright 
framework as a source of protection. As a rule, computer programming is not made 
for any purpose other than controlling and enabling the operations of a computer, and 
thus not primarily from intellectual inspiration, but from a specific order. Computer 
programming made however a quick entrance into the legal copyright system, due to 
its economic importance, whereas the debate concerning photography took decades 
despite the admitted “artistic” nature of the activity.
It is undoubtedly a “matter of immense significance to the economies of many 
countries”265 that paved the way for the protection of computer programming in 
the copyright sphere, whereas it is equally clear that the economic importance of 
photography does not raise important international trade-policy issues.
As an example, the profit motive is present also in the 1996 WIPO Copyright Treaty’s 
preamble, which states that the contracting parties recognize the outstanding 
significance of copyright protection as an incentive for literary and artistic creation.266
Finally, it is worth noting that unlike the human rights elements, the economic rights 
as a rule are assignable.
II.2.4. The Development Motive: Protecting the Commercial User’s 
Business Opportunities
The development motive reflects the need to allow new forms of communications 
and media to develop and prosper in the interest of the media business and thus, the 
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community. This interest may be contradictory to some other interests, such as the 
author’s exclusivity or protection of the markets of some other, older technology. This 
element is however identifiable in the context of the technological development of 
communication and copying means. Usually, the way to ensure that new technologies 
are being widely used, as well as their development, is the active creation of market 
conditions that will boost competition. So, the development motive also represents 
pro-competition.
The core of this development motive might well correspond to the words of 
Schumpeter:
“We have (...) seen that, both as a fact and a threat, the impact of new things 
– new technologies, for instance – on the existing structure of an industry 
considerably reduces the long-run scope and importance of practices that 
aim, through restricting output, at conserving established positions and at 
maximizing the profits accruing from them. (...) But in the process of creative 
destruction, restrictive practices may do much to steady the ship and to alleviate 
temporary difficulties.”
Hardly any legislator would admit to having as a goal the maintenance of restrictive 
practices, but rather, the encouragement of the development of new technologies. 
In the Berne system, the development motive was formulated in the 1928 Rome 
conference in the following manner267:
”The proposal by the Austrian Delegation thus submits to the Conference 
for consideration the system of “compulsory licensing” or “legal licensing” in 
connection with the application of a musical work to mechanical instruments. 
Three arguments are put forward in support of the proposal: (…) the second is 
of a more restricted nature, being based on the supposition that the exclusive 
right of the author to agree to mechanical-musical applications could be a threat 
to or a restriction on the development of the phonomechanical industries, in 
which so many economic and financial interests are involved.
Although the discussion has its roots in the Berlin Conference 1908, the development 
motive received an important place in the language of the 1928 sub-committee 
report. 
II.2.4.1. Creative Destruction
Some of the works of Joseph A. Schumpeter seem to crystallize the essence of 
the development motive. Schumpeter’s well-known theory describes the “creative 
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destruction” of capitalism.268 Schumpeter sees the technological innovator as the 
driving force of economic development.269 
Being an entrepreneur is however “not a profession” and as a rule not a lasting 
condition.270 The entrepreneur is an outsider, without the data for his decisions and 
the rules of conduct that are very accurately known to those within.271 “In the breast 
of one who wishes to do something new, the forces of habit rise up and bear witness 
against the embryonic project. A new and another kind of effort of will is therefore 
necessary in order to wrest (...).” There will be a reaction of the social environment 
against one who wishes to do something new.272
Needless to say, this description is well-suited to the game of legislative change, where 
the interested parties very often represent either those who may benefit from new 
technology or those who may lose.
As discussed earlier, Schumpeter makes a very important distinction between this 
economic leadership – that is, the endurance of outer resistance for the establishment 
of a commercial innovation – and carrying out a mere technical invention.
“As long as they (inventions) are not carried into practice, inventions are 
economically irrelevant. And to carry improvement into effect is a task entirely 
different from the inventing of, and a task, moreover, requiring entirely different 
kinds of aptitudes.”273
To conclude, invention is one thing but to establish a business is from an economic 
point of view (which is Schumpeter’s) far more important. Using the terminology 
of North, technology provides a challenge for the existing institutional framework. 
We see regulation as a necessary, although not sufficient, element for establishing 
the transaction rules for a new business.274 The Schumpeterian ability to create and 
establish a business, on the basis of new technological innovation, and to have an 
impact on the content of the regulation, is often accepted by legislators. This represents 
the development motive.
II.2.4.2. The Control of Competition
It is clear that the early printing privileges were more targeted towards controlling 
competition and creating barriers to entry, than liberalizing the industry in the name 
of competition. Concerning, for example, the Stationers’ Company in 17th and 18th 
century England, the role of the Company was that of a trade union of booksellers, 
who were mainly situated in London.275 It was by then more or less natural that they 
enjoyed a monopoly of printing. The trade was organized into guilds which in practice, 
and also by force of legislation and town regulations, could discipline members and 
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keep out newcomers unless they served a long apprenticeship with an established 
master. - The Statute of Queen Anne 1709 however meant that the privileges were to 
be abolished and the position of the Stationers’ Company was threatened.
In relation to the Berne Convention one might see the first signs of competitive 
argumentation in the context of the 1908 Berlin Revision, when new technology –
voice recording – had emerged and created the need to fit the new way of mechanical 
reproduction into the international copyright system. The arguments in the conference 
in favor of the record industry were very much based on pro-competitive argumentation. 
One of the basic assumptions of this study is that competition issues are likely to arise 
in the context of the emergence of new technologies. Therefore, the development 
motive always plays an important role when new technologies are discussed.276
One could see reflections of the development motive in the WIPO 1996 Copyright 
Treaty’s Preamble stating that the contracting parties recognize the profound impact 
of the development and convergence of information and communication technologies 
on the creation and use of literary and artistic works.277
Ricketson has pointed out concerning the Berne Convention that the middle period 
from Rome to Brussels introduced the impact of the technological development and 
the emergence of new interest groups.278 Clearly, the 20th century early on discussed 
the effect of competition in the copyright field.
Why “the development motive”, why not “the competition motive”? The basic starting 
point of competition law is the prohibition or control of the misuse of a dominant 
market position and cartels. According to modern competition doctrine, the holder of 
an exclusive right, if in a dominant position in the market, must either procure protected 
products at reasonable prices, or grant licenses to third parties.279 The interpretation 
of the development motive in this study is that the legislator intends beforehand to 
dissolve monopoly positions (in the form of flexible licensing practices) that otherwise 
could harm the development of new forms of usage of copyright protected works. 
That is, the development motive works ex ante, whereas competition evaluation is ex 
post.
II.2.5. The Human Rights Motive
Copyright is usually divided into economic and moral rights. Concerning the economic 
rights, there is a rather clear connection to the ownership rights in relation to the 
international human rights instrument. In international agreements, national legislation, 
and legal practice, however, the element of exclusivity is very often regarded as less 
important in relation to the general economic rights, that is, a right to remuneration. 
As an initial remark, we might assume that this might suggest a differentiation of these 
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two elements, although not at the level of the international human rights instruments. 
Concerning moral rights (the right of respect and the paternity right), the connection 
to the human rights system is less clear, and mainly based on interpretation offered in 
different scientific articles but identifiable.280
Remembering the reservation on altruism made by Bertrand Russell, we may however 
note that according to Drahos, human rights guide the development of copyright.281 
Like the profit motive, the human rights motive also contains two elements, which 
may also be, if not in conflict, at least in a “restrained relationship” with each other282: 
the perspective of the copyright holder, and the perspective of society/the rights of 
others. – It is worth noting that intellectual property law has not been thought of 
systematically in relation to the human rights norms.283 Also, the work done by some 
scientists in this area is probably more introductory by nature than conclusive. This is a 
new area and thus new questions have to be asked, even though we realize that clear 
or even satisfactory answers are not yet available.284
The first element of the human rights motive is closely related to the “droit d’auteur” 
as described that is, in the early drafts of the convention texts, which were later to 
become the Berne Convention, and the development of the moral rights, which took 
place subsequently with the general development of the rights and limitations of the 
Convention.285
The Berne Convention 1886 Article 4 has a broad definition of copyright protected 
works, which represent the “droit d’auteur” at its purest form. One might say with 
reasonable justification, that the original Berne Convention of 1886 was very much 
influenced by the human rights motive.
The roots of this motive are in the philosophical writings and legislation of the 
Enlightenment, which emphasized the importance of the protection of the artistic 
work of the human genius.286 Legally, the foundation of this is the constitution 
granting usually both a right to property, of which intellectual property is one form 
of property, and a right to the fruits of an individual’s intellectual work. In modern 
jurisprudence, copyright has sometimes been regarded as an indication or extension 
of one’s personality. This theoretical approach relies on the assumption that property 
as such is a part of one’s personality.287
This motive is closer at hand in the arguments of the copyright organizations and any 
organization representing the individual artists’ interests. Respectively, the more we 
discuss the investments or the industrial importance of the rights, the less we usually 
discuss in terms of the human rights motive.
The human rights motive also has important consequences in relation to the moral 
rights. These are very much related to the respect of an individual work of inspiration 
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in the exact form and manner it was originally intended by the author. According 
to Stig Strömholm, the “droit moral des auteurs” did not appear as a separate legal 
concept before the 19th century.288 By 1880, the French law already allowed such 
distinctions.289
Concerning the emerging mass media, the Berne Convention revision in Rome 1928 
established the moral rights of the author to claim authorship of the work, and to 
object to any distortion, mutilation, or any other modification of the work that would 
be prejudicial to the honour or reputation of the author. The right was limited to the 
lifetime of the author.290
The Rome Conference 1928 decisions concerning the moral rights display the human 
rights motive. - There was some opposition to the general proposal from the common 
law countries, whose copyright laws did not directly protect such rights, but did so 
indirectly through other legal remedies such as the law of defamation.291
A compromise was settled: the protection of the two basic moral rights was granted 
(authorship and objection of any distortion etc.), but the determination of the 
conditions under which these rights were to be exercised and enforced was left to the 
domestic laws of each Union country. This gave the member countries some flexibility 
in their choice of the manner of protection, and the Article did not make it mandatory 
that this be done through their copyright laws.292 Under the Paris Convention (1971) 
text, the author or his personal representatives are entitled to enforce his moral rights 
throughout the copyright period and even after he has parted with the copyright.293
Even the human rights issue has a “dualistic nature”, which will be discussed later. 
Not only the copyright holders’ human rights have to be respected, but also the users’ 
human rights.294 The element comes from society’s point of view, or the rights of 
the individuals who form society. Immaterial property rights are rights concerning the 
exploitation of information. According to Drahos, the intellectual property rights are 
becoming the prime resource in modern economic life. Property in expression conflicts 
with freedom of expression. Intellectual property rights are used by states to secure 
marketplace objectives,295 which may conflict with the information policies and rights 
in a society. This element shall be however differentiated and discussed further in the 
context of “the public interest motive”.
Throughout this study, the human rights motive is seen as a moral or natural right 
principle, as “good in itself”.296 This institutional origin of the human rights motive 
must be differentiated from the practical use of copyright, as the collecting societies, 
protecting the droit d’auteur, have had their share of criticism concerning the sometimes 
rather straightforward adaptation of the profit motive.297 It is also evident that the 
position of the ‘ailing artist/author’ has been used in alliance with other interests – 
the publishers in the early 18th century England in the context of the creation of the 
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Statute of Queen Anne, the collusion of publisher and author interests in the creation 
of the Berne Convention during the 1880s, and the alliance of performers and record 
producers in the debate preceding the 1961 Rome Convention.
However, the relation of copyright to the international protection of human rights is 
more complicated. There seems to be at least four distinct rights elements that enjoy 
protection in some sense, and which bear a relationship to the human rights:
-copyright exclusivity (as a property right)
-right to remuneration (as a liability right)
-right of paternity (as an inalienable right)
-right of respect (as an inalienable right)
As the first one – exclusivity – is in some cases not respected, that is, in cases of 
compulsory licensing, (or extended collective licensing), the absence of the right to 
remuneration is a rare case, and there are basically very few exceptions concerning the 
latter two.
Human rights remain a controversial issue in international copyright protection. Since 
the human rights tradition in general is rather remote to the US system of copyright, 
in the TRIPS agreement, moral rights were expressly excluded. This raises the question 
of the role of moral rights in the present international system.298 However, it must be 
stressed that the nature of the TRIPS agreement is commercial and therefore may not 
provide broad justification for the exclusion of the moral rights from the copyright 
system altogether. - Copyright and the international human rights system are discussed 
later in more detail.
In the 1996 WIPO Copyright Treaty’s preamble, the human rights motive is represented 
by the contracting parties’ desire to develop and maintain the protection of the rights 
of authors (italics: MH) in their literary and artistic works in a manner as effective and 
uniform as possible.299 This is however not part of TRIPS.
For the purpose of our study, it is finally worth noticing that unlike economic rights, 
human rights are as a rule non-assignable.
II.2.5.1. Copyright in the International Human Rights Treaties
The role of international human rights protection becomes increasingly topical 
regarding copyright, since technological change globalizes communications, and there 
is a need for common global justification for the legislation relating, for example, 
to freedom of speech.300 The documents of most substance in relation to copyright 
are the United Nation’s Declaration of Human Rights, and the European Convention 
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on Human Rights. Since the European Convention in its preamble refers to the UN 
Declaration, the Declaration may be seen as a prime source of the norms with the 
European Convention offering supplemental elements.301
II.2.5.1.1. The United Nation’s Declaration of Human Rights
In general, the preamble of the UN Declaration explains the basis of human rights 
protection, which is an essential instrument in order to avoid the atrocities of the 
World Wars in the future by creating institutions of international control under the 
protection of the United Nations. Therefore, it has to be understood that the basic 
problems the Declaration is meant to address are much larger than the aspects of 
copyright, and thus too far fetched conclusions must be avoided.
The General Assembly agreed on the Declaration to be a common standard of human 
rights to all nations.302
II.2.5.1.1.1. The Economic Right
Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association with others.303 
No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property. Copyright is clearly a property right, 
and the protection of copyright at the human rights level may be seen as stemming 
from this Article of the Declaration.
Additional protection is provided in Article 27 (2), stating everyone’s right to the 
protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary, or 
artistic production of which he is the author.
The right to set limitations on the different elements of copyright is very important 
in relation to the copyright legislation. Article 18 of the U.N. Declaration states that 
restrictions permitted under the Convention to the rights and freedoms shall not 
be applied for any purpose other than those for which they have been prescribed. 
Basically, this would suggest a relatively high threshold for any limitations especially 
concerning the interpretation in courts. Article 29 (2) sets an additional requirement: 
“In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such 
limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition 
and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements 
of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society.” Additionally, 
Article 29 (3) requires the United Nations’ purposes and principles be respected.304
As stated previously, a brief study of the history of the Berne Convention suggests 
several cases where economic rights have been upheld as a right to remuneration, 
whereas the exclusivity has been overlooked in the form of allowing the national 
implementation of compulsory licenses for the signatory states.
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II.2.5.1.1.2. The Moral Rights
In the preamble of the Declaration, among others, the faith in fundamental human 
rights and in the dignity and worth of the individual is expressed.305 It is probably 
slightly far fetched to refer to Article 12, but according to its wording, certain elements 
might make sense in the context of the moral aspects of copyright, for example, attacks 
upon honor or reputation.306
A reference to the moral rights is made in Article 27 (2), according to which also the 
protection of the moral interests resulting from scientific, literary, or artistic production 
is a human right.307
This illustrates the many-faceted nature of copyright, containing historical components 
of both an economic and human rights nature.
II.2.5.1.1.3. Potentially Colliding Rights
One of the most important questions of the regulation of copyright is, to what extent 
different elements of copyright might collide with other human rights, and how should 
these collisions be resolved.
Probably the most debated collision may take place with freedom of speech.308 This 
was the argument in the U.S. Supreme Court case discussed below. Whether such a 
collision exists or not the solution in favor of some other human right would take the 
form of a restriction or limitation of copyright in some manner. Article 19 protects 
freedom of “opinion and expression”, and further includes the freedom to seek, 
receive, and impart “information and ideas”. Opinions, information, or ideas may not 
as such be subject to copyright protection, but whether “expression” would also hold 
the form of expression protected by copyright, is debatable. However, in that case, 
we would not be discussing anyone’s right to receive certain forms of expression, but 
rather someone’s (unilateral) freedom to express himself.
Freedom of expression is a classical negative right309, where the core content of the right 
is the individual’s immunity against the state in the use of that right. Right to access on 
the other hand is a positive right, which may require government intervention.
Important human rights, which become important public policy goals also in the 
context of copyright legislation, are represented in Article 21 (1) 310 (right of equal 
access to public service), Article 22311 (cultural rights, among others), Article 26 (1) 
(right to education)312, and Article 27 (1) (right to enjoy the arts and share scientific 
advancement).313 Article 29 (3) contains a general rule of interpretation of the scope of 
rights, stating that the purposes and principles of the United Nations must be applied 
in the exercise of the rights.
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II.2.5.1.2. The European Convention on Human Rights
The European Convention on Human Rights is basically an instrument of international 
law on an individual’s political freedom, not so much economic rights like property 
rights, which are not mentioned in the Convention text.314 In the preamble, the 
Convention refers to the UN Declaration.
Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his 
correspondence.315 Whether unpublished works would amount to ”correspondence” 
is unclear, however, it should be relatively certain that they otherwise belong within 
the protection of private life.316
Everyone has the (unilateral, MH) right to freedom of expression.317 This right shall 
include freedom to hold opinions and receive and impart information and ideas without 
interference by public authorities and regardless of frontiers (emphasis MH). The scope 
of freedoms seems to be of a similar breadth as the UN Declaration, and therefore, 
the freedom to receive information and ideas does not in itself mean a right to receive 
material with copyright protection, as copyright does not protect information and 
ideas as such.318
An important set of criteria for the limitations of these freedoms is given in Art. 10 (2): 
”The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may 
be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed 
by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, 
territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the 
protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or the rights 
of others (emphasis MH), for preventing the disclosure of information received in 
confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.” 
Restrictions may be set on the basis of the protection of the rights of others. They have 
to be prescribed by law and be necessary in a democratic society. The difficulty here 
is though that in the absence of any clear right relating to copyright, no exact legal 
collision may be theoretically examined. 
II.2.5.2. Copyright and Freedom of Expression in Europe
According to Hugenholtz319, there are a number of explanations for the late development 
of European interest in the potential copyright/free speech conflict. There are no 
European Court of Human Rights decisions. Rather than the “utilitarian” copyright 
law of the US, the European droit d’auteur is an essentially unrestricted natural right 
reflecting the ‘sacred’ bond between the author and his personal creation. Another 
explanatory factor is a certain reluctance on the part of the European national courts 
and scholars to apply fundamental rights and freedoms in ‘horizontal’ relationships, 
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that is, conflicts between citizens - with the exception of the Bundesverfassungsgericht 
in Germany.320 
The European Convention on Human Rights does not recognize copyright or intellectual 
property as human rights. On a national level, only in Sweden does the constitution 
expressly recognize copyright. In Germany, doctrine and case law connect copyright 
to the constitution, where the protection of moral rights and economic rights are 
separated.321 Article 14 (2) of the German Constitution recognizes that property serves 
a social function, which provides the basis for limiting too broad copyright protection, 
for example, for public good.322 Elsewhere in Europe, the protection of copyright as 
a human right is thought to be implicit in constitutional provisions that guarantee 
private property, rights of privacy and personality, artistic freedoms, and so forth.323 - 
In Finland, the Constitutional Law Committee of the Finnish Parliament has, in a recent 
statement, emphasized the need to maintain a balance of human rights interests 
within the copyright system.324
Concerning the legal doctrine, according to Hugenholtz, there are several arguments 
against the conflict of freedom of speech and copyright. Firstly, copyright does not 
limit the use of information, as copyright does not monopolize ideas. Copyright and 
freedom of expression are consistent because they both promote speech. Copyright 
already reflects a balance between free speech and property rights, thus ‘internalizing’ 
the conflict within the frame of the copyright law. For this argument, support can 
be offered from the idea/expression dichotomy, the limits to the economic rights, 
the limited term of protection, and the various other limitations and exceptions of 
copyright.325
In Europe, economic rights are generally drafted in flexible and ‘open’ terms, whereas 
limitations on copyright will tend to be rigorously defined and ‘closed’. In the US, 
the copyright owner’s economic rights are narrowly defined, and the exception 
for fair use leaves a wide scope for unauthorized uses.326 Many of the limitations 
found in European laws are inspired by the concern over freedom of expression and 
information. Most countries allow copying for personal use, news reporting, quotation 
and criticism, scientific uses, archival purposes, library and museum uses, and for access 
to government information.327
As a concluding analysis, Hugenholtz puts commercial messages and political speech 
in different categories, where the latter enjoys the higher protection of Article 10 of 
the European Convention on Human Rights. Although “artistic speech” enjoys a higher 
level of protection than “commercial speech”, there is no exceptio artis allowing artists 
immunity from restrictions. The freedom of the press is well protected. Public interest, 
substantiality of the restrictions, the aim of the regulation, and the level of European 
consensus are important with regard to the “necessity in a democratic society” test. 
Where norms tend to diverge nationally, the Court will allow a wide “margin of 
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appreciation”. In sum, freedom of expression arguments are likely to succeed against 
copyright claims aimed at preventing political discourse, curtailing journalistic or artistic 
freedoms, suppressing publication of government-produced information, or impeding 
other forms of public speech.328
The European Commission of Human Rights seems reluctant to accept freedom 
of expression arguments in cases where property rights in information are merely 
exercised to ensure remuneration, and the flow of information to the public is not 
unreasonably impeded: “As long as licenses are made available under reasonable 
conditions, or statutory licenses apply, the European Court is unlikely to find that 
copyright and Article 10 collide.”329
Of the latest development, it is worth recognizing Article 17 (2) of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union, accepted at the Nice summit on 18 Dec 
2000 (2000/C 364/01): “Intellectual property shall be protected”. Although this study 
will not interpret the Charter any further it is important to realize that IPR’s status as 
human rights is quite clear within the European legal framework.
To conclude, it seems difficult to deny the at least partial human rights status of 
copyright. Although the legal interaction between copyright and other human rights 
is unclear, we can however without hesitation conclude that the human rights system 
bears an important relation to copyright legislation, and that it is justified to speak of 
a human rights motive behind the copyright legislation.
I.2.5.3. The U.S. Supreme Court on the Potential Collision between 
Copyright and Freedom of Speech
The U.S. Supreme Court discussed in the recent Eldred v. Ashcroft case the potential 
collision between copyright and freedom of speech. The argument came about in a 
case brought against the state claiming that Congress had exceeded its constitutional 
powers in prolonging the duration of copyright from 50 to 70 years.330 
The petitioners argued, among other things, that the 1998 Copyright Term Extension 
Act (CTEA) was a content-neutral regulation of speech that failed inspection under 
the heightened judicial scrutiny appropriate for such regulations, that is, in relation to 
the First Amendment (freedom of speech) of the U.S. Bill of Rights. The District Court 
stated that no collision exists between copyright and freedom of speech, since there 
are no First Amendment rights to use the copyrighted works of others.
By establishing a marketable right to the use of one’s expression, copyright supplies 
the economic incentive to create and disseminate ideas.331 In addition to spurring 
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the creation and publication of new expression, copyright law contains built-in First 
Amendment accommodations.332
First, it distinguishes between ideas and expression and makes only the latter eligible 
for copyright protection. The Supreme Court referred to 17 U.S.C. § 102 (b): ”In no 
case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, 
procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, 
regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in 
such work.”333
The Supreme Court cited the case Harper v Row, 471 U.S. at 556: ”The idea/expression 
dichotomy (emphasis MH) strike(s) a definitional balance between the First Amendment 
and the Copyright Act by permitting free communication of facts while still protecting 
an author’s expression.”334
Second, the ”fair use” defense allows the public to use not only facts and ideas 
contained in a copyrighted work, but also expression itself in certain circumstances. 
The fair use defense affords considerable ”latitude for scholarship and comment335, 
and even parody.336
According to the Supreme Court, the CTEA itself supplements these traditional First 
Amendment safeguards: 1) library etc. exception for the last 20 years of the protection 
period 2) title II of the CTEA (Fairness in Music Licensing Act of 1998) exempts small 
businesses, restaurants, and like entities from having to pay performance royalties 
on music played from licensed radio, television, and similar facilities. 3) CTEA does 
not oblige anyone to reproduce another’s speech against the carrier’s will. The First 
Amendment securely protects the freedom to make – or decline to make – one’s own 
speech.337 The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
According to Samuelson, in some respects concerning the circumstances, Eldred v. 
Ashcroft was over-determined for two reasons: Congress has already extended the 
copyright terms many times before, and life plus seventy years is however a limited 
time.338
Judging from a formal point of view, it seems that the US Supreme Court adopted 
a systematic approach concerning the potential conflict or “restrained relationship” 
between copyright and freedom of speech as interpreting the copyright legislation to 
represent a balance of the different interests.339 Whether the balance is set correctly or 
not, is another and highly important issue, but the systematic approach resembles the 
point of view of this study and the motives framework.
95
II.2.6. The Public Interest Motive
It has long been recognized that restrictions or limitations upon authors, and related 
rights may be justified in particular cases.340 The public interest motive is a counterpart 
of the human rights motive as it displays almost all “third-party” –related interests in 
the area of copyright. The public interest works mainly not for the author’s benefit, but 
to balance or rebalance the effects of copyright in order not to harm essential societal 
interests.341
On the other hand, in the early days of print, the government had an interest, not 
only to protect the investment of the printer, but also the political interest to control 
the content that was printed. It has even been said with clear justification that the 
authorities in the early days of printing were in fact against the liberty of the press.342 
Another angle is society’s interest in maintaining certain operations that are important 
elements of a free society, like the freedom of the press and news reporting. For 
example, society’s interest concerning important news was discussed in International 
News Service v. Associated Press343:
“But the news element – the information respecting current events contained 
in the literary production – is not the creation of the writer, but is a report of 
matters that ordinarily are publici juris, it is the history of the day. It is not to be 
supposed that the framers of the Constitution, when they empowered Congress 
‘to promote the science and useful arts’ intended to confer upon one who 
might happen to be the first to report a historic event the exclusive right for any 
period to spread the knowledge of it.”
But there have been other public policy goals involved in copyright legislation. Copyright 
law has never been just concerned with the protection and fostering of the single 
creative individual, but other themes have also been significant in its development, one 
of them the educational mission.344 Even the preamble of the 1710 Statute of Queen 
Anne started with the words, “An Act for the Encouragement of Learning (...)”.345
One could see that the public interest represents the basic need of the community 
to restrict copyright protection, or the excessive use of it, in the name of a legitimate 
society interest. The public interest today has little in common with the censorship ideas 
of the early print privileges, but is more vocally concerned about the importance of 
the free flow of information and the press’ ability to use different copyright protected 
sources in their news work. In relation to the potential collision of different human 
rights, discussed in the relation of the human rights motive, the human rights of others 
represent one element of the public interest motive, that is, the users’ right.
It is therefore important to realize that unlike other motives discussed, the public interest 
motive in the sense described above has changed emphasis during the evolution of 
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copyright: from government-centered censorship interest towards interest on the 
users’ right.
In the Preamble of the WIPO 1996 Copyright Treaty, the public interest aspect is 
visible: on the one hand, the contracting parties recognize the need to introduce 
new international rules and clarify the interpretation of certain existing rules in order 
to provide adequate solutions to the questions raised by new economic, social, 
cultural, and technological developments. On the other, they also recognize the need 
to maintain a balance between the rights of authors and the larger public interest, 
particularly education, research, and access to information, as reflected in the Berne 
Convention.346
The interests of the authors versus public interest were discussed at length in the 
Stockholm Conference in 1967, when the three-step test was introduced into the 
Berne Convention. The working documents make a reference to the practical difficulty 
of defining a proper balance between the right of reproduction and exceptions to 
that right. “This is probably associated too with the considerable difficulty of finding 
a formula capable of safeguarding the legitimate interests of the author while leaving 
a sufficient margin of freedom to the national legislation to satisfy important social or 
cultural needs”.347
Public interest has also been discussed in relation to the “minor exceptions doctrine”, 
which is based on the statement by Rapporteur-General Marcel Plaisant in the General 
Report of the 1948 Berne Revision Conference. According to Brennan, this statement 
was not made in a personal capacity but was regarded as an “agreement” between 
Berne Union members in the sense used in the Vienna Convention:348
“Your Rapporteur-General has been entrusted with making an express mention 
of the possibility available to national legislation to make what are commonly 
called minor reservations. The Delegates of Norway, Sweden, Denmark and 
Finland, the Delegate of Switzerland and the Delegate of Hungary, have all 
mentioned these limited exceptions allowed for religious ceremonies, military 
bands and the needs of the child and adult education. These exceptional 
measures apply to Articles 11bis, 11ter, 13 and 14. You will understand that 
these references are just lightly pencilled in here, in order to avoid damaging the 
principle of right.”
The minor exceptions doctrine reflects the public interest motive in allowing exceptions 
under certain circumstances, not on the basis of economic or development interest, 
but on the basis of human rights related public interest. 
Human rights protect the basic freedoms of individuals in a modern society. Copyright 
is protected, in that it contains human rights elements, from two perspectives: on the 
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one hand, as a property right, on the other, containing moral rights. It is also apparent 
that copyright may serve freedom of speech against “chilling affects”.349
Since the freedom of expression protects an individual’s right to receive information 
and ideas, it does not as a rule protect anyone’s interest in certain forms of expression 
protected by copyright (the idea/expression dichotomy). One may with a high degree 
of confidence say that no general right for receiving copyright protected works is 
included in the human rights instruments.
However, one of the central arguments of the fundamental criticism has been, that 
the right/limitation –relation should be reversed; one should rather see the right to 
receive and distribute information as the primary right, to which copyright may form 
an exception under certain circumstances.350 The current logic of the legal system may 
anyhow not be claimed to follow this logic at present stage. 
It seems also clear, judging not only from the basis of the human rights instruments, 
but also based on the historical development of the international copyright protection, 
that not all elements of copyright enjoy equal status as intrinsic values: it has been 
often stated in the Berne Convention that exclusivity might be overlooked by allowing 
compulsory licensing, if the right-holders are granted monetary compensation. In the 
EU’s Information Society Directive, fair use by private citizens is acceptable, if only the 
right-holders’ compensation is safeguarded by a levy system.351 The criteria widely used 
and accepted in the copyright limitations is the three-step test:352 at least initially, it is 
possible to draw comparisons between the three-step test and the criteria developed 
for human rights restrictions in the international human rights instruments.353
Moral rights, as rights per se, without the direct instrumental economic effect, are 
likely to be regarded as intrinsic values, and thus less likely to be adjusted by policy 
needs.
Without hesitation we may say, even with Russell’s reservation in mind that both the 
human rights motive and the public interest motives are central “mutual beliefs” of 
copyright, and it is not meaningful to discuss copyright only from a perspective excluding 
these, for example, from the basis of the economic efficiency calculus alone.354
II.2.7. The Motives and the Purpose of Them in This Study 
The motives introduced above may not always be logically ”pure”, in a sense that there 
necessarily are overlapping areas: for instance, one might point out that the author’s 
interest has not only a strong human rights element emphasizing human dignity, but 
is also of an economic nature. On the other hand, there maybe conflicting positions: 
competition is very much in the public interest, and also in the interest of the profit 
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motive of the entrant, but less so with the incumbent. As much as we appreciate the 
human rights aspect of copyright, freedom of speech and equal access to information 
have to be respected as important societal values with deep human rights interest. In 
numerous cases, the settling of conflicting interests has required compromises and the 
member countries of the Berne Convention have been afforded the liberty to set the 
power balance of the different motives in their national legislation.
As an important example of this, the three-step test for exceptions restricting the 
reproduction right (special case/normal exploitation/reasonable) concerning the 
reproduction right illustrates conflicting interests:355
“It shall be a matter for the legislation in the countries of the Union to permit 
the reproduction of such works in certain special cases, provided that such 
reproduction does not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and does 
not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the author.”
Under these circumstances, the reproduction rights might be limited, for example, 
with compulsory or extended collective licensing.
However, the motives in the sense defined for the purpose of this study intend to reflect 
the emphasis or the main tendency of a chosen line of argumentation in the copyright 
legislation. It is justified to say, that the ‘American’ way of copyright argumentation 
tends to follow the profit motive, whereas the French tradition tends to follow the 
human rights motive.356
We could also illustrate this difference of the traditions with Coase’s requirement for 
assignable rights: economic rights as a rule are assignable, whereas human rights are 
not. This reflects also a basic understanding of the role and functions of copyright in 
these respective societies.
The media and copyright industries tend to be divided concerning the interest positions: 
some argue for the protection of investments, while some favor the encouragement 
of new forms of distribution and the competitive impact of new entrants without 
the burden of too restrictive legislation. Every time a new distribution or copying 
technology takes root, we may see the industry representatives divided: those who 
have their business interests in the old technology and old institutional framework are 
worried that the new technology does not share the same copyright burden as the old 
one, while the new technology lobbyists might say exemptions are needed to get the 
new business running: the reward will come to the right-holders later on. The profit 
motive and the development motive might therefore be in conflict and the legislator 
will have to decide, whether to encourage the new development or protect the old 
investments. In a Schumpeterian sense, the choice is between maintaining status quo 
or enabling “creative destruction”.
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Public interest/censorship has played a very important role in the past, and is once 
again topical concerning the problems of control in the Internet. However, the public 
interest motive seems to be more vocal, for example, in relation to the rights of the 
minorities and the opportunities of the weaker members of societies, as well as the 
developing countries, to have equal access to information and arts.
It is important to note that the rights discussed in relation to the profit motive are 
assignable economic rights, whereas the human rights as a rule are not assignable.
We might illustrate our motives initially in the following manner:
  Person related   Corporate Related
Originator human rights motive  profit motive
  (the author’s right)  (encouragement of 
      creative investment)
User   public interest motive  development motive
  (the users’ human rights)  (encouragement of competition
      and technological development) 
Besides being explanatory devices for the ”mental models” or ”mutual beliefs” in 
copyright, the motives have another important role especially in the lobbying situation: 
they represent copyright stories, that is, the parties’ opinions on the recommendable 
direction of the legislation. A lobbyist has to have a good story. The parties tend to 
express their perspectives using more or less exaggerated argumentation along the 
lines of these motives. The best story gets the legislator’s interest. From the parties’ 
point of view, the legislation game is essentially one-off and therefore represents a 
Prisoners’ Dilemma situation. Society, or the legislation community, has to decide how 
to organize the environment.357
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283 Drahos, p. 370. – See also Hugenholtz below.
284 See e.g. Mylly, Välimäki, Oesch V.
285 Porter, p. 10, on the differences of the basic concept of copyright between the European 
and the common law system: “(...) common law legislations, which are primarily concerned to 
protect owners of intellectual property, rather than the rights of natural authors, also afford 
protection as original right owners to legal persons, such as publishers, movie producers, record 
companies or broadcasting organizations. This wider definition of the term ‘author’ casts quite 
a different complexion on the nature of the corporatist bargain between the intellectual laborer 
and the employer, than that which exists in those countries which define the term ‘author’ more 
narrowly. In these countries, the author’s right is considered to be a human right (italics: MH), 
which protects the intellectual labors of the individual.” The dual dimension of copyright is also 
reflected in the UN Declaration of Human Rights: it is customary that a common law lawyer 
refers to the rights of property when intellectual property is concerned (Art. 17), whereas a 
European lawyer is likely to point out the general right to the benefits of one’ intellectual work 
in Art. 27 (2). 
286 See e.g. Varpio. Drahos, p. 351. Drahos has however important reservations as to the 
relationship of copyright and human rights, which historically is “thin at best”, p. 357. 
Drahos’ skepticism is in our interpretation based on the early censorship drive of the public 
administration. According to him, however the status of the rights of property is uncontroversial 
in international law, p. 359. Drahos refers to Schermers stating that most property rights cannot 
be included in the category of fundamental human rights, and concerning IPRs, these would 
only be “the need-based personal property rights”, p. 360.
105
287 See Garsek on copyright from personality perspective. Garsek draws relatively far-reaching 
conclusions from the personality approach, p. 213: “Napster deprives an artist of control over 
the dissemination of her personal property, hindering the artist’s ability to develop as a person. 
Thus by providing an infrastructure that encourages the unauthorized distribution of an artist’s 
copyrighted works, her personal property, Napster deprives that individual of the ability to fully 
experience personhood.”
288 Strömholm, p. 114: “On ne saurait parler du “droit moral des auteurs” comme d’un concept 
juridique avant 1800.”
289 Strömholm, p. 150. Later, before the 1880s, in French law, the right to communication 
to the public, the right against unauthorized modification, and paternity right formed a 
distinctive totality: “La jurisprudence ayant rapport aux trois prérogatives principales – le droit 
de communiquer l’oeuvre au public, le droit au respect et le droit à la paternité – constitue déjà, 
dans cette période, un corpus assez important pour permettre des conclusions bien fondées.”
290 Porter, p. 5. Ricketson I, pp. 102-103: Ricketson seems to have a slightly different 
interpretation (p. 103): “The article was (...) silent on the question of the continuance of these 
rights after the author’s death, but a resolution in favor of this was passed by the Conference. 
There was no decision by the latter, on whether there could be contractual renunciation of moral 
rights.” 
291 Ricketson I, p. 102. 
292 ibid.
293 Berne Convention Art 6bis, Laddie, p. 585. 
294 Several writers in Finland have discussed the problem recently, e.g. Koillinen - Lavapuro, 
arguing that copyright must not be unilaterally seen as a property right without taking into 
consideration other human rights and the need to balance conflicts with other human rights, 
especially freedom of speech. The writers replace the “laissez faire” freedom as the core of 
copyright with the obligations and freedoms of the human rights system. The writers also argue 
that copyright and its limitations may be reversed in constitutional scrutiny, where fair use might 
become the basic rule and copyright its exception (this would reflect the basic difference of the 
US approach versus European, see below “Copyright and Freedom of Expression in Europe”). – 
The article is part of the debate concerning the expansion of copyright in the digital environment 
and is written from the viewpoint of the expansion of exclusive copyright. Therefore the article 
does not discuss the potentially rebalancing effect of neighboring rights, compulsory license, 
extended collective licensing or platform levy (the terms platform fees or copyright levies are 
also used in literature) arrangements. Also, the US Supreme Court decision Eldred et al v. 
Ashcroft came after the article was published. Tuomas Pöysti has written on the constitutional 
aspect of the technical protection of copyright protected material, “Tekijänoikeuksien teknisten 
suojakeinojen perusoikeusjännitteistä”, November 2002, available on the Internet (IPR University 
Center), discussing among other things the possible contradiction between proprietary 
protection and fair use. - Juha Pöyhönen has suggested, as a token of the constitutional 
interpretation of the copyright system, that “Mein Kampf” should not enjoy copyright due to its 
nature opposing equality (Pöyhönen, pp. 98-99).
295 Drahos, p. 350.
296 Drahos sees the human rights in relation to Thomist political theory, according to which the 
validity of positive law is judged by natural law, see Drahos, pp. 350-351.
297 Porter, p. 6, concerning the Australian and New Zealand’s criticism on performing rights 
societies, “which seemed to have a stranglehold over the terms under which their works could 
be performed, and extracted excessive royalties from any body which attempted to use them”.
298 Brennan, p. 70. – However, the United States Code title 17 Copyright, contains moral rights 
provisions for visual art (§106A). 
299 WIPO 1996 Copyright Treaty, Preamble
300 See e.g. Stoner, p. 11: “The future will be based upon universal notions of human rights, for 
the digital age eliminates all national boundaries with the decentralized nature of the Internet”. 
– Tuomas Mylly has also proposed that copyright legislation must be evaluated within the human 
rights system, Mylly p. 251. See also Koillinen – Lavapuro. The following text is shortened and 
updated based on Huuskonen II.
301 The Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe contains an immaterial property clause, Art. 
II-77(2), stating simply: “Intellectual property shall be protected.” 
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302 The General Assembly proclaims this Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a common 
standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations, to the end that every individual and 
every organ of society, keeping this Declaration constantly in mind, shall strive by teaching 
and education to promote respect for these rights and freedoms and by progressive measures, 
national and international, to secure their universal and effective recognition and observance, 
both among the peoples of Member States themselves and among the peoples of territories 
under their jurisdiction. - Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this 
Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political 
or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. (UN Declaration of 
Human Rights, preamble).
303 Article 17 of the UN Declaration
304 Article 29 (3): “These rights and freedoms may in no case be exercised contrary to the 
purposes and principles of the United Nations.” See also discussion relating to the “core” of the 
human right, as elements outside “the core” being less rigid for regulation and limitation.
305 U.N. Declaration of Human Rights, preamble: “Whereas the peoples of the United Nations 
have in the Charter reaffirmed their faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and 
worth of the human person and in the equal rights of men and women and have determined to 
promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom” (emphasis MH)
306 Article 12 of the U.N. Declaration of Human Rights: “No one shall be subjected to arbitrary 
interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour 
and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or 
attacks.” 
307 Article 27 (2) of the U.N. Declaration of Human Rights: “Everyone has the right to the 
protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic 
production of which he is the author.”
308 Article 19: “Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes 
freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information 
and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.” Elements of freedom of expression 
are also included in the freedom of religion, Article 18: “Everyone has the right to freedom of 
thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, 
and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his 
religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.”
309 Drahos, p. 361
310 Article 21 (1): “Everyone has the right of equal access to public service in his country.”
311 Article 22: “Everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social security and is entitled 
to realization, through national effort and international co-operation and in accordance with 
the organization and resources of each State, of the economic, social and cultural rights 
indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his personality.”
312 Article 26 (1): “Everyone has the right to education. Education shall be free, at least in the 
elementary and fundamental stages. Elementary education shall be compulsory. Technical and 
professional education shall be made generally available and higher education shall be equally 
accessible to all on the basis of merit.”
313 Article 27 (1): “Everyone has the right freely to participate in the cultural life of the 
community, to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific advancement and its benefits.”
314 However, ‘property clause’ is included in the First Protocol to the European Convention on 
Human Rights, Paris, 2 March 1952, Article 1: “Every natural or legal person is entitled to the 
peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the 
public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles 
of international law. The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of 
a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance 
with the general interest or secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.” 
315 Art 8.
316 Art. 8 (2): There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right 
except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the 
interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the 
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of 
the rights and freedoms of others. 
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317 Art. 10.
318 Elements of freedom of expression as also related to religious freedom, Article 9: ”Everyone 
has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to 
change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in 
public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance. 
Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as are 
prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for 
the protection of public order, health or morals, or the protection of the rights and freedoms of 
others.”
319 Hugenholtz, The page number references are to the Internet version available at 
www.ivir.nl. – See also Karnell III, a large number of national cases studied but with conclusions 
not deviating from Hugenholtz’s as to the lack of a milestone case, p. 533: “When human rights 
arguments have had their day in court, as in Austria in a number of cases, it has been in support 
of interpretation of copyright law or in support of political discourse (…), where the author’s 
professional interests were unaffected.” 
320 Hugenholtz, pp. 1-2.
321 ibid., pp. 3-4.
322 ibid., p. 4.
323 ibid.
324 PeV 7/2005.
325 ibid., p. 6-7.
326 ibid., p. 8.
327 ibid., p. 9. Most of these forms will continue to be allowed under the EU Infosoc directive of 
2001, subject to statutory licenses requiring compensation. 
328 Hugenholtz, pp. 14-15. Whether the situations described in Hugenholtz’s conclusions 
are likely or not remains to be seen, but so far the most important conflicts of copyright and 
freedom of expression could be described as commercial rather than political, and the freedom 
of speech has apparently been put in the argumentation toolbox as a last resort (MH). 
329 Hugenholtz, pp. 15-16. A small reservation must be made, since Hugenholtz is basically 
trying to foresee in abstracto, what could be the reasoning of a future European Court decision. 
- N.B.: After Hugenholtz’s article was published, European Commission of Human Rights 
gave in 2002 a decision where, at first sight, the issue anticipated by Hugenholtz, the collision 
between copyright and the freedom of speech would have been discussed. However, although 
a collision between copyright law and freedom of speech existed, the legal issue was that of 
right to privacy rather than copyright. In Austria, a newspaper was not allowed to print a picture 
of a politician on, among other things, the grounds of copyright legislation. Austrian courts 
decided for the plaintiff, but European Court of Human Rights reversed the decision. However 
the problem with any broader conclusions is the wording of the Austrian Copyright Act, Section 
78 (1): “Images of persons shall neither be explicitly public, nor in any way made accessible to 
the public, where injury would be caused to the legitimate interests of the persons concerned, 
or, in the event that they have died without having authorized or ordered publication, those of 
a close relative”. As we see, the issue in this section is privacy, not copyright. The appearance of 
this norm in the context of copyright law seems a national specialty. Therefore, no definite ECHR 
decision on the relation of copyright and freedom of speech is yet available. Concerning Finland, 
the Constitutional Law Committee gave a recent statement concerning the relation of copyright 
to constitutional rights, see PeV 7/2005.
330 Eldred et al. v. Ashcroft on January 15th, 2003 (618). The case was mainly based on the 
interpretation of the authority of the Congress to grant copyright protection for a ”limited time”. 
Another argument concerned the collision between copyright and freedom of speech, which is 
discussed here. Page numbers are a reference to the version available on the Internet.
331 Profit motive (MH), Harper & Row 471 U.S., at 558. Eldred et al. v. Ashcroft on 15 January 
2003 (618), p. 14. 
332 Harper & Row 471 U.S., at 560. Eldred et al. v. Ashcroft on 15 January 2003 (618), p. 14.
333 Eldred et al. v. Ashcroft on 15 January, 2003 (618), p. 14.
334 Eldred et al. v. Ashcroft on 15 January 2003 (618), p. 14. It is worth mentioning that in 
this respect, the UN Declaration or the European Convention on Human Rights lead to similar 
conclusions. 
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335 Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 560. Eldred et al. v. Ashcroft on 15 January 2003 (618), p. 14. 
336 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. 510 U.S. 569, 1994. Eldred et al. v. Ashcroft on 15 
January 2003 (618), p. 14.
337 Eldred et al. v. Ashcroft on 15 January 2003 (618), p. 14. The Supreme Court states, that 
the D.C. Circuit spoke too broadly when it declared copyrights ”categorically immune from 
challenges under the First Amendment”, but in ”this case” Congress has not altered the 
traditional contours of copyright protection. This basically leaves the question open, what might 
be the circumstances under which a collision might appear.
338 Samuelson p. 25.
339 This point of view may easily be questioned from different perspectives of the interested 
parties, but the aforementioned is merely targeted at showing the systemic interpretation of 
copyright norms in relation to the human rights. 
340 WIPO Study on Limitations and Exceptions of Copyright and Related Rights in the Digital 
Environment, web publication 5 April 2003, prepared by Sam Ricketson p. 3. “Thus, at the 
outset of the negotiations that led to the formation of the Berne Convention in 1884, the 
distinguished Swiss delegate Numa Droz stated that it should be remembered that “limits to 
absolute protection are rightly set by the public interest” “. Ricketson identifies three categories 
of exception and limitations to copyright: 1. Provisions that include, or allow for the exclusion 
of, protection for particular categories of works or material. 2. Provisions that allow for giving 
immunity from infringement proceedings for particular uses, e.g. where this is for the purposes 
of news reporting or education, or where particular conditions are satisfied. 3. Provisions that 
allow a particular use of copyright material, subject to the payment of compensation to the 
copyright owner. ibid. pp. 3-4.
341 Berne Convention Centenary, p. 105, minutes of the sixth meeting 1884 conference, includes 
a formulation corresponding of the public interest motive of copyright by President Numa 
Droz: “Consideration also has to be given to the fact that limitations on absolute protection are 
dictated, rightly in my opinion, by the public interest.” Stoner, p. 4: “Copyright law ensures only 
a degree of protection for intellectual property while balancing public interests”.
342 Laddie gives a vivid picture of this historical phase, p. 54: “(...) In the 16th and 17th centuries 
the authorities, far from opposing (the) London cartel, welcomed its activities (that is, discipline 
the members and keep out newcomers, MH). This is easily explained when one appreciates 
the authorities’ motives. They were against the liberty of the press; they feared it would spread 
dangerous ideas, such as Protestantism, or Roman Catholicism, or Royalism, depending on the 
political and religious exigencies of the day. The simplest method of controlling this dangerous 
engine was to make printing illegal save for a small band of licentiates whose activities would be 
easy to watch.” 
343 Stoner, p. 5.
344 Ricketson II, p. 2.
345 ibid., p. 4.
346 WIPO 1996 Copyright Treaty, Preamble
347 WIPO, Records of the Intellectual Property Conference of Stockholm, June 11 to July 14, 1967 
(Geneva 1971), p. 113. 
348 Brennan, pp. 81-82. Berne Convention Centenary p. 181.
349 It has also been pointed out, that freedom of speech is protected by copyright doctrine. 
See e.g. Stoner, p. 4: “The (Supreme) Court (of the U.S.) has held in copyright cases that the 
promotion of the “sciences and useful arts” and the marketplace of ideas are very important to 
a democracy. Thus, the court has protected speech through copyright doctrine”. – Human rights 
in relation to constitutionalism provides an interesting connection between the theories of North 
and Lagerspetz; whereas North (e.g. p. 110) sees the third world countries suffering from lack 
of efficient and reliable institutional framework, Lagerspetz (p. 212) places his hopes on the rise 
of constitutionalism in the Third World countries. This could suggest an interesting link between 
constitutional freedoms and a functioning market, that is, a link between human rights and an 
efficient market.
350 See e.g. Mylly. Lessig applies frequently this approach, see Lessig.
351 See also an interesting quote in Stoner, “Digital Horizons of the Copyright Frontier: 
Copyright and the Internet”, p. 4, a reference to Justice Brandeis in International News Service 
v. Associated Press: “The plaintiff has no absolute right to the protection of his production; he 
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has merely the qualified right to be protected against the defendant’s acts (of infringement)”. 
ibid further: “Copyright law ensures only a degree of protection for intellectual property while 
balancing public interests”.
352 Berne Convention, Art 9 (2) of the Paris Act: “It shall be a matter for legislation in the 
countries of the Union to permit the reproduction of such works in certain special cases (first 
step: MH), provided that such reproduction does not conflict with a normal exploitation of the 
work (second step) and does not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the author 
(third step)”.
353 The comparison was brought up by legal counsel Kristiina Harenko in a seminar presentation 
at Helsinki University on 11 Dec 2003, concerning human rights and copyright. - Concerning the 
precondition for the limitations of constitutional rights, see Veli-Pekka Viljanen, “Perusoikeuksien 
rajoitusedellytykset”, Vantaa 2001. - The limitation preconditions are described by the 
Constitutional Law Committee of the Finnish Parliament in the following manner: (PeVM 25/94 
vp, p. 5; Hidén p. 1171):
-the limitations of the constitutional rights must be based on a parliament act. This also implies 
that it is forbidden to allow a lower hierarchical level for limitations of constitutional rights.
-the limitations must be “clear-cut” (tarkkarajaisia) and sufficiently clearly formulated. The 
essential content of the limitations must be clear in the text of the law.
-the reasons for the limitations must be acceptable. Limitation must be subject to a pressing 
need in the society (painava yhteiskunnallinen tarve). The interpretation of the European 
Convention on Human Rights may have importance (under certain circumstances).
-limitations to the core content of a constitutional right may not be carried out by an ordinary 
act of parliament
-the limitations must be proportionate, and necessary for the achievement of the purpose (...).
-in relation to the limitations, sufficient legal protection must be guaranteed (e.g. an appeals 
court)
-the limitations may not be contradictory to the international human rights obligations of 
Finland.
354 Human rights discussion, although topical recently, is not at all new to copyright, as we have 
seen the historical context of the author’s right. The change of emphasis concerning the role of 
the international documents was illustrated in the opening words of the first plenary meeting 
of the Rome Convention on the 10th Oct 1961. The representative of Unesco, Mr. Saba, stated: 
“(...) a change had taken place in the nature and role of international conventions. Whereas, 
in the past, their purpose had generally been to specify the reciprocal rights and obligations of 
governments, of late they were tending more and more to enforce observance of human rights 
and to define the moral and social standards which any State belonging to the world community 
must perforce embody in its domestic legislation.” (Rome Convention Records) – Discussion 
concerning the balance of interests see in the Berne Convention, see e.g. Berne Convention 
Centenary p. 105, 156, 165-166, 181 and 197.
355 Berne Convention, Paris Act 1971 Art. 9 (2).
356 See Patterson on this division. Whether these differences between the two main legal 
systems actually lead to a very different practical conclusion is an important and interesting 
question, which is however not within the scope of this study. It would however be interesting 
to discuss the case of a ‘bad’ song: regardless of the level of protection or under which legal 
regime we are operating, the composer of a ‘bad’ song always has the lower hand, as the 
merchandise has no market value. On the other hand, both legal systems are likewise capable of 
recognizing ‘good’ songs and preparing successful products for the market. See discussion on 
the ideas of Ruth Towse above, the superstar –phenomenon. This language becomes improper 
when the intrinsic value elements of copyright are discussed. 
357 See Calabresi-Melamed. During the finalization of these words, the Copyright Act of Finland 
was passed. The event raised a remarkably lively debate on the legality of private copying and 
the circumvention of technical protection of digital material. Hundreds of people demonstrated 
in front of the Parliament building in favor of users’ rights. 
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CHAPTER THREE: 
The Development of International Copyright 
Protection Towards a Right to Remuneration
112
In order to further extract the consequences of technological development regarding 
copyright, it is necessary to walk through the main changes of the copyright regime 
and evaluate the content and causes of change.
The following chapter will deal with the main development, that is, the invention 
of printing technology and its immediate consequences, the advent of the author’s 
right, the era of bilateral international copyright protection, and the development and 
amendments of the Berne Convention as the prime source of international copyright 
law. The emphasis remains on sound recording, broadcasting, and re-broadcasting. 
Later, in the final chapter, some contemporary issues on the Internet (WIPO 1996) and 
mobile technology will be briefly discussed as potential sources of present and future 
anomalies to the copyright system.
The amendments of the Berne Convention have been largely inspired by the content 
and structure of national laws of the most important member countries. However, 
because of the intensive globalization of communication and trade, the necessity of 
an international harmonization instrument is a requirement for coherent copyright 
protection. According to Stamatoudi, for example, any attempt to introduce national 
intellectual property solutions severely disregards the new reality and loses sight of the 
precise scope of the emerging problems.358 Therefore, the interpretational drive and 
attempt in the following is not first and foremost national, but international, or even 
global.
III.1. The Development of Copyright before 
the Berne Convention
III.1.1. The Origin of Copyright
Copyright or author’s right as such did not have an institutional form in the Roman 
legal system. Art and writings were copied and sold in bookstores, but as property, 
the results of spiritual work were seen as “res extra commercium”, that is, common 
or public property. Artists were supported by wealthy aristocrats. Roman law however 
recognized the criminal act of plagiarism, publicizing somebody else’s work under 
one’s own name. This was severely punished and also loathed by public opinion, as this 
was seen as a wrong against someone’s person or personality.359
In the Middle Ages, the modern concept of “author” had not yet developed.360 The 
works were either identified by their performer (e.g. the singer of poems), or as a 
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composition of many unidentified authors (The Bible). The art of writing was not art 
of creating, but of imitating the past masters.361
Concerning the development of copyright legislation, it has been claimed that the 
invention of printing technology in the 1450s was the first time it became meaningful to 
distinguish between an original work and a copy.362 In 1455, Johannes Gutenberg was 
the first Western (the Chinese used it 400 years earlier) printer to use movable type.363 
Soon after the introduction of printing in Europe in the fifteenth and early sixteenth 
century, national authorities started granting exclusive printing rights or privileges to 
printers and publishers. The first printing privileges were accorded in 1469 in Venice, 
and 1476 in England. This is widely seen as the origin of copyright.364 The reasons for 
such grants of protection were also basically similar in the respective countries:365
At first, it could be claimed with justification that printing privileges were instrumental 
in the governmental interest to maintain control (censorship) over the content of 
printed works. The new media was ”full of promise and danger to the established 
order”.366 Hand-copying was rather slow for the purposes of quick distribution of, 
for example, revolutionary information, and therefore, also relatively easy for the 
governmental officials to control.
In England, the stationers, who may be regarded as the forefathers of modern 
publishers, were the “chief proponents” of exclusive rights against copiers. They 
created guilds against the “outsiders”, and soon found an ally in the Crown.367 The 
protection against importation of foreign books was regulated in 1534, and the 
Stationers’ Company charter in 1556. The right to enter the market was confined to 
company members:368
“The system of control was equally satisfying to Elizabeth and her Stuart 
successors, who supervised it through the Star Chamber and the heads of the 
Established Church”.
Secondly, it was apparent that the privileges from society’s point of view created 
stable conditions for the industry to operate. The privileges served to encourage a new 
industry. They created “the rules of the game”, which could, from a later perspective, 
be criticized, but which were highly instrumental and necessary for the development 
of the industry.
Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, the printing privileges served the self-interests 
of printers and publishers. Unfettered competition was a threat to the printer who had 
invested in the industry, which was in many cases exposed to intense competition with 
all its negative consequences from individual printer’s point of view.
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Historically the birth of patent law coincided with the initiation of the printing privilege 
system. The first patent statute was enacted by the Venetian Senate in 1474, providing 
the maker of “any ingenious device (…) reduced to perfection so that it can be used 
and operated” an exclusive license of 10 years to use the invention.369 
A preliminary conclusion is that both profit and public interest motives were behind the 
early organization of the printing industry. Public interest must however be understood 
as a censorship interest, rather than the modern “users’ rights” approach which was 
to develop much later. Whether we may see a development motive in the modern 
sense is also questionable, because the interest was to control the competition and 
this interest was stemming from within the industry. The human rights motive, which 
developed later along with the author’s right, played no role in the early phase of 
copyright.
Initially the object of protection was not the printing activity as such, but a work or 
certain works.370 The commercial risk in the activity was precisely that another print 
shop would print a certain work after it was already agreed it would be printed by 
another. The privileges were therefore targeted against both piracy and probably poor 
coordination of work within the trade. Later the privileges developed into general 
privileges, although special privileges concerning only certain works could also be 
granted.371
Concerning the basic themes of the study, it seems quite evident that the necessity to 
create legal instruments to control the activity do not emerge as direct consequences 
of the technological phenomenon as such, but because of the economic market 
disturbances created by the use of the new innovation that is, in the case of the 
printing industry, the losses made by the industry due to too many new entrants.372 
In Venice alone, there were more than 200 print shops in the beginning of the 16th 
century, which created the need to control the entry.373 This was possible with the help 
of the government, which also had a censorship interest.
At this stage, the interest concerning the role and status of the author was minimal. 
Some documents of that era list all the participants of the printing of a work in the 
same category of handcraft.374 One reason for this might be that in the early stages 
of the printing industry, most of the books printed were old, classical texts. Another 
reason might be that this was the age of patronage, in which the authors received 
their chief remuneration and recognition from wealthy, aristocratic patrons rather 
than through the sale of their work.375 For example, because authors could not (in 
England) be members of the printers’ guild, there is no evidence that the company was 
concerned with how a printer acquired a manuscript, although eventually the practice 
of paying the author for the manuscript became the custom.376
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Although both in Italy and Germany, the condition for according privileges was that 
the author had given his consent377, the position of the author was still to develop into 
its present importance during the 18th and 19th century.
III.1.2. The Emergence of the Author’s Right
The first country to expressly recognize the author’s right was the United Kingdom, in 
the Act of 1710 (The ”Statute of Queen Anne”, originally “An Act for the Encouragement 
of Learning”). The Statute of Queen Anne granted to authors and their assignees a 
short period (two terms of 14 years each) of statutory protection for their printed 
books.378 Concerning the basic theme of this study, it is important to note that the 
change on this occasion was not first and foremost a technological, but economic or, 
in a broader sense, institutional. The solution stemmed from the controversy between 
the Stationers’ Company and the Crown.
III.1.2.1. The Stationers’ Company 
During the preparation of the Statute, The London Company of Stationers (publishers) 
was concerned to revive the protection which its members had received previously, 
but which the Company might lose.379 The legal status of the printers was arranged by 
the Statute of Monopolies in 1624.380
In lobbying for the Statute of Queen Anne, the publishers were using the claims of 
the authors for recognition as a vehicle for advancing their own interests.381 Although 
the statute vested the copyright in the author initially, this was an illusory benefit 
because the author had to assign the copyright to a bookseller in order to get the 
work published.382
There were two underlying reasons for the enactment of the Statute of Queen Anne: 
First of all, the members of the Stationers’ Company had developed the concept 
of copyright as a private-law copyright, with a limited function, that is, to protect 
the members from publishing works that another member had the right to publish 
through registering the title in the Stationers’ Register Book. The right was perpetual, 
that is, with no time limit. The Statute of Queen Anne was targeted at “destroying” 
the Stationers’ monopoly. The model of organization and the basic underlying interest 
bear a close resemblance to the description of the Venetian model.383
Secondly, the Licensing Act of 1662, which was the censorship statute in England, 
protected the stationers’ copyright by making the publication of a book in violation 
of copyright an offense.384 Censorship was ended in England in 1694, and the 
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Statute of Queen Anne illustrated a way to regulate copyright without the censorship 
element.385
According to Patterson, the development reflects the two traditions of copyright, which 
are still relevant to modern copyright: the natural law copyright, and the statutory 
copyright. The former reflects the self-interest of the property owner, whereas 
the latter provides limitations to the use of copyright in the public interest, that is, 
encouragement of learning and dissemination of information.386 In the terminology of 
this study, Patterson describes the main dichotomy as being between profit and public 
interest motives. The Stationers’ copyright represents natural law copyright, whereas 
The Statute of Queen Anne is the prime example of statutory copyright. 
The classic cases Millar v. Taylor in 1769 and Donaldson v. Beckett in 1774 provided 
subsequent but controversial turns in this development. In Millar, the decision was 
a success in the stationers’ attempt to restore a perpetual common law copyright 
for unpublished works, which right could later be assigned to the publisher and 
maintained. However, Donaldson limited the common law copyright until the 
publication took place, when the common law copyright ceases, and thereafter, only 
statutory copyright prevails.387
III.1.2.2. The Institutional Expansion of the Author’s Right
It seems evident, that the philosophical works of John Locke concerning the human 
right to property did provide arguments in the copyright legislation. The idea of ”droit 
de l’auteur” goes hand in hand with the human rights tendency of the Enlightenment. 
According to Locke’s thinking, the author had obtained ownership of his work by 
investing his creative abilities in the work.388
The position of authors was changing in British cultural life and they were becoming 
more independent of patronage. The development was similar in other parts of 
Europe.389 According to Yrjö Varpio, the attitude concerning the author – the creator 
of literal works – changed radically from the end of the 18th century in throughout 
Europe. The role of the artist had started to develop from a servant creating short 
poems for varying practical occasions like birthdays or other celebrations, to a free 
poet creating individual and distinctive works of art. The artist had become an owner 
of immaterial capital created by himself.390
The French Revolutionary Laws of 13-19 January 1791 and of 19 July 1793 represent 
the first recognition of the rights of authors, dramatists, composers, and artists. The 
first law accorded an exclusive performing right to authors of dramatic and musical 
works for a period lasting until five years after their death. The second dealt with 
reproduction right.391
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The “Lex Beaumarchais” in the context of the 1791 copyright law for the first time 
granted a creator of a dramatic work an exclusive right to the public performance 
during his lifetime and five years after.392
Both these French laws placed author’s rights on a more elevated basis than the Statute 
of Queen Anne had done. There was a conscious philosophical basis to the French law 
that saw the rights protected as being embodied in the natural law. The law of 1793 
referred to the exclusive right as being the ”property” of the author, composer, or 
artist.393
In England, the Statute of Queen Anne was extended to sheet music already in 1777 
(Bach v. Longman), and in 1833, the performance right was given to dramatic works 
in England, and extended to musical works in 1842. Engravers had already been added 
in 1734 and 1766, and in 1798 and 1814, sculptures were protected, and the Fine Arts 
Copyright Act 1862 brought in paintings, drawings, and photographs.394
Ricketson has pointed out395 that the distinction between common law and the 
continental European system may not be as clear-cut as the common typologies 
suggest: although common law and civil law traditions may appear to have widely 
diverging concepts of copyright and author’s rights, the origins of these concepts have 
much in common and may easily approach in the present day.396
During the Enlightenment, the profit motive was followed by the human rights motive 
as a central element of the ideological background of copyright. Since the human rights 
motive may be misrepresented as a sign of altruism in the sense described by Russell, 
it must be stressed that self-interest elements were behind many of the changes. The 
egoistic motives of the printers provided inspiration for the creation of the author’s 
right, since at the verge of losing their printing privileges, the printers needed an 
alternative form of protection. The author’s right came in handy for this purpose, 
because the authors were more or less dependent on the printers, and certainly in 
London on printers that were members of the Stationers’ Company. 
Laddie et.al.397 have pointed out that many elements of the modern copyright system 
were already present in the English system of copyright in the last quarter of the 18th 
century. These included:
-an exclusive right to multiple copies of literary, dramatic, or musical works,
-limited in time with the object of balancing the interests of producers and 
consumers
-with provision for control of abuse of monopoly
-the right treated as assignable property
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The basic framework of copyright motives was emerging, as profit, public interest, and 
the human rights motives were already present at this stage. The development motive 
would later be encountered in light of the early 20th century technologies.
III.1.3. The Expansion of Statutory Copyright Protection
Originally, the printers’ copyright was an institutional solution to the changed 
circumstances in the technological opportunities to produce copied works. However, 
there is no clear technological reason for the introduction of the author’s right or its 
expansion to other fields of intellectual creativity during the 18th century.
The introduction of the author’s right seems to be a consequence of a relatively pure 
institutional crisis related mainly to the strong position of the Stationers’ Company as 
the Crown’s ally. The original purpose of Parliament was to “destroy” the privileges 
afforded by the Crown, and among them the position of the Company. The Stationers 
were however at least partially successful in their defensive strategy. The creation of the 
author’s right gave the Company an instrument to maintain a strong position because 
of the dependency of authors on publishing contracts with members of the Company. 
Author’s right, therefore, seems to be a product of the publishers’ innovative defense 
in a situation where the risk of losing the present monopoly position seemed evident. 
Still, as a purely tactical instrument, it probably would not have succeeded throughout 
the centuries without other justifiable reasons that were emerging in society from an 
ideological basis (Locke). The Stationers’ Company was – looking back almost 300 
years – able to use an idea that had already been discussed in philosophical circles, and 
which enjoyed the benevolence of the law-makers. In this way, the change resembled 
modern decision-making: how can a politician oppose the idea of the protection of an 
ailing artist? The author’s right justification, which was later developed into a strong 
human rights tendency, also created a path-dependency in copyright legislation.398
The introduction of the author’s right into the copyright system seems to be a major 
change for no compelling technological reason. It is a clear reminder that technological 
innovation, although admittedly important if not the prime mover of economic and 
institutional development for the past two centuries, is not necessarily the only force that 
may bring about institutional and legal change. Although technological development 
seems to be behind most of the amendments to the international copyright system, 
and indeed behind the introduction of the first printing privileges, we shall later see 
that the introduction of the neighboring rights – especially the performer’s right – 
bears a distinct resemblance in this manner to the events before the passing of the 
1710 Statute of Queen Anne. Similarly, the introduction of moral rights into the Berne 
system may not only have a technology-based explanation. 
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III.1.4. The Era of Bilateral Agreements for International Copyright 
Protection
The 19th century saw the Industrial Revolution shape the economy and society. One of 
the most important consequences was the rapid increase of international trade due to 
improved transportation. Concerning copyright protected works, this relatively soon 
brought about the issue of cross-border piracy, which required international measures 
for creating and enforcing protection.
The international copyright protection was first achieved by reciprocity agreements. 
Despite the lack of a broader international agreement, most states were prepared 
to grant protection to foreign works on condition of reciprocity, that is, that their 
works received protection in the country of origin of the foreign work.399 Although 
the publishing business was basically controllable - printing itself requiring investments 
and the author having control over the publishing agreement – geographically Europe 
was a continent of relatively small nations close to one another, which enabled the 
cross-border piracy of books. 
There were two approaches: either country A accorded protection to works from 
country B, if the latter gave substantially equivalent protection to works from country 
A (material reciprocity), or, country A accorded protection to works from country B in 
the same way as it protected the works of its own authors (formal reciprocity).400
The system of bilateral agreements made the task of ascertaining an author’s 
entitlement to protection in a country other than his own difficult and complicated401, 
which stressed the need for an international arrangement.
III.2. Towards the Berne Convention
International copyright protection became an issue in the 19th century due to increased 
foreign trade. The most important reason in the background for this was the rapid 
development in transportation technology, which reduced the transaction costs of 
importing copyright protected material. The period between 1800 and the First World 
War saw an unprecedented increase in internationalization:402
“The West adopted the steamship, the railroad, and the motor car, all of which 
replaced travel by coach or slow ship. International trade, investment, and 
migration grew rapidly.”
As a percentage of the world economy, international trade grew during that period 
from 3 to 33 per cent. World trade, as a share of world output, did not return to its 
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1913 levels until in the 1970s.403 The result of the development of the technological 
environment triggered not only the dissemination of ideas worldwide, but also the 
need to seek protection for undue use of copyright protected material.
III.2.1. The Need for an International Convention
The early 19th century copyright law was essentially national by nature.404 However, the 
printed word, musical composition or artistic creation did not, even then, recognize 
national boundaries. As a consequence, unauthorized reproduction and use of foreign 
works were for a long time established features of European cultural and social 
life.405 
The attitude of most countries towards this practice was anomalous: on the one hand, 
they were protecting the works of their own national authors, yet on the other not 
regarding the exploitation of foreign works as unfair or immoral. Countries with high 
levels of literary and artistic output were clearly most at risk, particularly with closely 
neighboring countries or countries sharing the same language.406
We may conclude that the attempt to prevent international piracy in printing was the 
principal reason for the gradual development of international copyright relations in the 
19th century.407 Even the foundation of Association Littéraire et Artistique Internationale 
(ALAI) was inspired by the world fair of 1878 in Paris, where many nations boycotted 
the event due to piracy fears.408
III.2.2. The Basic Elements of International Copyright Protection
The International Conference arranged in Berne 10-17th September 1883 by the 
initiative of ALAI discussed five draft propositions derived from the work of the French 
national commission.409 These formed the essence of the convention.
In the first proposal, national treatment without formality was granted for the authors 
of literary or artistic works appearing or performed in one of the contracting states. 
The proposal includes a wide list of literary and artistic works subject to protection: 
“(...) any production whatsoever (emphasis: MH) in the literary or artistic domain 
which may be published by any method of printing or reproduction”.410 – It is easy to 
conclude that in practice, almost any literary or artistic creation was to be protected. 
The intention was quite likely to create formulations that could as far as possible stand 
the test of time by incorporating the possibility of changes in technological means of 
use or the creation of new art forms. 
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With regard to the international trade, the exclusive right concerning especially 
translations was central. This early version of the basic ideas of international copyright 
protection represents in plain form the “exclusivity doctrine”, and will henceforth be 
referred to as such in the text .
a) Exclusive right on printing and public performance 
The fundamental provision was that the authors of literary and artistic works appearing 
or performed in one of the contracting states would enjoy in other contracting states 
of the Union, irrespective of their nationality, the same rights as nationals.411 The 
basic issue was therefore not to include domestic regulation within the scope of the 
convention.412 The protection would take place on the basis of formal reciprocity.
From the point of view of economic efficiency in the Coasian sense, this was an act 
enabling the creation of a functioning and legitimate international market for the 
copyright protected works, which is a precondition for efficient resource allocation. 
Sharing Towse’s view of the importance of copyright as providing as a societal status 
for copyright owners413, we might also see that the convention enabled the members 
to inform and emphasize internationally the importance of copyright to the users of 
copyright protected works, including the illicit nature of international piracy.
b) Exclusive right to translation
The second proposal was the most radical one, guaranteeing an exclusive right to 
authorize translation, and stating that an unauthorized publication of a translation was 
an infringement of copyright, thus making translation comparable to reproduction.414 
This would also be among the most important tools in fighting cross-border piracy, 
because in the European multi-lingual circumstances, translation was very often the 
precondition for piracy.
c) Legal enforcement
The third proposal obliged the contract parties to arrange legal enforcement and 
settling of damages in case of copyright infringements. Seen from the perspective of 
Thurow’s “choke point”415, this was an essential practical tool for facilitating the control 
of international copyright protection. Practice in relation to the Berne Convention has 
shown that the actual enforcement was difficult and did not gain momentum until the 
introduction of the TRIPS agreement.
d) An early form of the reproduction right
The fourth proposal distinguishes between ownership of an object and reproduction 
right.416 This along with the right to translation were important elements in the 
international counter-piracy measures.
e) International supervision of the Treaty
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The fifth proposal concerned the establishment of a central international office to 
deposit the copies of all copyright laws of the contracting states, and to publish a 
regular overview in French to offer relevant documentation and other information.417 
This provision was central in establishing fixed operational forms for international 
copyright protection.
The result of the Conference was a draft convention of ten Articles, most of which 
became the basis of the final clauses of the Berne Convention in 1886.418
In 1885 a group of French and German authors’ and publishers’ associations419 decided 
at the international congress of the ALAI to attempt to set up a union to provide 
international protection for their interests. So, it is justified to say that from the very 
beginning of the era of international copyright protection agreements, the authors 
and publishers recognized their common interests, as was the case with the Statute 
of Queen Anne.420 The parallel interest positions that emerged during the enactment 
of the 1710 Statute of Queen Anne had not changed but remained an important 
background factor in the legislative process. Both the profit motive as an incentive to 
creativity and the human rights related spirit of natural law copyright were present. The 
associations were successful nationally in having their agenda leveraged on a national 
– that is, state – level. Both the development and the public interest motive were to 
appear later during the revisions of the Berne Convention.
The Berne Convention was formally created in several official conferences organized by 
the Swiss government in 1883-1886 under the chairmanship of minister of the Swiss 
government Numa Droz.421 The final three texts422 were signed by nine countries, seven 
of which were European.423 The Roman Catholic countries France, Italy, and Spain 
represented a strong human rights sentiment. They saw the author’s right as a human 
right. The author of the work was not merely entitled to an economic remuneration 
for the work, but was also entitled to:424
-an inalienable moral right which required the author’s name always to be on 
the work
-the work to be reproduced in a complete form every time it was used
-to receive a financial benefit every time the work was resold 
The purpose of the Convention was ”to protect, in as effective and uniform manner 
as possible, the rights of authors in their literary and artistic works”.425 Although 
the basic purpose was to protect the interests of authors, it is equally clear that the 
wider interests of printing trade and commerce were also playing a role in the three 
successive diplomatic conferences that drafted and adopted the final Convention text 
between 1884 and 1886.426 Not only was the rights perspective important, but also 
the creation of an international copyright market by laying down the ground rules of 
international protection.
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The Berne Convention was first signed in 1886, and has since been renewed in Paris 
1896, Berlin 1908, Rome 1928, Brussels 1948, Stockholm 1967, and Paris 1971.427 Since 
any amendment to the Convention has proven difficult, in 1996, the WIPO copyright 
treaty was signed to continue to adapt international copyright protection to match the 
development of the new technology (the Internet).428
The Berne Convention was originally signed by only a few countries, which however 
represented substantial international market power due to their colonial interests. 
Regardless of the number of initial signatories, the Convention had a great geographical 
scope of influence. Out of the nine countries signing, six of the European countries 
(Belgium, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, and Spain) were colonial powers and 
extended copyright protection also in their colonies, creating a global scope for the 
Convention. – The other signatories were Switzerland, Tunis, and Haiti.429 Concerning 
the position each of the countries had, it is justified to say that although they represented 
an important portion of the global production of copyright protected goods, they were 
mostly net importers in the international copyright market.430 This was to change late in 
the 20th century, when the world’s most important net exporter of copyright protected 
works, the United States of America, joined the Berne Convention on 1 March 1989.
III.2.3. A Note on the Interpretation of the Berne Convention
Concerning the interpretation of an international treaty, and especially the Berne 
Convention, the rules of interpretation are to be found in the customary public 
international law. This study does not offer us the opportunity to investigate it any 
deeper. The main rules of interpretation might however be illustrated by the rules 
contained in the Vienna Convention of the Law of the Treaties.431
The main interpretational guideline concerning international treaties is in art. 31 (1): 
“A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning 
to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object 
and purpose.” The interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition to the text, 
including its preamble and annexes, any agreement or instrument in relation to the 
treaty that was made between all the parties in connection with the conclusion of the 
treaty. Any subsequent agreement or practice between the parties shall be taken into 
account in the interpretation. Preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of 
its conclusions may be taken into account, for the purposes of confirming the meaning 
or determining the meaning in case it is ambiguous or obscure, or leads to a result 
which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.432
Although this is a study in legal discipline from an economic perspective, the purpose 
of this study is not so much the interpretation of the Berne Convention as such, but 
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rather the study of the technology-initiated development of international copyright 
protection in light of the Berne Convention.
In order to understand the main development of the international copyright protection, 
the reports of the Berne conferences, giving light to the motives of technology-oriented 
amendments, are widely discussed. In addition, other international instruments will be 
briefly discussed. These are in particular the Rome Convention, TRIPS and the WIPO 
treaties 1996. These documents are not so much discussed as a means to interpret the 
Berne Convention, because they do not fulfill the formal criteria – not all Berne parties 
have signed the other documents – but rather in order to see how the international 
copyright system has developed further.
III.2.4. The Basic Principles of International Copyright Protection
The basic principles of international copyright protection are national treatment 
and minimum protection. It is important to bear in mind that the conventions do 
not intend to regulate the domestic relationships of a state to its own citizens but 
rather the international relationship of a country to the nationals of other contracting 
countries.433 Naturally, despite this, the conventions have in practice a harmonizing 
effect on member states’ legislation which can at least be contributed to sharing 
information on different national solutions. 
III.2.4.1. The National Treatment
The original text of the Berne Convention, Article 2 stated the basic principle of national 
treatment:434 “Authors who are nationals of one of the countries of the Union, or their 
successors in title, shall enjoy in the other countries for their works, whether published 
in one of those countries or unpublished, the rights which their respective laws do 
now or may hereafter grant to their nationals.”
This is the basic requirement for global copyright protection. In order to be efficient 
in economic practice, this however requires the participation of all or at least the 
major countries, which are important users of copyright protected material, to agree 
and sign to this principle. The existence of copyright havens may still challenge this 
principle. They may dilute the “choke point”.
This principle is clearly in line with the profit motive, because effective enforcement 
is the essence of copyright. Without international protection of copyright in the early 
19th century, the print industry experienced problems in the form of cross-border 
counterfeiting, and this led to the first international convention on copyright.
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The principle also serves the human rights motive, because respect for droit d’auteur 
as a human right might be better enforced through an international agreement with 
an obligation for sanctions at national level. International trade may be said as a rule 
to reduce the opportunities to maintain censorship – the early version of the public 
interest motive. Since efficient international copyright protection increased the cross-
border distribution of copyright protected material, the national states could no longer 
impose such excessive control on their information industry compared to the age of 
national printing privileges.
The principle of national treatment serves the development motive, since a controlled 
international environment with predictable and similar behavior of the authorities 
provides a large market for copyright protected products, and thus creates an incentive 
to invest. International harmonization creates an institutional framework of transparent 
information concerning the rules of the game, and thus – on a game theoretic level 
- provides a tool to avoid the negative consequences of the “prisoner’s dilemma” 
situation that otherwise would reign.
Some critiques of the copyright regime could argue that copyright havens should 
be seen as incubators of new and revolutionary technologies for dissemination of 
information and entertainment, as the new innovators have nothing to lose in the “old 
technology market”. However, after some initial success in the free market, even the 
revolutionaries start to require protection for their own activities and need protection 
to secure their investment in the new technology on the long-term basis. Any business 
company would eventually face the challenge of establishing its activities and the 
position in the market, as Schumpeter illustrates.
III.2.4.1.1. Reciprocity
As discussed before, there are two types of reciprocity, the material and formal 
(see above, The Era of Bilateral Agreements). The Berne Convention is based on 
formal reciprocity, although the commitment of the member states to the terms of 
the convention is intended to ensure a high level of material reciprocity. The formal 
reciprocity essentially means, as stated earlier, that country A will offer the same 
protection to works from country B as to works from country A, on the condition that 
B will protect works from country A in a similar manner as it does works from country 
B.
Reciprocity is embedded in the principle of national treatment and is instrumental in 
supporting the same motives as the national treatment.
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III.2.4.2. Minimum Protection
Minimum level of protection might be described as the “lowest common denominator”, 
to which the member countries are committed. Both the profit motive and human 
rights motive may justify this.
The founders of the international copyright system were quite generous in their 
definitions of the scope of the initial state of the international copyright protection435:
“The expression “literary and artistic works” shall include books, pamphlets, and 
all other writings; dramatic or dramatico-musical works, musical compositions 
with or without words; works of drawing, painting, sculpture and engraving; 
lithographs, illustrations, geographical charts; plans, sketches, and plastic works 
relative to geography, topography, architecture, or science in general; in fact, 
every production whatsoever in the literary, scientific, or artistic domain which 
can be published by any mode of impression or reproduction. (emphasis: MH)”
The intention clearly was to have as forward-looking definitions as possible. The 
intention seems to have been to contain also new and developing forms of art in 
whichever new form of usage. As the history of the Berne Convention clearly shows, 
this assumed intention was not entirely successful. Normally the emergence of any new 
technology for the exploitation of copyright protected works has required thorough 
debates and long negotiations on suitable amendments.
III.2.4.3. A Path Dependency to Maximal Protection?
From the author’s rights’ point of view, the idea of broadest possible copyright 
introduced in the Berne Convention also protects his or her investment in education 
and acquiring the artistic talent. Looking at the very first formulations of the scope of 
copyright, it clearly was the intention of the “founding fathers” of the international 
copyright system that copyright protection must be as broad and forward-looking 
as possible to express and conceive. The protection should also cover as broadly as 
possible the developing future forms of works and new ways of use. There was yet no 
sign of a compulsory licensing element or interest. This indicates a “path dependency”, 
since regardless of the development of alternative licensing forms, the idea of the 
exclusive nature of copyright has proven persistent.436
Public interest understood as the rights of the users might conflict with the principle 
of broadest possible copyright protection in, for example, the case of granting access 
to libraries, allowing handicapped people an affordable access to copyright protected 
material, etc. This was however clearly not an issue in 1886.
Although it is clear that the intention of the Berne Convention was to also offer 
the broadest possible copyright protection, the public interest factor was already 
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recognized.437 Later, especially concerning the advent of compulsory licensing, new 
forms of free use and, for example, the three-step test, it is quite clear that the principle 
of the broadest possible copyright protection needed to be adjusted to the prevailing 
reality of society and the economy.
The well-intended but usually disappointing attempt at copyright definitions to cover 
all possible future uses and technological developments is symptomatic even of the 
later development. One could ask whether this underlying but not very much debated 
tendency creates a path dependency to copyright regulation to automatically develop 
towards higher levels of protection? The Stationers’ Company in 17th century England 
realized very well that if a right was tied to the author’s person it enjoyed higher 
legitimacy and could not easily be taken away. So, instead of evaluating case-by-case 
the need for copyright protection in a new technological environment, copyright as 
a human right persists as a natural law element and does not have to be created in 
new circumstances, but found through interpretation. This may establish a strong path 
dependency: once rights have been given, they cannot easily be removed without 
major constitutional constraints. The institutional expansion of copyright is thus a 
“one-way-street”. 
It is however apparent that this all-embracing intention to cover all future circumstances 
in copyright definitions has not worked without friction in practical situations, because 
the applicability of old rules is always questioned in relation to new technology. Even 
though the international community might agree that the old formulation also covers 
new forms of uses, the courts having to decide a case on a national level will only 
apply the national criminal code and in case of ambiguity will decide in favor of 
the defendant. Criminal cases cannot be decided on the basis of analogy to former 
technologies and forms of use of copyright protected material.
In context of the TRIPS adaptation of the Berne Convention with the exclusion of moral 
rights, it has been asked whether this will lead to trade-emphasized interpretations 
of the Berne Articles, and thus lead to a “maximalist” reading from an economic 
perspective. This would lead to a reading where copyright owners’ economic rights 
were given utmost protection and exceptions to those rights were strictly confined.438
III.2.4.4. The Most Favored Nation Treatment
Importantly, the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
introduced a new element, the most favored nation treatment:439
“With regard to the protection of intellectual property, any advantage, favour, 
privilege or immunity granted by Member to the nationals of any other country 
shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the national of all other 
Members.”
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Exemptions to this obligation may be allowed if based on another international 
obligation listed in the Article.
According to Gervais, Article 4 introduces a new element in the intellectual property 
framework. The rule originates from multilateral trade agreements, where its purpose 
is to ensure uniformity, that is, against bilateral arrangements. As the condition only 
applies to agreements after the signing of the WTO Treaty, its initial application will 
most likely be minimal. The agreements must further be notified and constitute 
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination.440
III.3. The Conferences to Amend the Berne Convention 
The Amendments of the Berne Convention during the 20th century were greatly 
influenced by the issues raised by technological development in the areas of sound 
recording, movies, and broadcasting industries. Photocopying and later digital copying 
challenged the system. In the following, the amendments of the Berne Convention 
are first briefly listed, and later analyzed in more depth. Also the parallel development 
in neighboring rights is discussed, as well as the post-Berne documents of the 
contemporary era.
The Berne Convention has been revised and completed several times. As the 
starting point is that the TRIPS incorporation of the Berne Convention concerned 
the acquis of the convention, the historical events bear importance even in light of 
modern interpretation.441 In addition, returning to our theoretical framework, law as 
representing conventional facts requires a historical method as one necessary tool for 
more complete interpretation.
III.3.1. The 1896 Paris Completion 
In order to preserve the dynamic character of the Berne Convention, the member 
countries decided that a date for an early revision should be set to maintain momentum. 
However, at the first revision conference several countries expressed their reluctance 
to accept any major changes to the convention. The amendments were therefore 
of a limited nature, among the most important being the definition of “publish” in 
Art. 2 amended in the form “published for the first time”.442 Another amendment of 
importance concerned Art. 5, where the ten year limit for the exclusive right to authorize 
translations was amended to “the term of their right in the original work”.443
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III.3.2. The 1908 Berlin Revision: Mechanical Reproduction Right, 
Movies Right
The main purpose of the Berlin revision of the Berne Convention in 1908 was to 
provide additional protection for authors when their works were reproduced by 
the new mechanical recording technologies of photography, sound recording, and 
cinematography.444
Concerning Article 2, architectural works, choreographic works, and pantomimes were 
included. Translations, adaptations, arrangements of music, and other reproductions 
in altered form of a literary or artistic work, as well as collections of different works, 
were to be protected as original works without prejudice to the rights of the author of 
the original work. Photographic works were granted protection in a limited sense.445 
Granting of exclusive rights concerning mechanical reproduction was recognized in 
Art. 13, but might be subject to national restrictions such as compulsory license.446 The 
right to cinematographic works was embodied in Art. 14, provided it had an original 
character.447
III.3.3. The 1914 Berne Completion: Additional Protocol
The 1896 act allowed authors from non-Union countries the benefits of the 
Convention, if their work was first published in a Union country. This caused problems 
especially in Canada, which had a long border with an important non-Union country, 
the US. The UK had earlier proposed “bona fide resident” limitation. Finally, a protocol 
was accepted which allowed a member country to restrict protection in the case of 
non-Union countries that failed to protect the authors from the Union country in an 
adequate manner.448 
III.3.4. The 1928 Rome Revision: Moral Rights, Broadcasting Right
The two most important issues of the Rome Conference in 1928 were the moral 
rights and the introduction of the broadcasting rights. They both reflected the issues 
that were rising because of the technological development of the mass media.449 A 
number of other changes were made to the Convention, among others an inclusion of 
protection of oral works.450 
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III.3.5. The 1948 Brussels Revision Conference: Other Lobbying 
Groups Emerge
In Brussels it was decided, that a claim for protection could be based directly on the 
Convention itself, thus enabling the national courts to enforce the rights regardless 
of the member country’s possible negligence to include the Berne provisions into 
its domestic law.451 Some significant changes were made concerning the recording, 
broadcasting, and movie rights of authors. Recording right was defined as a separate 
right, instead of the earlier definition of recording as an adaptation. No right for the 
sound recording itself was granted. The definition of broadcasting was broadened to 
include television. The authorship of cinema works was debated, but was finally left 
to national decisions.452
Cinema and photographic works received “list status” in the primary list of works 
protected under Article 2.453 While the Brussels Conference made many changes to 
the Rome text, there were no fundamental changes to the authors’ rights, but the 
rights were rather maintained to adapt to the latest development in technology.454
According to Ricketson, the new technological developments had spawned a number 
of powerful interests concerned with their exploitation, and the aims of these groups 
were generally “anti-ethical” to those of authors. The diverse pressures meant that 
authors were seen as one interested party facing demands of fairness from broadcasting 
interests, interests concerning education, and the developing countries, rather than 
being the sole dominating party requiring more unilateral protection.455
This observation enables us to maintain that the traditional copyright motives were 
accompanied by a strong development interest.
III.3.6. The 1967 Stockholm Revision Conference, and the Paris 
Conference: Reproduction Right and the Three-Step Test
The conference program indicated the complex environment of copyright 
legislation:456
“[...] The Programme of the Conference is based on the conception that 
improvements of this nature should include not only the enlargement of the 
protection granted to authors by the creation of new rights or by the extension 
of rights which are already recognised, but also the general development 
of copyright by reforms intended to make the rules relating to it easier to 
apply and to adopt them to the social, technical and economic conditions of 
contemporary.”
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The Stockholm Revision Conference of the Berne Convention therefore had to 
negotiate two major sets of problems. The first was to revise the Berne Convention to 
accommodate new technological developments, the second to reconcile the demands 
and needs of the First and Third Worlds. In the first area, the results were partially 
successful, in the latter no solution was reached. The protocol of the Stockholm Revision 
Conference never came into force due to insufficient ratification, which required a new 
conference that was held in Paris 1971.457 The changes to the substantive provision of 
the Convention that were finally adopted were of a fairly limited nature.458
However, as an indication of the institutional development with a natural law tendency, 
ten new rights were afforded to authors459, but the nature of these changes was rather 
that of a redefinition of an existing right than introducing new, revolutionary rights. It is 
however worth mentioning that among other changes, due to the development of the 
copying technology, the reproduction right to the work was defined, also introducing 
the “three-step test”.460
Concerning the development of the Berne Convention as a whole, Ricketson has 
described its development in the following manner:461 “During the initial period from 
Berne to Berlin, the Euro-centric doctrine of authors’ rights advanced; the middle 
period from Rome to Brussels introduced the impact of the technological development 
and the emergence of new interest groups, and a later period where the interests 
of the users, particularly those from the developing countries, radically changed the 
terms of debate about international copyright protection”.
Following Ricketson’s comment, the rapid development of digital technology and 
computer programming has brought about a new set of problems not least of which 
is the ease of digital copying. These were dealt with in a diplomatic conference of 
1996 in Geneva.
The Berne Convention is administered by the World Intellectual Property Organization 
(WIPO) founded in 1967.462
III.3.7. The Industry Initiated Limitations in the Berne Convention
The technology related development led to adapting compulsory licensing schemes 
within the Berne framework. Finally, the industry-initiated related exceptions allowing 
compulsory licensing by the Berne Convention resulted in the following amendments 
in conclusion:463
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-Article 9(2): reproduction of literary and artistic works, the three-step test:
“It shall be a matter for legislation in the countries of the Union to permit 
the reproduction of such works in certain special cases, provided that such 
reproduction does not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and does 
not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the author.”
-Article 11bis(2): broadcasting, rebroadcasting or communication by wire, public 
communication by loudspeaker or analogous instrument:
  
“It shall be a matter for legislation in the countries of the Union to determine 
the conditions under which the rights mentioned in the preceding paragraphs 
may be exercised, but these conditions shall apply only in the countries where 
they have been prescribed. They shall not in any circumstances be prejudicial to 
the moral rights of the author, not to his right to obtain equitable remuneration 
which, in the absence of agreement, shall be fixed by competent authority.”
-similarly in 11bis(3) concerning ephemeral recordings
-Article 13(1) (recording of musical works)
“Each country of the Union may impose itself reservations and conditions on 
the exclusive right granted to the author of a musical work and to the author of 
any words, the recording of which together with the musical work has already 
been authorized by the latter, to authorize the sound recording of that musical 
work, together with such words, if any; but all such reservations and conditions 
shall apply only in the countries which have imposed them and shall not, in any 
circumstances, be prejudicial to the rights of these authors to obtain equitable 
remuneration which, in the absence of agreement, shall be fixed by competent 
authority.”
To the same category could be added Article 14bis (2)(b) (ownership of cinematographic 
works):
“(…) in countries of the Union which, by legislation, include among the owners 
of copyright in a cinematographic work authors who have brought contributions 
to the making of the work, such authors, if they have undertaken to bring such 
contributions, may not, in the absence of any contrary or special stipulation, 
object to the reproduction, distribution, public performance, communication to 
the public by wire, broadcasting or any other communication to the public, or to 
the subtitling or dubbing of texts, of the work.”
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III.4. Compulsory Licensing
As a starting point, compulsory license permits an individual to use someone else’s 
copyright against payment.464 The term “statutory license” is sometimes used in the 
same sense, and it probably better illustrates the core idea of state intervention to the 
licensing procedures. But most of the literature uses the term “compulsory license” 
and this is also the choice in this study for clarity.465
Payment refers to a fee set either by a state organ, as in the case of the US cable 
television compulsory license, or in arbitration. The compensation for the use of the 
copyright protected material may be set in various ways. A common concept used to 
illustrate a two-way approach is “equitable remuneration”; this originally derived from 
the German patent law concept “angemessene Vergütung”.466 According to Brennan, 
equitable remuneration represents a value or price, which is fair to both rights holder 
and licensee by creating an equitable sharing of the benefits derived from the use of 
the rights in question.467
III.4.1. The Origin of Compulsory Licensing in the Berne System
A great deal of debate has occurred lately among the Finnish copyright researchers 
upon the proper breadth of copyright, and the detrimental effects of its expansion.468 
Our opinion is that the question can be reduced to an issue of the scope of the right 
and its limitations. This leads to seeking a balance of the various motives interacting 
in the copyright arena.
According to Senftleben, the interest to limit copyright may be related to several 
conflicting interests:469
-freedom of expression and information
-the dissemination of information
-the right to privacy
-the enhancement of democracy
In addition, limits are moreover set to authors’ rights in order to regulate industry 
practice and competition. As examples of this type of regulation, Senftleben offers 
the exemption of ephemeral recordings made by broadcasting organizations, 
and compulsory licenses concerning broadcasting rights and recordings of musical 
works.470
David J. Brennan has studied the origins of compulsory (statutory) licensing in the 
Berne Convention.471 As an explanation of the adaptation of compulsory licensing, he 
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seems to indicate that a decisive factor was the erroneous conception of the character 
of sound recordings in relation to the earlier musical boxes. The major difference was 
that in sound recordings, unlike the music boxes, the musical performance was not 
fixed with the machine. - However, for competition purposes in the print industry, 
compulsory licensing had already been widely debated in England in the early 19th 
century.472
The French Court of Cassation held in 1862 that the manufacture of a musical box, 
which embodied a musical work in which copyright subsisted, was an infringement 
of copyright as that manufacture occurred without the consent of the work’s author. 
Accordingly, the French customs authorities prevented the importation of all musical 
boxes from Switzerland, where most manufacturers were.473
Because of the importance of the trade to the Swiss, a suggestion was made by them 
to agree to a ”final protocol” attached to an 1864 bilateral copyright Convention.474 
The protocol required the parties to exempt the manufacture of musical boxes from 
copyright infringement. France amended the copyright law in 1866 accordingly.
The expression ”instruments serving to reproduce mechanically musical airs” was 
understood to mean integrated mechanical devices that rendered musical performances. 
These included musical boxes, bird organs, chiming clocks and snuffboxes. The quality 
of the mechanical performance was quite limited. Copyright owners had not objected 
to this manufacture because they felt that the devices would not be profitable or 
harmful to the sales of printed music.475
In the Berne Convention 1886 (Protocol Three), it was decided to remove ”arrangement 
of music” from the list of protected works, and the right to make arrangements of 
musical works was treated as one of the recognized exclusive rights of a musical work 
copyright owner.476 In the final protocol, the text was altered as follows:477
”It is understood that the manufacture and sale of instruments for the 
mechanical reproduction of musical works in which copyright subsists shall not 
be considered as constituting an infringement of musical copyright.”
Thus, the manufacture and sale of musical boxes were excluded from the operation of 
the Berne Convention. Brennan claims that outside France, Germany, and Switzerland, 
mechanical musical instruments were little known, and the delegates to the initial 
Berne Conferences were not fully aware of the significance of the provision.478
By the time of the Paris revision in 1896 the position had altered. New technology 
had produced a range of mechanical devices that performed, with improved fidelity, 
musical works embodied in removable media, such as perforated cards, cylinders, 
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paper rolls, and finally, disks. In the 1890s the manufacture of both this equipment 
and its associated media began to emerge as a major and profitable industry.479
Brennan claims, that the new industry was able to flourish untroubled by the Berne 
Convention by virtue of Protocol Three.480 Copyright owners perceived this to be doubly 
unfair: the popularity of the new technology meant that their sales of printed music 
began to decrease, and they received no share of the profits generated by the use of 
their copyright in the new technology.481 This argument will later be discussed in context 
of Ricketson’s similar argument concerning the development of the recording industry. 
It is however worth noting the following. As the prime argument of economic and 
institutional theory tends to emphasize the importance of legal framework as “rules of 
the game” and thus facilitating the market economy, the argumentation of Brennan 
and Ricketson is interestingly contradictory to this “prisoners’ dilemma” assumption 
of the functions of law. Their claim essentially is that the rapid development of the 
recording industry took place because of the lack of legal norms. 
In the Paris Conference of 1896, Protocol Three was a subject of intense debate. 
France, supported by Belgium, Italy, and Monaco, sought for a distinction between 
mechanical devices that are integrated with the musical performance (musical boxes), 
and devices to which the musical performance is sold separately. Germany, supported 
by Great Britain, Norway, Spain, and Switzerland, attacked the French proposal.
The main French response was: ”The industry in question – which is thriving, it would 
seem – will not die due to the fact that authors’ rights are better respected. It will be 
possible for it to dip into the public domain or come to terms with authors who, in 
most cases, will be content with a modest fee.” The reform proposal was eventually 
defeated.482
In the Berlin conference of 1908, unanimous support for the amelioration of the 
exception contained in Protocol Three existed save for Switzerland. The discussion 
contained an important controversy, also in relation to the development motive of 
copyright (the Report of the Drafting Committee):483
”The right of the author and the right of the inventor of instruments must not 
be weighed against each other: the latter may have achieved wonders, shown 
true genius, but his right stops at that of others; he cannot appropriate a raw 
material which does not belong to him and, in this case, the raw material is 
precisely the musical expression. It matters little what method is used and 
how difficult it may or may not be to read the disk or the cylinder, the musical 
expression is nonetheless incorporated in that desk or cylinder.”
Here, for the first time in the context of the Berne Convention, the development 
motive is discussed. Although the intention was to avoid striking a balance between 
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the human rights based natural law copyright and the further development of the 
inventions of the Second Industrial Revolution, this was a problem that had to be 
solved.
Berne Article 13 was amended to provide authors of musical works with the exclusive 
rights of authorizing ”the adaptation of those works to instruments which can 
reproduce them mechanically.”484
However, the fact was that the status quo had been a free exception. The French 
delegation was in favor of the grant of an exclusive right to authors and let the market 
find a solution. However, the countries whose interests were more closely aligned 
with the phonograph manufacturers required some limit upon the scope of the newly 
recognized exclusive right. Germany proposed that ”once the author has used his work 
or has permitted its use under the aforementioned conditions, any third party shall be 
able to claim the rights (...) by offering equitable compensation”. If an agreement 
could not be reached, each country’s legislation would provide a mechanism for the 
manner in which the amount would be determined.485
Germany explained this provision from the point of view of protecting the small 
phonograph manufacturers against the high costs they could face as a result of excessive 
license fees sought by the authors, and against the establishment of monopolies by 
larger phonograph manufacturers. This was the first time a provision on compulsory 
licensing was suggested to the Berne Convention. The proposal was rejected but in 
the convention text, the option for national exceptions was granted. It is important to 
note the express existence of the development motive in this question:486
“(…) the German authorities were seeking to safeguard the interests of small 
manufacturers (of sound recordings, MH) by protecting them both against 
the too heavy costs they could face as a result of excessive estimates on the 
part of authors and publishers and against the danger of the establishment of 
monopolies in favor of some manufacturers with large amount of capital at their 
disposal.”
Copyright was not seen entirely as from either the profit motive of human right aspect 
protecting the author, but in the context of a broader business environment – although 
the tone of the discussion was partly disapproving.487
The proposal – compulsory license with equitable remuneration – re-appeared in 1928 
as the qualification placed upon the rights of broadcasting, and in 1948 upon the 
retransmission right. The Final Report of the drafting committee explained that the 
German suggestion was based upon the system of compulsory licenses existing in the 
German patent legislation, and which still exists.488
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According to Brennan, it may well be that equitable remuneration represents a value 
or price which is fair to both rights holder and licensee by creating an equitable sharing 
of the benefits derived from the use of the rights in question. This means a reasonable 
return to the rights holder and a cost burden upon the rights user that permits the 
latter to conduct its business profitably.489
However, as noted before, the German proposal was rejected. The British delegation 
formulated a provision that became an acceptable compromise:490
”Reservations and conditions relating to the application of this article (13) may 
be determined by the legislation of each country in so far as it is concerned; 
but all such reservations and conditions shall apply only in the countries which 
impose them.”
It was therefore accepted that under this provision a country could in its national 
legislation make rules ”in the manufacturers’ favor, (permitting) them to reproduce 
tunes under conditions which were very mild for the manufacturers and very harsh for 
the authors”. Article 13 was finally accepted. The authors received no minimum right 
to fair payments in return for mechanical reproductions of their musical works under 
a statutory license in national law.491
Although the initial and possible misunderstanding of the difference between musical 
boxes and phonographs may have contributed to the events, it is not likely that the 
form of legislation would entirely be a result of events of accidental nature. Rather, 
it is natural to conclude that the legislator’s express intent was to favor a new form 
of media in both the business and the society’s interest. Or to put it more bluntly: 
the legislator (the Berne Union) was neither willing nor able to confront the national 
application of compulsory licensing in Germany.492
The solution also reflects mistrust of the outcomes of free negotiations in case the 
right-holders misuse their position. The solution rather reflects fears that a strong 
position of the right-holders would amount to negative consequences in the market. 
This solution paved the way to the mass use issues that were confronted later in Berne 
Revision Conferences.493
From an economic point of view, compulsory licensing with equitable remuneration 
should put the rights holder in the same position, as would happen through a market 
based transaction. The rights holder should receive a market price, although he is 
not entitled to refuse the transaction. In Coase’s example, the transaction takes place 
because it is economically rational. As stated earlier, no one is under an obligation to 
contract because it would be economically rational. The compulsory licensing scheme 
changes this, and in ways to be discussed later, is able to simulate rational market 
behavior.
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III.4.2. Industry Initiated Compulsory Licensing in Other 
International Copyright Instruments
Since the purpose of the study is not a thorough examination of the international 
copyright system as such, the other international agreements besides the Berne 
Convention and also the basic elements of the EU legislation will only be briefly 
discussed. The main principles are however based on the Berne Convention, which 
is therefore a primary source in order to understand the basic development of the 
international copyright system. The neighboring rights issue – the Rome Convention 
of 1961 – will be more thoroughly discussed later in relation to the development of the 
record producers’ legal position.
As a general comment regarding the international copyright protection system, 
there are two different approaches to the national implementation of the treaties. 
The Geneva Convention for Phonograms and the Universal Copyright Convention are 
based on an obligation of the members to regulate domestic law accordingly, whereas 
the Berne Convention and Articles 10, 13 and 14 of the Rome Convention created 
rights directly after accession (convention law).494
The other conventions besides the Berne Convention as a general feature contain 
relatively lengthy provisions allowing for the contracting states varying formal 
requirements as preconditions for protection.
III.4.2.1. Universal Copyright Convention: US Participation
The United Stated did not sign the Berne Convention until 1 March 1989. In order 
to have US participation in the international copyright protection, the Universal 
Copyright Convention was created in 1952.495 A notable difference between the Berne 
Convention and the US system is the US requirement for registration as a precondition 
for copyright protection, which was contradictory to the requirement of informality in 
the Berne Convention.
The Universal Copyright Convention was built on the principles of national treatment 
and minimum protection, but the level of the requirements for the minimum protection 
is lower than in the Berne Convention. The intention was to create as broad international 
agreement as possible in order to make the level of protection obtainable to countries 
other than those with a tradition for high-level copyright protection. The time for 
protection is 25 years after the year of death of the author. A formal requirement for 
copyright protection is allowed. Developing countries were allowed exceptions from 
the main copyright protection clauses.496
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The material regulation is limited in the Universal Copyright Convention. In fact the only 
paragraph with any broader material substance concerns the compulsory licensing of 
a translation. If, after seven years from the first publication, no translation of the book 
has been published in the Contracting State, any national of such State may obtain a 
non-exclusive license from a competent authority of that State. A just compensation 
conforming to international standards must be made to the right-holders.497
III.4.2.2. The Rome Convention 1961: The Neighboring Rights
The award of the broadcasting right to authors of literary and artistic works at the 
Rome Conference 1928 started the discussion whether or not performing artists 
should have a right in their performances, analogous to that which was awarded to 
authors.498
After several decades of preparation, the Rome Convention was created in 1961, 
combining the so-called “neighboring rights”, the performers’, record producers’ and 
broadcasting organizations’ rights.
According to Porter, concerning the performers’ rights, the convention is essentially a 
compromise between the interests of the performers and those of their employers, be 
they movie producers, record producers, or broadcasting organizations.499 The rights 
granted to the record producers were broader: they were granted the right to prohibit 
or authorize the direct or indirect reproduction of their sound recordings. However, 
unlike movie producers, the record producers were not entitled to prevent a record 
from being broadcast or communicated to the public, but were only entitled to a 
single equitable remuneration:500
“If a phonogram published for commercial purposes, or a reproduction of 
such phonogram, is used directly for broadcasting or for any communication 
to the public, a single equitable remuneration shall be paid by the user to the 
performers, or to the producers of the phonograms, or both.”
It is however not completely correct to see this as an indication of compulsory licensing, 
as the right originally does not expand to exclusivity, but is limited to being of a “liability 
rule” nature. However, the Geneva Convention uses the term “compulsory license” in 
similar circumstances.501 
Concerning the broadcasting organizations, the Rome Convention gave them extensive 
rights to authorize or prohibit the re-broadcasting of their broadcasts, the fixation of 
their broadcasts, and the reproduction of any fixation made without their consent.502
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III.4.2.2.1. The Background of the Rome Convention
The protection of artists, record producers, and broadcasting companies had for a long 
time been debated in the conferences for the revision of the Berne Convention. In those 
discussions, it was finally proposed503 that these issues might be subject to another 
international instrument. It was on the one hand inevitable that new instruments were 
needed, as on the other it was clear that sufficient agreement could not be reached 
within the Berne Convention.504
III.4.2.2.2. Preparations and the Power Balance
Experts from 16 countries were invited to the conference of experts, which took place 
at the Hague from 9 to 21 May 1960. Some interest groups were also entitled to 
send observers with a right to speak but not vote. The main group of experts was 
composed of government officials and scientists, as well as representatives for artists, 
broadcasting companies, and authors. The record industry had no representation, but 
used the observers to express the industry’s views.505
According to Bergström, the power balance within the experts’ group was as follows: 
There was a centre-group with most influence, and two side-groups.506 The centre-
group was the most influential and was composed of Western European experts aiming 
to strike a balance between the two side-groups. The first side-group was composed 
of Eastern countries’ experts and the Western countries’ experts representing the 
performers’ interests. The second side-group was gathered around a North American 
proposal, which gave a relatively low level of protection. The intention of this proposition 
was to ensure as many countries as possible could accept the resolution.507
The connection between copyright and neighboring right was created in the definition 
of member states; it was agreed to propose that the convention should be applicable 
between countries that were either members of the Berne Convention or the Universal 
Copyright Convention of 1952.508
The principles of minimum protection and national treatment were agreed.509 Although 
the supremacy of the author’s right was recognized, since the act of using a copyright 
protected work usually bears both copyright and neighboring right, it was concluded 
as self-evidently practical to create as close a resemblance as possible.510
An important conflict of interest concerned the performer’s right, whether it should 
be an exclusive right or whether it should be restricted to a right for remuneration. 
This question was of great interest especially to continental European broadcasting 
organizations, which were afraid of becoming overly dependent on the artists’ 
organizations. The right was proposed, but with a reference to the member countries’ 
national legislations.511
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III.4.2.2.3. The Performers’ Right
The authors’ rights organizations were not at all in favor of the Rome Convention. The 
representative of the authors’ organizations was quoted:512
“Authors considered that an international convention in that field was not 
necessary, as the ordinary law – particularly the law relating to contracts – was 
adequate to ensure the protection of the legitimate interests involved.”
It is hardly conceivable that the authors saw this as a general recommendable model 
for solving regulatory problems in the intellectual property right field.
The discussions in the Conference reflected the need to draw a distinction between 
copyright and neighboring right:513
“Although creations of the mind owed much to technique, which had made it 
possible to disseminate them more widely and had also led to the emergence of 
new forms of creation, it entailed risks for them: it sometimes tended to obscure 
or alter the concept of intellectual creation to the point where the work was 
completely lost to sight behind the material means permitting its dissemination 
(...). For it was from the sources of literary or artistic creation that organizers 
of plays and concerts, as well as producers of phonograms and broadcasting 
organizations, drew their material.”
Another important question concerned the secondary use of sound recordings: this 
was as a rule subject to remuneration. The payment was subject to direct use in a 
radio program, or another separate public performance in, for example, a restaurant. 
The underlying idea was to separate such broadcasting activities that only relayed the 
original signal, from the original broadcast. There should be only one payment from 
the broadcasting company, which then would be allocated by the record producers 
and the artists’ organizations.514
III.4.2.2.4. Basic Principles of the Protection Offered by the Rome 
Convention
As a rule, the right-holders of neighboring rights perform, record, and broadcast 
copyright protected works of authors. There are few exceptions. The Rome Convention 
protects the supporting functions of intellectual creation. The neighboring rights do not 
affect the author’s rights, but the intention of the Convention is that the neighboring 
rights protection allows the interpretation, record manufacture, and broadcasting to 
expand and prosper as further exploitations of intellectual work.515
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The protection is based on two corollary principles: Firstly, the legal status of the 
author’s right is not affected in any way. Secondly, no member country will allow 
protection for the performance without protecting the underlying work.516
The development of the neighboring rights in general reflects the technological 
development in several respects: the most important aspect in relation to this study 
is that they represent the category “liability rule” in the tort law classification of 
Calabresi-Melamed, rather than property right. This fact seems to stem, not only from 
the history of sound recording as such, but also from the “hierarchical” comparison to 
the author’s right that enjoys a higher level of both legal protection and – as could be 
added in the spirit of Towse – societal status. 
Adapting some of Schumpeter’s main ideas on economic development, we could 
conclude that the initial period of sound recording was a period of “invention”, 
whereas the “innovation” was the idea to use sound recording in particular as a tool 
for the music distribution business. The definition of the legal protection of a sound 
recording was crucial in “establishing” the sound recording business as part of the 
economic production. This took place mainly during a period from 1908 to 1961.
III.4.2.3. The Geneva Convention
The Geneva Convention was created in 1971 for the protection of the record producers. 
The main concern of the Geneva Convention was piracy, against which several measures 
were agreed upon.517 Thus the name, “Convention for the Protection of Producers of 
Phonograms Against Unauthorized Duplication of Their Phonograms”.
The Geneva Convention does not create substantive rights in the protection of sound 
recordings. The mode of protection is left to domestic law, whether it is carried out in 
copyright, unfair competition, or penal law, as long as some protection exists.518
The Geneva Convention, Article 6, contains provisions allowing national limitations to 
the producers of sound recordings. However, it also contains relatively strict language 
concerning compulsory licensing:
“(…) no compulsory licenses may be permitted unless all of the following 
conditions are met:
(a) the duplication is for use solely for the purpose of teaching or scientific 
research
(b) the license shall be valid for duplication only within the territory of the 
Contracting State whose competent authority has granted the license and shall 
not extend to the export of duplicates;
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(c) the duplication made under the license gives rise to an equitable 
remuneration fixed by the said authority taking into account, inter alia, the 
number of duplicates which will be made.”
III.4.2.4. The Brussels Satellite Convention
The Convention Relating to the Distribution of Programme-Carrying Signals Transmitted 
by Satellite (Brussels Convention) was created in 1974 to cover the protection of 
broadcasting satellite signals. The Convention obliges the members states to take 
certain measures if broadcasting satellite signals are rebroadcast without proper 
authorization.519 
The reason for the creation of the Brussels Convention was the inadequacy of the 
provisions of the Universal Copyright Convention and the Berne Convention on 
satellite transmissions. Both cover broadcasting, but whether satellite broadcasting 
was covered was uncertain. The Convention creates no new rights. It focuses on the 
unauthorized distribution of the satellite signal, for example, through cable-systems, 
rather than unauthorized reception of the signals, that is, private reception of the 
signals does not violate the Convention. The signal is the object of protection, not the 
content.520 
However, Article 8(3)(a) allows for a notice procedure concerning the possible national 
limitations to the protection of the Satellite Convention.521
III.4.2.5. The EU Legislation
The Rome Treaty of the European Union does not contain express provisions on 
copyright. In the first decades of the European Economic Community, it was even 
discussed, whether EC legislation had any effect on the right-holders’ position. In 
the 1960s the European Court of Justice issued several decisions on trademark and 
patent rights, which cleared the aforementioned position. It was nevertheless not until 
the 1980s when the first decisions on copyright were given.522 The question of the 
EU’s mandate on intellectual property rights remained an issue until the 1990s.523 
Rosas sees that the relation of the European Union to intellectual property matters 
has developed in three “waves”: firstly, the effect of the Rome Treaty, secondly the 
harmonization of national legislation, and thirdly the introduction of new rights.524
The Commission of the European Communities issued its first important legislative 
document on the development of the EC copyright in 1988 (“The Green Paper on 
Copyright and the Challenge of Technology”). The focus was on the importance of 
the copyright legislation to industry and trade. The Commission was mostly concerned 
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with the protection of computer programs, copying of audiovisual works, the lending 
right, piracy, and protection of data bases.525
In 1990 the Commission published a document “Follow-Up to the Green Paper: 
Working Program of the Commission in the Field of Copyright and Neighboring 
Rights”. On the basis of that program, the EU gave five Directives during 1991-96.526 
In 1995, a Green Paper on Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society 
was given, which led to the preparation of the Infosoc Directive.527 The debate on the 
resale rights led also to a Directive in 2001, and the Enforcement Directive in 2004.528
The European Court of Justice has given several important decisions on copyright. An 
interesting distinction is made between the existence of a copyright and the use of the 
right; the Court has ruled that the Rome Treaty per se does not affect the existence 
of a copyright. On the other hand, the Treaty and other relevant documents of the EU 
legislation may have an effect on the use of the said right. The Court has also developed 
a doctrine of the “core content” of copyright: according to this doctrine, the holder 
of an exclusive right may, in order to protect the core content of the exclusive right, 
limit the free movement of goods in the Community. The Court has also given some 
important rulings concerning the position of the national copyright organizations, 
which usually are able to exploit a monopoly or dominant position in their dealing.529 
All member states of the European Union are parties to the Berne Convention. The 
national treatment obligation of the Berne Convention requires the member states to 
afford the high level of protection to the other member countries of the EU, which 
obligation is also embedded in the Rome Treaty.530
The EU legislation provides several mandates for compulsory licensing:
-The Rental Directive Article 10 (2) (limitations to rights in Chapter II, “Rights Related 
to Copyright”):531
“(…) any Member State may provide for the same kinds of limitation with 
regard to the protection of performers, producers of phonograms, broadcasting 
organizations and of producers of the first fixations of films, as it provides for 
in connection with the protection of copyright in literary and artistic works. 
However, compulsory licences may be provided for only to the extent to which 
they are compatible with the Rome Convention.”
The Infosoc Directive Article 5 (Exceptions and Limitations) stipulates on compulsory 
licensing against fair compensation (Art. 5(2)). The Member States may provide for 
exceptions and limitations to the reproduction rights in the following cases (non-
compensation cases excluded here):532
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(a) reproductions on paper or any similar, effected by the use of any kind 
of photographic technique or by some other process having similar effects, 
with the exception of sheet music, provided that the rightholders receive fair 
compensation; 
(b) in respect of reproduction on any medium made by a natural person for 
private use and for ends that are neither directly nor indirectly commercial, on 
condition that the rightholders receive fair compensation which takes account of 
the application or non-application of technological measures (that is, the DRM 
option, MH);
(e) in respect of reproductions of broadcasts made by social institutions pursuing 
non-commercial purposes, such as hospitals or prisons, on condition that the 
rightholders receive fair compensation
Art. 5(5) repeats the principle of the “three-step test”.
Interestingly, the Satellite and Cable Directive applies a broad Scandinavian-type 
“extended collective licensing” scheme, with only a short time-limit for possible 
compulsory licensing regimes (Art 8(2)).533 According to Article 3, Members States 
shall ensure that the authorization of the broadcasting right may be acquired only by 
agreement.
A Member State may provide that a collective agreement between a collective 
society and a broadcasting organization concerning a given category of works may 
be extended to right-holders of the same category who are not represented by 
the collective organization. The requirements for this provision are that the satellite 
signal is a simulcast of a terrestrial broadcast by the same broadcaster. Moreover, the 
unrepresented rights holder shall, at any time, have the possibility of excluding the 
extension of the collective agreement to his works and of exercising his rights either 
individually or collectively.534
Similar provisions concern the cable retransmission right (Art 8(1): Member States shall 
ensure that when programs from other Member States are retransmitted by cable 
in their territory the applicable copyright and related rights are observed and that 
such retransmission takes place on the basis of individual or collective contractual 
agreements between copyright owners, holders of related rights and cable operators. 
Members States shall further ensure (Art. 9(1)) that the right of copyright owners and 
holders of related rights to grant or refuse authorization to a cable operator for a cable 
retransmission may be exercised only through a collecting society. A similar regulation 
concerning the position of the “extended” collective license concerning the satellite 
broadcasting right, is given in Art. 9(2).
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The solution attempts to solve the contradictions very often experienced in relation 
to compulsory licensing, and at the same time maintain the exclusivity doctrine of 
copyright. The European solution may be regarded as a copyright organization model, 
because the opportunity to negotiate fully for all right-holders, whether given an 
individual mandate or not, gives an extremely strong negotiating position for the 
copyright collective organization.
III.4.2.6. The TRIPS agreement: Berne Inclusion
Since the international development within the Berne Convention frame had proven 
less than satisfactory during the 1980s535, copyright and related rights protection was 
taken up in the GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) negotiations. During 
the Uruguay round, the TRIPS agreement (an Agreement on Trade-Related Aspect 
of Intellectual Property) concerning immaterial rights was created. The World Trade 
Organization (WTO) was founded to administer the agreed conventions.536 
TRIPS is based on national treatment, as well as on most favored nation treatment, 
which means that the country has to offer to the nationals of the member states the 
best benefits offered to the nationals of any member state.537
The TRIPS obliges the member states to offer the same level of protection as the Berne 
Convention, with an exception on moral rights. The TRIPS contains a provision on the 
obligation to damages and penal sanctions, and provisions concerning arbitration in 
case a member state does not comply with the provisions.538
The intention of the parties was not to adopt the bare text of the Berne Convention, 
but the acquis of Berne. The term refers to the body of legislation to which the member 
states are bound, rather than the plain text.539 This fact emphasizes the importance of 
the interpretation of the Berne Convention. 
III.4.2.6.1. Relationship to GATT
After the Second World War, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was 
reached between 25 nations. The object was to promote an expansion in production, 
exchange, and consumption, by reducing the barriers to the international trade in 
goods. From the 1970s, the US, Japan, and countries of Western Europe began to 
move away from an emphasis upon trade in the exchange of tangible goods. This 
was to maximize for a country its appropriation of value arising from its comparative 
economic advantage over other nations. It was decided that a new round of trade 
negotiations should focus upon harmonizing intellectual property rules between 
trading nations.540
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Finally, the Berne Convention was incorporated into GATT. The final agreement 
concluded in 1994 was in force from the beginning of 1995. Now, a proven failure 
to comply with those norms by a member state may lead to a WTO judicial process 
culminating in WTO-authorized trade sanctions.541
Violations against the Berne Convention were to be handled by the International Court 
of Justice. However, this was not an efficient mechanism judging by the number of 
settlements.542 
III.4.2.6.2. Berne Convention in TRIPS – Exclusion of Moral Rights
However, during the negotiations it became clear that the moral rights were not 
acceptable to the US – who preferred the insertion of the term “economic rights”. 
Article 9(1) of TRIPS requires contracting parties to comply with Articles 1 to 21 of 
Berne, but expressly excludes the need to comply with Article 6bis of Berne. The 
exclusion of moral rights from TRIPS extends to rights derived from Article 6bis. TRIPS 
also contains a “three-step test”.
It has been debated, whether TRIPS, especially in relation to the exclusion of moral 
rights, will solicit a new trade-related interpretation of the Berne Articles and emphasise 
the economic aspect leading to “maximalist” interpretation.543 Needless to say, this 
also would indicate a dominance of the profit motive over the human rights motive 
(assignable over non-assignable right).544
III.4.2.7. The 1996 WIPO Copyright Treaty: Right of Communication to 
the Public
The WIPO Copyright Treaty was adopted in 20 December 1996, together with WIPO 
Performances and Phonograms Treaty. The Treaty is an agreement within the meaning 
of the Berne Convention Art. 20, “Special Agreements Among Countries of the Union”, 
according to which the governments of the countries of the Union reserve the right 
to enter into special agreements among themselves, insofar as such agreements grant 
to authors more extensive rights than those granted by the Convention, or contain 
provisions not contrary to the Convention.545
The ratification required signatures of 30 member countries.546 The Treaty entered into 
force on 6 March 2002.547
The basic intention of the treaties was to protect the interests of the authors and right-
holders in the digital environment, provided that a balance of interests with the larger 
public interest was maintained.548 A new right was introduced, a right of communication 
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to the public, in order to provide protection for authors and right-holders in the digital 
(net) environment. The key of the new definition was the accessibility of copyright 
protected material from a place and time individually chosen by the user.549
The conference debated on the exclusion of transient copies from copyright liability. 
The matter was finally left to be settled through the three-step test.550 
The treaties are not part of TRIPS.551
III.4.2.8. The Compulsory Licensing Scheme in the U.S.
The first compulsory license in U.S. law was the mechanical license created by Copyright 
Act of 1909. The license was regulation was carried over to 1976 Act with certain 
changes and clarifications, and has been amended several times since.552
In the case of nondramatic musical works, the exclusive rights to make and to distribute 
phonorecords of (copyrightable) works are subject to compulsory licensing under 
certain conditions.553 When phonorecords of a nondramatic musical work have been 
distributed to the public in the United States under the authority of the copyright owner, 
any other person, including those who make phonorecords or digital phonorecord 
deliveries, may obtain a compulsory license to make and distribute phonorecords of 
the work.554 
In its original form, the mechanical license permitted anyone to record a new version 
of any recorded and publicly distributed song on a phonorecord (piano roll, record, 
reel-to-reel tape, cartridge, audio cassette, compact disc), and to distribute the new 
version to the public so long as the mechanical royalty rate was paid to the proper 
copyright owners. Exact copying of the first recording was not allowed.555
According to the present wording, a person may obtain a compulsory license only if 
his or her primary purpose in making phonorecords is to distribute them to the public 
for private use, including by means of a digital phonorecord delivery. The requirement 
is that the original fixation took place lawfully.556 Statutory licensing may be applied 
in certain digital audio transmissions, if not, for example, part of an interactive 
service.557
A statutory license is applied to the rental, lease, or lending of phonorecords.558
The mechanical license was the sole compulsory license in U.S. law until the Copyright 
Act of 1976 which introduced three more: cable, jukebox, and public broadcasting 
compulsory licenses.559 Later, the record rental and satellite compulsory licenses were 
added. 
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The secondary transmissions to the public by a cable system of a performance or 
display of a work embodied in a primary transmission made by a broadcast station 
licensed by the Federal Communications Commission or by an appropriate authority 
of Canada or Mexico shall be subject to statutory (that is, compulsory) licensing.560 A 
statutory license is applied for the transmitting organizations for the reproduction of 
one phonorecord of a sound recording (ephemeral recordings).561 
The secondary transmission of a performance or display of a work embodied in a 
primary transmission is not an infringement of copyright if the secondary transmission 
is made by a satellite carrier for private home viewing pursuant to a statutory license 
under §119.562
The jukebox compulsory license originally authorized jukebox operators to perform 
publicly non-dramatic musical compositions on their jukeboxes as long as the royalty 
rate was paid.563 The current regime however is based on contractual agreement, with 
an arbitration option.564
The secondary transmission of certain broadcasts may be subject to compulsory 
licensing, if the secondary transmission is made by a satellite carrier to the public 
for private home viewing.565 The remuneration concerning some non-commercial 
broadcasting may be subject to arbitration.566
III.5. Economic Issues of Copyright Limitations
After this brief overview of the development of the international copyright protection, 
in the following chapter, we shall study in more detail the technology related 
amendments to the right-holders and users’ positions. Although the nature of 
discussion is a comment on historical events, we shall also briefly probe the present 
challenges.
III.5.1. The Initiation of Voice Recording and Radio Business
Because the central theme of this study requires a general understanding of the stage 
of development of the industries during the period when the major legal framework 
was set, our main interest concerns the record, radio, and movie industries as examples 
of the impact of technology. A short look at their early industry statistics illustrates 
the phase of the activity when the Berne Convention amendments were under 
discussion.
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The term “sound recording” is generally understood to mean the embodiment of all 
kinds of sound in some enduring material carrier thus permitting them to be repeatedly 
played back, reproduced, broadcast, or otherwise communicated for aural perception. 
A sound recording of the performance of a work amounts to the reproduction of 
both the performance and the work. The exclusively aural fixation of the sound of a 
performance or of other sounds is called a “phonogram” and the natural or legal person 
first fixing the sound is generally referred to as “producer of phonograms”. These may 
be duplicated in the form of discs or tapes of various technological characteristics.567
The origins of producing sound recordings date back to the last decades of the 19th 
century. The first record of sound vibrations that could be played back for aural 
perception was invented by Thomas Edison 1877. The first lateral recording of sounds 
in a spiral groove on a flat disc was invented by Emile Berliner in the 1880s.568 The first 
phonograms were made in 1889 under Berliner’s license.569 In the Berlin conference 
1908, the impact of the rising record industry was already recognized:570
“Since 1896 the manufacture of mechanical musical instruments has undergone 
an unexpected development; substantial industries have formed in various 
countries, and thousands of copies of pieces of music in ever-increasing 
numbers have been reproduced.”
Very early statistics of the record and movie industry are difficult to find, and it may be 
questioned whether they have survived.571 The main source used here in this respect 
is ”The Knowledge Industry in the United States 1960-1980”572, which, in addition to 
the years mentioned in the name of the book, offers some information from the earlier 
phases. Since the information of the book relies on quite broad statistical material, 
and the study group has apparently left no stones unturned, the gaps in information 
regarding the early years of development are today most likely impossible to fill.
As we are however more interested in the general development of the relevant 
industries rather than particular details, the US statistics may provide an example or an 
indication of the broader global development. Although the US was not a member of 
the Berne Convention at the time, the intention of this chapter is to show that both 
the record and movie industries were already well developed when the international 
legislative solutions were adopted. The US statistics provide a sufficient example.
In the US, the business structure of the sound recording industry began to develop 
at the beginning of the 20th century. A division between majors and minors soon 
developed.573 By the 1930s, Radio Corporation of America (RCA; its major shareholders 
included General Electric and AT&T) dominated the US market, Decca and EMI had the 
British Empire market, Pathé-Marconi had control over the French market (including the 
colonies) and Philips presided over the Northern and Central European markets.574 
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A statistic on record retail sales shows575 that in 1921, the annual sales was 105.6 million 
USD, but gradually decreased to 46.2 million USD in 1930. The Depression hit the 
industry and during 1931-1937 the sales levels were less than 20 million USD. During 
World War II, the sales levels started to approach the 100 million USD mark, and by 
1946 the sales were 198 million USD. After that, the development was rather steady 
until the late 1950s, when the sales grew steadily to 1980 (2,450 million USD).
It seems that during the Depression, radio broadcasting started to grow and quite 
probably received a market share from the ailing record sales.576 In 1921, there were 
no households reported with radio sets, but in 1929 there were already over 10 
million US households with a radio. By 1942, this figure was 30,600,000, and in 1980, 
79,100,000. By 1940, out of the total expenditure on advertising in the US (2,088 
million USD), radio’s share was already over 10 per cent (216 million USD). 
From the point of view of our main study, it is however clear that the record business 
was already wide and important in the early 1920s. Other documentation and the 
descriptions of the history of phonograms indicate that this was already the case in the 
second decade of the 20th century. Stories of the sales of, for example, Caruso’s early 
recordings further indicate that sales were already wide by 1910.577 Similarly, by 1930s, 
radio had become an important media.
When the compulsory licensing for recordings became an optional part of the Berne 
Convention in 1928, this only meant the acceptance at the level of law of what had 
already been established at the level of the economy. Already in 1908, when the 
problem was widely debated, and national exceptions to the exclusivity rule were 
accepted, the industry had gained economic momentum.
The first radio broadcast ever was made on 24 December 1906 in Massachusetts.578 
Although this initiation had a broadcasting element of copyright relevance – singing 
songs etc – it was unclear whether broadcasting would just be established as a new 
form of telegraphy rather than an independent phenomenon579. Ronald Coase has 
an interesting and revealing quotation from the early pioneers of broadcasting in his 
study on the British broadcasting monopoly, concerning how this new technology 
could or could not be used. Broadcasting was originally called “wireless telephony”, a 
term that was to receive a totally new meaning more than fifty years later:
“The possible fields in which wireless telephony may be utilized are many and 
diverse, but those in which its commercial application is probable are relatively 
few. One reason at least for this statement is to be found in the competition 
of the old-established wire telephone and in the much greater secrecy of wire 
communication over wireless. As a well-known writer has recently aptly put it: 
‘A wireless telephone talk is a talk upon the housetops with the whole world 
for an audience’. (…) Wireless telephony’s most important field is consequently 
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for long distance, and especially trans-ocean work, and for communication with 
ships.”580
In November 1918, attention had however been brought to the possibility of distribution 
of news by means of broadcasting.
The Berne solutions concerning radio broadcasting also took place after the operation 
had already had a successful start, and the legislation was not supposed to change the 
subtle balance already established concerning copyright.
It is quite clear that during the creation of the Rome Convention in 1961, the industries 
concerned were already rather well established with a relatively long industry 
tradition.
III.5.2. From Physical Transportation to Electronic Distribution
The development of technology and lately particularly the digital technology has had 
a fundamental effect on the recording industry. The industry has developed from 
Edison’s cylinder recordings to shellac 78 rpms (revolutions per minute), long-play 
and single 45 rpms and long-play 33 1/3 rpms, to 8-track tapes and cassettes, to 
compact discs (CDs) and DVD.581 However, this is not the only fundamental effect of 
new technology, as recording studios are relying increasingly on synthesizers, drum 
machines, and digital equipment for recording, engineering, and mixing. New methods 
are also being developed to identify performance and mechanical rights with greater 
accuracy.582
According to a press release of International Federation of the Phonographic Industry 
(IFPI), although global music sales have continued to fall, and have fallen by 1.9% 
during the first half of 2005, digital sales have tripled to 6% of the industry’s revenue. 
The retail value of the industry’s sales was 13.4 billion USD in the first half of 2004, 
compared to 13.2 billion USD in the first half of 2005.583
This development may make it difficult in the long run to discuss the recording industry 
totally separate from the development of the Internet. However, as long as the industry 
is mainly concentrating its activities around selling physical copies of recordings (CDs) it 
is meaningful to see the industry as separate from the Internet. In ten years time, the 
analysis might be totally different.584
It has been said that thanks to the earlier technological development as radio, television, 
video, satellite broadcasting, LPs, and CDs, the music industry has “danced all the 
way to the bank with its profits”. The worldwide impact of technology rewarded 
many music industry participants with profit growth figures for many years.585 The 
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copyright solution of applying compulsory licensing was intended to establish the 
chosen business model and quite clearly was successful in this intent.
However, the sales of pirated music has been estimated to grow rapidly: of estimated 
total sales of music products, in 2003 35 per cent has been estimated as illegal sales, 
and in 2005 40 per cent.586 Out of this, two-thirds are estimated as sales of pirated 
physical CDs, and one-third illegal downloads.587 
One could probably say that to a large extent the industry’s current problems are due 
to its own reluctance to change. A recent survey, when discussing the Universal Music 
Group’s price cuts by 25-30 per cent, reaches the following conclusion:588
“We believe it was this refusal to adapt, as well as the reluctance to 
acknowledge or prevent and punish the growing problem, that led the music 
industry into dire straits”.
It is very clear that the electronic distribution of such goods as music will and should 
reduce radically the cost structure – mainly transportation but also production - of the 
music industry that has for a century built its business model on the basis of the physical 
distribution of sound recordings. The reluctance to realize the technological change, 
but attempt to unilaterally benefit from it, has led the industry quite apparently to 
assume that the improvement in their cost structure will turn into increased profits.
The reaction of the large audience seems to suggest that the benefits of the increased 
possibilities and ease of copying and the benefits of electronic distribution will not, 
at the end of the day, remain with the record companies, but will have to become 
cheaper products for the customers. One could, with some justification, speculate 
that the record industry may have intended to keep the high ‘transaction’ cost level for 
the consumer regardless of the clear cost benefits of electronic distribution. This is a 
strategy that apparently is not working and needs to be changed.
The record industry as such may go through a major change from the physical 
distributor to electronic distributor, but its role as a producer of entertainment and 
music products is quite likely intact. Somebody has to arrange for the recording, produce 
the final product, arrange the sales, take the financial risk, arrange for advertising 
and promoting, and so on. These functions will not change and are as important as 
ever. Competitive advantage will most probably be built on similar qualities as before, 
with the important exception of, who is able to create a well-functioning electronic 
distribution. This could even be someone that approaches the business area from a 
totally different angle, like Apple or any of the potentially successful followers of the 
Napster business model, modified to fit in the legal framework.
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III.5.3. Piracy as the Crisis of the Physical Sales Doctrine
The pursuit of profit and the existence of private property are said to be the foundations 
of a free society. John Locke argued that each person has a natural right to own 
property, and the right is based on “labor” as an individual effort.589 As we saw in the 
beginning of this study, these ideas also play a significant role in modern copyright 
thinking. Yet, it is apparent that the pursuit of profit and private property in their 
extreme forms can cause several detrimental consequences and conflicting interests, 
like monopolist behavior or excessive demands for compensation. These consequences 
require counterbalancing measures, including anti-trust laws (development interest) and 
the protection of human rights of other parties (human rights interest). As discussed 
in the context of the motives, and the balancing of the motives, it is relatively clear 
that the profit motive in itself does not alone provide a justified basis for copyright 
legislation.
In relation to the modern media technology that developed during the 20th century, 
there are two kinds of “labors” entitling to property or profit: firstly, the individual, 
intellectual creation of an artist or inventor. Secondly, the technological achievements, 
a combination of innovation and investment, which are undeniably important and 
also require fair treatment in copyright legislation. Mere “invention” is not a sufficient 
guarantee for an economic breakthrough, since there has to be a commercial 
“innovation” in order to facilitate economic establishment. So, the development 
motive emerged in the interest of making sure that the potential of the technological 
innovations and investments were also recognized in the copyright system.
In this “modern” situation590, the nature of copyright and the principles of justice 
applied to the copyright wealth distribution – including both economics and morality 
– became crucial issues. What would be the just distribution of wealth, resources, and 
opportunities in the digital world? Or would the attempt of the government to insure 
fairness by interfering with the free accumulation of wealth, and redistributing wealth, 
resources, or opportunities result in fundamental injustice by violating the liberty of 
those who have freely earned their position?591
This problem is very clearly present when discussing the piracy issues of three major 
entertainment industries: 1) record production 2) movie industry 3) the electronic game 
industry.592 Piracy may be defined as unauthorized copying for commercial gain.593 
Piracy as a phenomenon has been enabled and encouraged by three elements594:
1. digital formats of content (for quick quality copies)
2. compression technology (to store and transfer files)
3. online penetration, particularly broadband (for access and distribution)
The estimated turnover of these three entertainment industries, worth 92 billion USD 
in 2003, could be up to one third higher without piracy. The industry that is losing the 
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most, music industry is estimated to lose 20 billion USD in 2003, against legitimate sales 
of 32 billion USD. In 2005, the situation is even worse, as the legal sales are estimated 
to decrease to 30 million USD.595 A reservation must however be made in relation to 
these numbers, as they are only intended as an estimation of a phenomenon of which 
no public records exist.
The movie industry is managing better, since out of the total demand of movie 
consumption, 94 per cent, equal to 53 billion USD, are expected to be gathered by the 
legitimate industry. By 2005, the estimated piracy could rise closer to 10 per cent of 
the industry’s total turnover, which is expected to be 62 billion USD.596
Unlike the record and movie industries, it seems that the video game industry has 
managed to keep the piracy problem under control, since nearly 100 per cent of the 
estimated total revenue of video games is earned by the legitimate content owners. 
However, it seems that this otherwise positive situation is subject to some opportunity 
cost, because the industry in general has avoided countries with significant piracy 
problems.597
Scholars have debated the detrimental effect of the Internet on the copyright system 
and the copyright economy. This is a justified concern from the record industry’s point 
of view, since the music (or record) industry is suffering – regardless of whether we 
agree with the estimations presented concerning piracy – from a rapid decline of the 
CD sales, still largely because of physical piracy, but increasingly because of Internet 
piracy.598 In similar fashion, media companies are facing the difficult task of developing 
sound business models to compete with free distribution of information. The movie 
industry and video game industry risk facing the similar concerns along with the 
development of the memory capacity of the computers, unless they are able to learn 
from the music industry’s experiences.
And yet was it not a more or less similar puzzle that led to the creation of the Berne 
Convention? Much of this effect is in fact a symptom of the industry’s inner crisis or 
“path dependence” to the business model of distribution of physical copies. Should 
the industry benefit from the decreasing costs of transportation when moving towards 
electronic distribution? This is the boundary at which one must evaluate, to what 
extent the society of the global community is willing to participate in the cost of 
maintaining sanctioned physical distribution when a dramatically cheaper means is 
available.
As online games move to subscription models with added benefits (e.g. tournament 
play, prizes or awards), there will be increased incentives to pay for legal game units 
and acquire unique registration rights. Such a technology advancement may also 
benefit filmed entertainment in the future, as high-definition televisions increasingly 
get networked with home PCs or advanced set-top boxes, and the industry can move 
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toward a model under which only registered users may receive updated and fresh 
content.599 This will lead to the strengthening of the “social lock”.
According to Stamatoudi, some of the essential trends in relation to multimedia 
production which will have an effect on the development of copyright in the future 
are the changing concept of authorship from a sole author to industrial activity, the 
increasing role of adaptations and reconstructions of works in comparison to original 
material, the increasing role of the industrial incentive rather than artistic desire to 
create, and the dematerialization of the notion of a work600. This development also 
relates to the problem of the smallest protected unit.601
III.6. Controversies of Compulsory Licensing
Although the traditional basis of copyright lies in the profit motive, the human rights 
motive became more important during the 19th century. In the following century, the 
impact of the Second Industrial Revolution was beginning to show in full force. The 
development of new media forms both in the interest of society and business (the 
development motive, the public interest motive) emerged as an important factor in 
the adaptation of compulsory licensing. The early 20th century saw a rise of media 
industries that, unlike the traditional printing industry, were not in a rights holder 
position. This required balancing measures within the copyright system.602 The 
technological development created a new media economy, which required a new 
institutional balance of interests.
When we discuss copyright as both an object of regulation and a vehicle for policy 
making and organizing the market of information business, there are basically three 
stages the legislative may choose from: the copyright exclusivity, the limitations to that 
exclusivity, or a total exemption from liability. Without going into detail as to how the 
international instruments regulate exclusivity and its limitations, we shall rely on the 
definition of limitations as suggested by Martin Senftleben: limitation of copyright 
means permission to use a work without payment (“fair use”), or via a statutory 
or compulsory license (against payment).603 Further, we shall not discuss separately 
statutory (or legal) and compulsory license but use the term ‘compulsory license’ when 
discussing non-voluntary licensing. A distinction to extended collective license is made, 
although it is seen as a model developed from the basis of compulsory licensing and 
thus represents a limitation to copyright in a systematic sense.
Regarding the reasons behind compulsory licensing, Senftleben lists several of them, 
out of which the industry-related are of most importance for the purpose of this 
study:604
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“Limits are moreover set to authors’ rights in order to regulate industry practice 
and competition. The exemption of ephemeral recordings made by broadcasting 
organizations and compulsory licenses concerning broadcasting rights and 
recordings of musical works can be perceived as examples of this type of 
limitation.”
Concerning Senftleben’s definition of compulsory licensing, for the purpose of this 
study, neighboring rights are seen as a form of compulsory licensing. This is an approach 
that is consistent with our distinction of the essential copyright elements:605
-exclusivity (“property right”)
-economic compensation (“liability right”)
-moral rights: paternity, respect (“inalienability”)
In order to discuss the impact of technology on Berne at an institutional level, a brief 
look at the contradictory nature and history of compulsory licensing is necessary to 
understand the nature of the arrangement. 
Compulsory licensing reflects several contradictions related to copyright:
-the non-recovery of sunk costs and the problem of free riding606
-a right to remuneration as a surrogate for the right to exclude607
-the control of a monopoly power not to use its power against the public 
interest608
-impracticality, burdensome nature of negotiations609
-the need to subsidize an infant industry against strong right-holders610
-the incentive/access balance611
In the following these contradictions are discussed in order to develop an understanding 
of the basic functions of compulsory licensing. The discussion also illustrates features 
that may be contributed to the development motive.
III.6.1. Non-Recovery of Sunk Costs and the Free Rider Problem
The non-recovery of sunk costs and free-rider problem of compulsory licensing were 
recently discussed in the context of the Microsoft case in the EU Commission.612 In 
the view of the Commission, Microsoft had abused a dominant position by creating 
interoperability between its product, the Windows desktop operating system, and rival 
products (server operating systems such as Novell’s Netware and the Linux Server), and 
refusing to give the rivals full access to the Windows application program interfaces 
(API). The Commission ordered Microsoft to license the APIs to competitors.613
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Microsoft had mainly two arguments against the proposed solution: first of all, 
creating the APIs had required heavy investments in research and development, and 
was protected not only by copyright but many patents. If the APIs were free to others, 
Microsoft would not be able to recover the sunk cost for the development of the 
APIs.614
Second, Microsoft argued that compulsory licensing would encourage free riders, who 
would not innovate, but rather wait for other firms to innovate first, and then require 
the necessary licenses for others’ work.615
According to a study by Le, the compulsory license in similar circumstances is justified 
per se. But in order to adjust the terms of the compulsory license to be more efficient, 
it would be recommendable to allow the incumbent to organize bidding for the APIs, 
allow joint R&D with the entrant regarding the API’s development, and furthermore, 
the law should allow the incumbent to set a minimum threshold for the access fee.
III.6.2. A Right to Compensation as a Surrogate for the Rights to 
Exclude
Brennan has compared the compulsory licensing of retransmissions to the classic 
example of lighthouses as described by R.H. Coase. His conclusion is that the cases are 
comparable in a sense that in both cases the actual exclusion of outsiders from the use 
of the service is difficult or impossible. Therefore, in both cases a right to remuneration 
serves as a surrogate for the right to actually exclude.616
The loss or non-existence of a choke point would be replaced by a right to remuneration, 
as in the example of Friedman, the non-existence of a choke point may advocate the 
public funding of the service.
In the United States, during the enactment of the cable television compulsory licensing 
provision, the following question was asked. Because the Constitution says that 
Congress may grant authors the exclusive right to their writings, is it unconstitutional 
for Congress to create compulsory licenses which render the author’s copyright less 
than exclusive by taking away from authors the right to deny potential users the use 
of their copyrighted works? The question has never been litigated. In 1909, during 
the enactment of the sound recording compulsory licensing, on the other hand, the 
songwriters feared that if they successfully challenged the mechanical compulsory 
license, they might be left with no protection whatsoever against mechanical 
reproduction of their songs, that is, the issue would fall under the fair use regime.617
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III.6.3. The Public Interest and Control of Monopoly Powers
The public interest view has been supported on many occasions.618 For instance, the US 
and Australian examples indicate a broad application of the public interest argument 
with regard to compulsory licensing.619
During the creation of the broadcasting amendments to the Berne Convention, the 
public interest especially in contradiction to the monopoly power of the right-holders´ 
organizations was expressed on several occasions.620
III.6.4. Impracticality
The mass use of copyright protected works makes the problems of exclusivity-based 
copyright fairly clear. Consider a cable TV system with a capacity of, say, 50 television 
channels. Every channel provides programs 24 hours a day seven days a week 
approximately two programs an hour.
Every program contains at least ten to twenty right-holders, but some major productions 
may contain hundreds or even thousands of cooperators earning some level of 
authorship to some creative element of the program, the average being assumed as 
one hundred. Let us further assume that the licenses for cable retransmissions were 
to be negotiated individually, and the amount of right-holders were 100. A simple 
calculation reveals that during the course of one day, this would amount to agreeing 
on 50 x 24 x 2 x 100 = 240.000 licenses. This is clearly not only impractical, but 
impossible.
The impracticality argument was used during the preparations of the US 1976 Copyright 
Act by the Congress, because it was stated that it would be impractical and unduly 
burdensome to require every cable system to negotiate with every copyright owner 
whose work was retransmitted by a cable system.621 
III.6.5. The Need to Subsidize an Infant Industry
The argument in favor of a new and innovative industry has been raised several times 
in copyright history. For example, in the discussions concerning the amendment of the 
Berne Convention to include the compulsory licensing exemption for phonorecords, 
the point of view of a new industry was raised.622
In the US, the “emerging industry” argument has been widely used especially in relation 
to cable television. The argument is that a developing industry needs the protection of 
a reliable and reasonable compulsory license to make planned growth possible.623 
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III.6.6. Adjusting the Incentive/Access Balance
Compulsory licensing may offer an alternative incentive/access balance within the 
copyright system, if applied between copyright holder and the productive user. Under-
utilization concerns in the consumer market would be met by new entrants producing 
perfect substitutes and forcing down prices.624
The incentive/access balance may however prove an equation with certain instabilities. 
According to Gallagher, the compulsory license for mechanical recordings of musical 
works “must estimate the benefits of interwork competition in the market for musical 
works versus the benefits of intrawork competition in the derivative work market for 
sound recordings”.625 However, Gallagher sees the compulsory licensing scheme as 
problematic, because one of the core functions of copyright is maintaining a private 
and independent creative and productive sector. State interventions to this mechanism 
are contrary to this end.626
Cassler has pointed out, interestingly, that authors do not always seek exclusivity as 
the prime solution for the maximal incentive. In 1909, songwriters feared that if they 
successfully challenged the mechanical license, they might be left with no protection 
whatsoever against mechanical reproduction of their songs.627 This is because the 
likely political alternative would not have been the establishment of exclusivity, but 
fair use.
On the other hand, where there is uncontrolled copying, the copyright owners are no 
longer against compulsory licensing, but actually look into it in order to improve the 
otherwise difficult situation.628
III.7. The Route to “Droits Voisins”
III.7.1. The Compulsory License Debate in Berlin 1908: Business 
Perspectives
During the 1908 Berlin Revision Conference, a sub-commission was appointed to 
consider the question of mechanical reproduction of musical works.629 At the Berlin 
Conference, for the first time in the brief history of the Berne Convention, big business 
interests began to conflict.630
Mechanical reproduction as a form of adaptation was extensively discussed, including 
phonograph recordings and piano rolls. The Closing Protocol of the 1886 had declared 
that mechanical reproduction was not to be an infringement of copyright because 
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such devices were not that time very widespread. This position was left unchanged 
by the 1896 Conference.631 We can here see the initial effect of the invention of the 
phonogram being not yet relevant either to the regulative or business interests. As a 
principle issue, phonograms are discussed, but since no pressing economic need exists 
for resolving the matter, no action is taken.
Some years later, a large industry specializing in the manufacture of phonograph 
recordings had emerged. The phonogram industry had developed from invention to 
innovation.
According to Ricketson, one of the factors contributing to the rapid growth of the 
recording industry was the lack of enforceable rights by copyright owners. The 
copyright owners had initiated campaigns at both national and international levels 
for the recognition of these rights, arguing that phonographic recordings were just 
another form of reproduction.632 The recording industry argued that the recognition of 
these rights would mean the ruin of their industry, which had been built in good faith, 
in the absence of legal restrictions.633
Ricketson’s comment illustrates an interesting shift in the argumentation concerning 
copyright and economic development. Traditionally, copyright has been seen from the 
profit motive’s point of view, a vehicle for encouraging creativity. If we consider closely 
Ricketson’s argument, we realize that he attributes – like Brennan (see earlier) - the 
rapid growth of the phonogram industry to the lack of enforceable rights. We might 
even turn his argument upside down and ask that if society is willing to encourage 
the development of a technological phenomenon, should it in fact consider, instead of 
granting rights, not granting rights. 
If we put the words of Ricketson in Coase’s context, we may face a puzzle. If the 
economic overall optimum is reached regardless of the allocation of rights - assuming 
the parties operate rationally and no transaction costs are taken into account – then 
how is it conceivable that the non-existence of rights would in fact have contributed to 
the positive economic development of a business? Theoretically, this should not be the 
case. The effect that rights however have on economic activity is the balance of power 
within that economic activity, that is, the allocation of rights pre-sets the negotiation 
positions of the parties. Twisting Ricketson’s words a little bit, if the exclusive right to 
control the recording of a work would have been established early on, the development 
of the industry might not have been as quick and broad as it was.634 We will not go as far 
as claiming that Ricketson would have seen the development of the recording industry 
as a negative trend, rather he illustrates the position of the industrial entrepreneur 
who seizes an opportunity knowing that legislation lags behind.
Going back to the “party-analysis” of Posner’s example discussed earlier, the rights 
affect the monetary outcome of the parties within certain economic activity. Therefore, 
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if the other party is not compensated for the production factor that it provides, this 
enables the other party to use this production factor without cost, and further invest 
into and develop the exploiting business. Therefore, the allocation of rights in this sense 
affects the industry’s development prospects. Leaving the industry free to exploit the 
production factors will certainly benefit the industry and facilitate its development. But 
this may also be the result of a conscious and intended legislative motive, that is, the 
development motive.
The protection afforded to literary and artistic works by the Convention in its original 
form gave the authors not only the right to equitable remuneration when their works 
were used, but also the exclusive right to authorize the use of their works, and therefore 
prevent others from using them.635 The music publishers (sheet music) had traditionally 
adopted the same business model in use in the publishing industry, namely acquiring 
from the authors the exclusive rights to the published works.636
The record industry especially in the US and the UK considered it important however 
to allow competition to flourish in this new industry through allowing competing 
record companies to produce sound recordings based on the same music and lyrics.637 
It is conceivable that the industry had “landed” in this production model through trial 
and error. It is also quite likely that the respect of the author’s right was never high in 
the Schumpeterian entrepreneurs’ agenda. The entrepreneur is simply reacting on the 
basis of his commercial opportunities, and will not in the first instance hire lawyers to 
find out what is wrong with his business concept.
Naturally, as Ricketson has explained, this led to legal conflict that had to be resolved. 
The Berlin Conference was finally persuaded to compromise: Article 13 expressly 
recognized the exclusive rights of musical copyright owners in relation to the adaptation 
of their works to instruments capable of reproducing them mechanically, as well as 
the public performance of those works by means of these instruments.638 However, 
the application of the Article was left subject to such reservations and conditions as 
might be determined by the domestic legislation of each country. This meant, in favor 
of the recording industry’s interests, that the system of compulsory licensing could 
be enforced. Germany had already introduced compulsory licensing, with the United 
States and the UK following. On the other hand, nothing compelled the member 
countries to adopt the formula.639
In the record industry, competitive advantage had to be secured by exclusive contracts 
with performers (not authors) and by making better recordings or better marketing 
of a given work. Unlike the solution adopted concerning the movie rights, the record 
producer could not block competition by acquiring exclusive rights from the composer 
of a song.640
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III.7.2. The Development of the Record Producer’s Right at the 
International Level
If the printed book was the main fixed platform of creative works in the first era of 
copyright, the sound recording, in its increasingly varied forms, has been the foremost 
subject of the second, increasingly electronic era.641 Similar to the printing piracy in 
the 15th century, in the early 20th century an increasing number of producers started 
to select for reproduction such records that had already proven successful on the 
market.642 Unlike publishers, who finally had the benefit of the printing privileges, 
as a legal establishment of their business, phonogram producers could not obtain 
exclusive rights from the authors to reproduce and distribute the latter’s works in the 
form of sound recordings. This could have provided them with at least some indirect 
protection against unauthorized copying of their sound recordings.643 The problem of 
the investor’s protection, the legal establishment of the business, had to be resolved 
due to the pressures created by the industry. This was no longer a matter of developing 
a new commercial innovation, but the establishment phase, where existing business 
interests had to be legally protected.
According to Boytha, the commercialization of the sound recordings has gone through 
two main phases: during the first phase, it was mainly important to control the use 
of the recordings that were put out by the initial producer. During the second phase, 
the control of reproduction has become equally important.644 We could say that the 
present day’s piracy issue is a clear indication of the second phase. The producer 
however needs an ally in this process. As the publishers joined with the authors in 
late 17th century England, on the eve of losing their privileges, so did the producers 
join with the performing artists to enable the legal establishment of the recording 
business.
At the diplomatic conference in Rome in 1928, the Italian Government together with 
the Berne Union first proposed that “when a musical work has been adapted to a 
mechanical instrument by the contribution of performing artists these latter should also 
benefit from the protection granted to that adaptation”. Phonograms were considered 
to be derivative works, that is, adaptations by performing artists of the works fixed 
therein.645 The Italian Government was not so much worried about the exclusive right 
itself, but about the benefit, that is, monetary compensation. Contrary to the common 
doctrine of copyright, it seems that exclusivity does not enjoy the highest priority, but 
economic compensation.
No agreement was reached in Rome. The Norwegian delegate pointed out that the 
problem exceeded the scope of the Berne Convention and asked whether it would 
not suffice to make the protection in question the subject of a special convention. The 
question was taken up by the International Confederation of the Societies of Authors 
and Composers (CISAC) in 1932. In this occasion, the term “neighbouring right” was 
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used for the first time in public.646 It is quite evident that the authors had not only 
doctrinal concerns but also an economic interest to make a distinction between the 
primary rights – copyright – in relation to other rights. 
In the Brussels Diplomatic Conference in 1948, the Belgian Government and the Berne 
Union again proposed a new Article (11 quater), according to which the performance 
of any work, protected or not, should have been protected under the conditions to 
be determined by the domestic legislation in each country of the Union. However, the 
majority of the delegations were of the view that the protection of performers should 
be secured in a framework other than the Berne Convention. The Conference adopted 
respective “wishes” concerning the protection of producers of phonograms and the 
rights neighboring the authors’ rights, in particular the protection of performers. The 
majority of the delegations also “expressed the desire that the governments of the 
countries of the Union study the means of securing, without prejudice to the rights of 
the authors, the protection of the manufacturers of instruments serving the purpose 
of mechanical reproduction of music”.647
Finally, after years of preparation, in 1960, a committee of experts from the predecessor 
of WIPO, UNESCO, and ILO met at The Hague to draft a convention that was later to 
become the International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of 
Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations.648
Since the Rome Convention combines the three basic neighboring rights, it has proven 
a rather slow instrument when, for example, rapid measures against piracy are needed. 
A simple convention – in comparison to Berne - was created in order to address the 
issues of making unauthorized duplicates of phonograms and the importation and 
distribution of such phonograms. In 1971 in Geneva, the Convention for the Protection 
of Producers of Phonograms Against Unauthorized Duplication of Their Phonograms 
(“the Phonogram Convention”) was created. The quick increase in the number of 
States party to it is partly because the Convention does not contain a minimum 
requirement concerning rights granted to the producers. It leaves to the contracting 
states the means – one or more - to choose from the following: the grant of copyright 
or other specific rights, protection by means of the law on unfair competition, and 
penal sanctions.649
III.7.3. The Motives and the Phonogram Solution
According to Ricketson, the most notable problem, and also an indication of the 
problems that were to emerge in the future, was “the threat posed to authors’ rights 
by the emergence of new technological means of reproducing and disseminating their 
works”, and the growth of powerful interest groups engaged in the exploitation of 
these new technologies.650
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If the point of view is strictly limited to the human rights motive – protection of the 
author as an intrinsic value – this conclusion is correct. Also from the point of view 
of the exclusivity doctrine, in a purely defined exclusivity-based copyright system, the 
idea of compulsory licensing was theoretically incorrect.
However, there is probably cause to examine Ricketson’s words somewhat critically. 
When someone becomes an artist, it is commonplace that this choice of profession 
is not inspired by a need for solitude and keeping the fruits of personal expression to 
oneself. Normally, an artist or an author are not only economically motivated, but also 
with a drive to have their works published and distributed as widely as possible. It is 
not at all clear that if an artist is presented with new forms of media, enabling a wider 
distribution of his work, and even new creative uses, he should feel threatened. On the 
contrary: artists are usually not known for their conservativeness, but rather for their 
interest to explore new areas of self-expression. Therefore, Ricketson’s view of the 
threat to the authors’ rights must be seen in the proper context: it is economic piracy, 
that was feared, not technology as such.
From an economic point of view, as technology offers better and cheaper ways of 
distributing copyright protected works, the authors and artists must have realized 
that there is an opportunity involved, either to have a larger share of the income 
collected from the consumer, to gain a bigger audience, and even broaden or create 
a completely new market.651
In a similar fashion, as we discuss electronic media, we notice another point that to 
some extent contradicts Ricketson’s opinion: in, for example, broadcasting, it is not 
proper that one author or rights holder could with his dissent block the broadcasting 
of a work that has several right-holders. This would in fact be against the right-holders’ 
interests, and would create ample opportunities for opportunistic behavior at the cost 
of the overall efficiency. The problem has also societal and cultural aspects that have 
to be taken into account. 
If all right-holders were to act rationally, this problem would not exist according 
to Coase. However, as Posner allows the subjective evaluation of rights, the right-
holders involved may evaluate their rights differently, and not come to a conclusion. 
The situation could be used for “hi-jacking” the others in order to receive excessive 
compensation. Finally, if the role of non-assignable (moral) rights is emphasized, this 
could lead to lengthy negotiations with random results. Even if we did not discuss 
the consequences of potential irrational behavior, we might conclude that under such 
circumstances, the market would no longer be effective or even function.
It is clear that along with the traditional profit and human rights motives in favor of 
the author, there were other interests that played an important role in the decision-
making of the 1908 conference. The conference gave credit to the arguments of the 
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phonogram producers, thus supporting the development motive – the encouragement 
of the development of new technologies and business models that were based on 
them. The solution to allow competing record companies to make recordings of the 
same songs without the author’s express consent was pro-competitive and at least was 
intended to have a positive impact on the development of the recording industry.
It is interesting to compare this solution to the motives behind the introduction of 
the printing privileges in Venice in 1469 (as well as the Stationers’ Company): the 
system of privileges was introduced to avoid the risk of someone printing the same 
material someone else had printed or was printing.652 The Berne Convention regulation 
concerning phonograms in 1908 attempted – at least seemingly - to reach the opposite 
goal: to facilitate record company competition by compulsory licensing of works. Why 
the opposite results?
Because of the privileges, the Venetian printers were able to protect their investments 
against excessive competition, whereas record companies were able to compete 
without exclusive deals on their raw material, that is, copyright protected works of 
music and lyrics. For the record industry, this meant an ability to continue utilizing the 
business model that had been earlier adopted, which was based on the opportunity 
to make various performances of the work on phonograms.653
The phonograph solution also served the profit motive, as the record industry claimed 
it had already been “built up” under the old regime, which afforded no copyright 
protection.654 The detrimental change of rules when an industry has already made 
significant investments under certain assumptions may easily lead to business failure, 
if the rules of the game are suddenly changed. The Venetian printing industry suffered 
from excessive competition within the industry and this required limitation. The 
record industry had adopted a business model, which was threatened by the authors’ 
requirements. So, as the basic threats of the respective industries were in different 
directions, the solutions had to be different.655
The Venetian solution tackled a problem that threatened the adopted business model, 
and likewise, the phonogram solution was directed to the encouragement of the 
development of the record industry’s current business model. Concerning the record 
industry, there was no competition from the “old technology” as such technology did 
not exist, which meant that the development motive was not challenged by protective 
interests of investors of the old school. One might conclude that the Venetian 
privileges were handed out purely in the interest of the profit motive, with probably 
some public or censorship interest, but the 1908 conference placed more emphasis on 
the development motive.656 A common feature remains: the protection of the business 
model, whether static (Venice) or dynamic (the record industry). 
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The debate concerning the record producer’s right continued through most of the 20th 
century. The right was finally adopted at the international level in the Rome Convention 
1961.657
Seen from the point of view of the artist, the development of technology may not only 
seem a threat, as Ricketson has pointed out, but an opportunity to use his or her talent 
investment in a new and additional way, and gain in the long run. It is self-evident that 
the record industry has enabled artists to gain income through sales of records. Some 
artists do not operate in any other way than by publishing recordings of their works.658 
Some discussion has taken place on whether a recording could be a work of art itself, 
protected by copyright.659
The human rights motive as such does not seem to have been a prime concern in the 
1908 conference. However, it is not too far-fetched to claim that the later development 
of the recording industry has also meant a development of a new art form, and thus 
benefited society. With the invention of music recordings, music itself has been made 
accessible all over the world, which may benefit mankind.660 Therefore, the presence 
of the human rights motive as “rights of others” could be argued.
Very importantly, the Berlin conference was persuaded to allow the states to draw a 
distinction in their domestic legislation, between the right of the author to equitable 
remuneration for the use of the work, and the right of the author, or his assignee, to 
restrict competition in the newly emerging record market.661 One could say that for the 
first time the traditional profit motive was challenged by the development motive. 
III.8. Broadcasting and the Public Interest Motive
What was the role of the early broadcasting activity? As an initial technological limitation, 
an important element that affects broadcasting legislation was – and still is to a certain 
extent - the scarcity of the broadcasting frequencies662. Broadcasting is still today a 
problem area of legislation, as it, on the one hand, provides a remarkable opportunity 
for disseminating information to the masses, and therefore enhances democracy. On 
the other, concerning the international allocation of frequencies, smaller countries, in 
particular, were entitled to only a very limited number of broadcasting frequencies, 
which has lead to the creation of broadcasting monopolies. As these monopolies 
represented important political power, they were initially organized both in Europe 
and in most other countries to be controlled by the state and to have an important 
role as a tool for maintaining governmental control. In the era of National Socialism, 
and also in socialist countries, broadcasting was a central factor for controlling society. 
It has been pointed out that in a state coup, the first building the revolutionaries raid 
is no longer parliament but the central TV station.663
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In the Rome Conference 1928, the national emphasis of broadcasting legislation was 
reflected in the report of the broadcasting sub-committee:664
“(…) because national legislation has, in various guises, given broadcasting 
services a markedly social character, it is difficult, precisely when the tendency 
seems destined to increase more and more, to anticipate the manner in which 
broadcasting services and the laws governing them are going to develop.”
The reasons for regulating broadcasting may be divided into four categories:665
a) because the airwaves are a public resource, the government (or some agency 
on its behalf) is entitled to license their use for broadcasting on the terms it sees 
fit
b) since the broadcasting frequencies are very limited, it is impossible for 
everyone to acquire a license to broadcast or to enjoy access to air his or her 
views on radio or television. Therefore, government may reasonably require 
licensees to share their privilege with other representatives of the public, and 
may compel them to present a balanced range of programs in the interests of 
the listeners and viewers. (according to Barendt, this is the most widely used 
argument.)
c) television and radio are more influential on public opinion than the press (or 
at least are widely thought to be).666
d) broadcasting is still a relatively new phenomenon, and it is understandable 
that society has wanted to regulate it, just as it has treated the cinema with 
more caution than it has the theatre. (an argument contributed by Barendt to 
Lee Bollinger) 
Although some of these arguments may have at least partially lost relevance, it is 
important especially from the point of view of copyright development to see their 
importance. From early on, broadcasting has been a target of wide public interest and 
also debate. It is therefore only natural that the copyright regulation models chosen 
have also reflected public interest.
The role of broadcasting as an important source of political power most likely had 
an effect, when the broadcasting right was discussed. The possibility for the Berne 
Convention member states to use compulsory licensing was opened again in the context 
of broadcasting. This was due to the problems of exclusivity in mass use, but one 
might also conclude that the operations of an important public policy vehicle were not 
allowed to be dismantled by individual right-holders or even collective organizations.667 
British and French delegations suggested adding the radio broadcasting right to the 
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author’s other exclusive rights, while delegations of especially Australia and New 
Zeeland thought the matter must be subject to intervention by the public authorities 
to protect the cultural and social interests linked to this specific new form of popular 
dissemination of intellectual works.668 So, it is likely that the solution concerning 
broadcasting was not primarily based on economics as in the case of phonograms, 
but on public policy issues.669 
On the Berne agenda, broadcasting was first discussed in the 1928 Rome Conference. 
A sub-commission was appointed to report on the matter.670
In the Rome Conference, the broadcasting right, as distinct from the public performance 
right, was introduced.671 A new Article 11bis recognized the exclusive right of authors to 
authorize the communications of their works to the public by means of broadcasting. 
It was however left to the member states to regulate the conditions under which this 
new right was to be exercised within their territory.672 This clearly comprehended such 
restrictions as compulsory licenses, but these restrictions should in no way prejudice 
the author’s moral right, nor his right to equitable remuneration.673 The problem 
illustrated by Friedman on parks and highways resembles, once again, the logic behind 
the solution:674
“The growth of new technical methods of using works makes it increasingly 
difficult for authors to exercise exclusive rights, and may even make individual 
licenses impossible in practice.”
A proposal concerning the performers’ similar exclusive right in relation to the 
broadcasting of their performances was not dealt with, because the commission 
thought there was insufficient uniformity in national approaches to justify attempting 
an international solution. The question was left to a resolution on the subject.675
As Ricketson points out, this was another instance of a new technological development 
that had profound implications for author’s rights.676 Radio broadcasting had begun 
in France and Great Britain in 1922, and was therefore unknown during the Berlin 
Conference in 1908.677
In Europe, three approaches had been made on a national level concerning the 
broadcasting right: in some countries domestic law defined copyright broadly as 
including all means of reproduction and performance of a work: in these countries, 
the law clearly gave the author rights when the work was broadcast.678
In countries of a more specifically defined protection of the author679, the situation 
was more difficult. The definition of “performance” was however thought to include 
broadcasting by an important scholar, and later on the courts both in Great Britain and 
Australia adopted this view.680
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In Germany, the courts and the legal profession approached the issue by elimination: 
radio broadcasting was not an adaptation of the work, nor was it a reproduction. Rather 
it was re-diffusion, which was protected by the national law. Italy and Czechoslovakia 
had passed their copyright laws after the arrival of radio, and a broadcasting right was 
specifically identified in their national laws.681 - This illustrates the classical difficulty 
of the “founding fathers” of copyright legislation to succeed with forward-looking 
legislation: new media forms do not easily - let alone certainly - adapt to old regulations, 
however they are formulated.
During the proceedings of the Rome Conference in 1928, France and Italy wanted 
specific recognition in the Convention of an exclusive right for authors of literary and 
artistic works to authorize their works to be broadcast.682 Australia, New Zealand, and 
Norway saw radio as just another publishing medium, and a public interest dimension 
to the manner in which it was established, as radio served the social and cultural 
interests of the public. Australia and New Zealand delegates in particular saw radio 
as an instrument of education, and were concerned about the Berne Convention’s 
impact on their educational policies. They also expressed worries over the activities of 
the performing rights societies.683
According to Porter, the old arguments about the social function of copyright 
resurfaced:684
“Did the author have a fundamental quasi-mystical right over the manner 
in which the work might be used by any new technology, or could a society 
control the terms under which that technology was used? Was copyright law 
only to be beneficial to the author, or could it serve society as a whole?”
A compromise was reached during the final days of the conference. The first 
paragraph of the new Article 11bis established the exclusive right of the author to 
control the broadcasting of the work. The scope of the right was limited to broadcasts 
“communicated to the public”.685 The right granted was based on a process of public 
communication.
The solution was very important concerning the development of copyright protection: 
The rights covered extended beyond individual acts of copying and performance to 
allow society to regulate one of its most advanced technologies of communication. The 
rules applying to other forms of exploitation might not apply to broadcasting. Member 
States were allowed to limit the author’s broadcasting right to enable broadcasters 
to fulfill their social responsibilities, as the second paragraph of the new Article 11bis 
allowed restrictions as long as the moral right was intact and the author had a right 
to obtain equitable remuneration. If no agreement on the remuneration could be 
reached, the state may appoint a competent authority to determine it.686
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It is no coincidence that the public interest motive (the human rights of others than the 
copyright holder) was strongly emphasized during the broadcasting discussion; since 
broadcasting capacity was scarce due to the limited number of frequencies allocated to 
each member country of ITU, the broadcasting operations were commonly organized 
to be carried out by state-owned companies or even governmental units.687 Therefore, 
the argumentation seeking justification for copyright limitations was based on the 
public service virtues – education, equal access to communication. The public interest 
motive was therefore quite important in the 1928 Conference, and one might say that 
it clearly overruled the human rights motive
In Scandinavian legislation, the licensing systems were based on the extended 
collective licensing system, which are discussed in the context of photocopying later 
in this study. 
As Russell encourages us to take a look behind altruistic motives, it is quite clear that 
the member states had a public policy interest – if not censorship interest - in the new 
media, which could be justified by human rights argumentation. This is however not 
an attempt to undermine the importance of that argumentation.
III.8.1. The Broadcasting Business Model as Distinct from Cinema 
Apparently for the first time in the history of copyright – with regard to both recording 
and broadcasting - the issue of mass use of copyright protected works emerges. The 
problem of mass use in relation to the exclusivity of the copyright holder has two 
elements: first of all, the technology allowing mass use can be paralyzed if every rights 
holder has in effect the right to prohibit the use. Second, if this happens, then the 
rights holder who consents, becomes a hostage of the one dissenting, which means 
that one rights holder can prevent another from realizing his economic rights and 
exploiting his copyright. This is both unjust from the right-holders’ point of view and 
inappropriate from both the broadcasting companies’ and society’s/users’ point of 
view.
Therefore effective measures had to be created in order to maintain two benefits, 
enable the right-holders to benefit from the use of their rights, and enable society to 
benefit from broadcasting without the threat of unreasonable demands of individual 
right-holders. 
How is broadcasting then different from cinema which did not require a compulsory 
licensing exception? This was explained by the representative of the International 
Federation of Actors in the following manner in the conference discussing the 
Rome Convention:688 Contrary to general opinion, sound movies had not played a 
predominant role in the evolution. Although the cinema had attracted very many 
actors, most were still working in theatres:
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“It was indisputable it was the mechanical means of reproduction and 
transmission (recording, radio and television) which had, in the space of a few 
years, transformed the author, who, until then, had been master of his own 
performance and his own talent, into a supplier for a chain of industries which 
reproduced and used his work unrestrictedly. (...) Broadcasting and television 
had introduced a new economic relationship between the performer and the 
public. Previously, the number of people listening to a performance could be 
controlled but recording now completely separated the performer from his 
performance, in other words, his performance could be possessed by others.”
As with the publishing contracts of books, the performer controls his performance 
in movies, and is able to create an agreement. Later on, the use of the movie in 
broadcasting is no longer under the performer’s direct control. From the author’s 
perspective, the “choke point” is lost. Therefore, it is quite apparent that the conditions 
and business logic of the broadcasting industry were and remained different from the 
movie industry.
III.9. Cinema – the Authorship of a Business Unit 
Unlike traditional arts, which were seen as a result of human creative effort – the 
creation of a genius – the cinema in the early days of international copyright protection 
was seen merely as an extension of photographic expression, reproducing reality with 
the aid of a machine. But when artists like Picasso and Cocteau took an interest in 
making movies, the critics and the audience could no longer disregard cinema as a art 
form.689 The ability to add sound to movies made an important improvement in the 
product itself but also created a new business setting.690 The movie industry was also 
commercially important to France in the early years of cinema. As Cowen has stated, 
France initially maintained the cinema industry’s global market leadership but lost it to 
the US shortly after the First World War.691
The US industry statistics on motion picture releases is more limited, but the level 
of production was very high in 1939 (761 releases, of which US produced 483 and 
imported 278). In the following decades, the production quantities would decrease 
rather than increase.692
Movies are very expensive to make, and in a given year there are fewer movies released 
than books, CDs, or paintings. These conditions favor dominant producers.693 In no 
other cultural area is the US dominance so clear.694
As an explanation of this state of affairs, Cowen believes that television has hurt 
especially the European domestic movie production.695 Hollywood has a superior 
ability to evaluate cinematic projects and forecast and meet consumer demand.696 
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Consumers prefer US movies.697 In Schumpeter’s language, their talent may be equal 
concerning ”invention”, but superior concerning ”innovations”.
But above all, since clusters are important for the creative industries, one turn-around 
effect may move a cluster from one locale to another. French had a dominant position 
in the world cinema market before the First World War, but lost it because movie 
productions ceased for many years. Hollywood was quick to take that place and 
started to dominate world markets in the 1920s, only a few years after the First World 
War.698 Hollywood executives also saw talking movies as an opportunity to expand 
abroad.699
It is thus important to realize that the early acceptance of cinema as an art form in the 
Berne Convention (1908) had French backing and influence.
III.9.1. Cinema in the Berne Convention
In the Berlin revision 1908, the first steps were taken to implement the continental 
European view that cinematography was an artistic form of creation rather than 
simply an industrial product.700 When a literary or artistic work was reproduced by 
cinematography, first of all, the author was protected. The movie itself could also 
be protected, if the author had given the work a personal and original character.701 
Cinematographic works were compared to translations or dramatizations, and their 
protection was stipulated along the same lines.702
In the Rome revision of 1928, the provision limiting protection to movies of a dramatic 
character was removed, and the need for a work to have an “original character” was 
removed in the Brussels revision of 1948.703
In the revision of the Convention in Brussels 1948, cinematographic works were given 
“list status” enumerated in Article 2 of the Convention.704
Unlike the case with recording rights, no compulsory licensing was allowed for the 
member states.705 Whereas in the record industry, competitive advantage had to be 
secured by exclusive contracts with performers and by making better recordings of a 
given work, in the movie industry competition had to be based on acquiring both the 
exclusive rights in the original work, and by exclusive contracts with the performers 
of that work. Blocking competition in the movie industry could thus be achieved 
by acquiring the exclusive rights of the literary work on which the movie was to be 
based.706 
One might point out that the solution was entirely opposite to that of the record 
protection. The movie itself was protected as a work of art, the record was not, and 
even the neighboring rights protection took until the 1961 Rome Convention. An 
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author could make an exclusive arrangement concerning the movie, but not concerning 
the recording. Why is that?
As pointed out before, and unlike the movie, a recording was not seen as an independent 
work of art, but merely a technical platform that was able to contain works and that 
could be used for public or private performance of the work. Recording music was 
faced with similar discussions on the man/machine dichotomy as photography did. 
Since the business logic of the early 20th century recording industry was largely based 
on copying successful recordings of other companies707, other arrangements would 
have been – as was claimed at the time - harmful to the recording industry.
The argumentation concerning the artistic importance of movies, and the early 
recognition of movies as an independent form of art, had a French influence.708 However, 
the profit motive also played an important role in the solution, as cinematographic 
works were the only category of works in the Berne Convention whose author might 
conceptually also be other than a human.709 
In this respect, a major deviation from the earlier dominance of the human rights 
motive was made in relation to movies, when it was agreed that the rights holder 
did not have to be an individual human being. Also a commercial company could 
be a rights holder. Since the rights for cinematographic works were never tied to a 
human rights holder, it was evident that from this point of view, the Berne Convention 
protected the investor as the rights holder. The business model of the movie industry 
is, as a rule, based on the authorship of a legal person. This solution has been strongly 
criticized by Ricketson.710
The process by which cinematographic works are made makes it difficult to identify the 
persons who are final authors of the production.711 Differences in national approaches 
seem to have emerged in the post –World War II period. By the time of the Stockholm 
Revision Conference in 1967, the Berne members could be divided into two camps: 
firstly, the “movie copyright” countries, mainly with a common law background, who 
granted all rights in movies to one person, usually the producer, who could also be a 
corporate entity. Secondly, some countries protected all human participants involved in 
making the movie who could be regarded as its “authors” or intellectual creators.712
One consequence of the Stockholm Revision of 1967 was that the determination of the 
ownership of copyright in cinematographic works was left as a matter to be decided 
in the national legislation of the country where protection was claimed, allowing 
however, as mentioned before, the authorship of a legal person.713
The different outcomes in relation to movies and recordings would interestingly suggest 
a “cascade” theory of business models, resembling the Coase theorem: businesses will 
find their way regardless of the legal allocation of rights. Both solutions also reflect the 
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international community’s ability to adjust copyright doctrine to correspond better to 
economic requirement of the relevant businesses, that is, the development motive.
III.10. Photography – The Technology Related Man/
Machine Dichotomy
In the 1896 Paris Revision Conference, proposals by Belgium and France to include 
photographic works in the list of works protected were fully debated.714 In the Berlin 
Conference 1908, a final compromise was made in a form of a separate Article 4, 
under which states were bound to protect photographic works and works produced 
by a process analogous to photography. This was however modified by Article 7 
providing a shorter term of protection to be accorded to such works.715
Oesch has pointed out716 that the reason for overlooking the granting of an author’s 
right to photographic works was the differing opinions of the member countries 
relating to the nature of a photograph as a literary or artistic work. Some countries 
considered photography way too technical to be considered a result of artistic work.717 
The only exception at the first stage was the protection of a photograph taken from a 
protected work of art: this enjoyed the same protection as the original work.718 Thus, 
it seems clear that a strong human rights motive was lacking, due to a perceived man/
machine dichotomy, as was a strong profit motive for granting exclusivity rights for 
photographic works.
However, photography is interesting from the point of view of technology: it illustrates 
the difficulties the legal community has had in identifying new forms of technology 
and evaluating their legal status.719 However, the initial reluctance of the member 
states to add the protection of photographic works to the Convention might indicate 
a lack of business interest or profit motive, which would have supported taking the 
issue to a higher political level in the Berne Convention’s agenda. There were initially 
no sufficient interests to oppose the ‘purity’ argument of photograph as a semi-
technical work in comparison to ‘pure’ artistic works. Unlike phonograph, movies, or 
broadcasting, photography itself did not form a separate and independent business 
model with a strong profit or development motive. Nor was there an important public 
interest element.
It is apparent that during the discussions of the copyright status of the photograph, 
there were no Schumpeterian entrepreneurs to defend their economic positions, 
because there was no independently important economic function of photography as 
such.
Photographic works achieved “list status” in the Brussels Conference in 1948.720
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CHAPTER FOUR: 
Further Deviation from the Exclusivity Doctrine 
Towards Platform Fees
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IV.1. Background Factors to the Change: The Evolving 
Concept of the Author
As we have discussed above, in the Middle Ages, the copying technology available 
allowed no one to efficiently copy works of art in the modern sense. Therefore, the 
originality of the works was not an issue, that is, the authorship of the work. The 
writings may have stemmed from many historical sources, and were usually copied 
by hand from oral speech.721 In the age of electronic distribution and the mass use 
of copyright protected works, the position of the author at the centre of copyright 
has again emerged in the debate. The concept of the individual author created in the 
Enlightenment is criticized.722 An indication of the change is evident in, for example, 
the EU directive on the legal protection of computer programs, where the author is 
defined in the following manner (Article 2:1):
“The author of a computer program shall be the natural person or group of 
natural persons who has created the program, or, where the legislation of the 
Members State permits, the legal person designated as the rightholder by that 
legislation.”
Ricketson wrote723 in 1992:
“My thesis is that (the concept of authorship) has now developed close to 
the breaking point. While it still embodies the values of personal creation 
traditionally central to copyright law, these values have now reached the point at 
which they are being steadily undermined and debased. (...) The choice is rapidly 
becoming one between people and machines: which value should the Berne 
Convention and national copyright laws embody and protect?”
Ricketson gives several supporting factors concerning his argument that the author 
is, and must be, a person. Article 1 of the Berne Convention refers to the need to 
protect the “rights of authors in their literary and artistic works”, which seems a clear 
reference to personal rather than corporate rights. The general term of protection is 
made dependent upon the author’s lifetime. Moral rights would make no sense if the 
author is not a human. Finally, the only instance where the author may be other than 
human, cinematographic works, is “clearly an exception”. Ricketson summarizes that 
the work must not be generated by a machine or be the result of some organized 
industrial undertaking wherein it is impossible to identify an individual human creator 
or creators.724
This anxious request for maintaining a human creator in the center of the copyright 
legislation may raise several questions. The author can be a corporation in the case 
of a movie, or the rights may be concentrated through exclusivity agreements in a 
corporation enjoying copyright benefits of the author, as in the case of, for example, 
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record producers and publishers. In the case of data programming, it may not make 
very much sense to use the concept “author” for a commissioned work for industrial 
use, where the legal presumption is the transfer of copyright to the employer.
However, an even more serious blow against the concept of author, especially droit 
d’auteur/genius, may come from the direction of computer-generated or computer-
assisted works. The human intellectual effort that was praised in the 18th and 19th 
century, may seem less impressive, when a chess computer beats the human world 
champion, and when the qualities of individual humans are increasingly explained 
using genealogical concepts.
Another point that sounds almost trivial: the copyright of the 19th century was granted 
for literary and artistic works that could be produced by an individual artist on his 
own, with the help of pencil and paper: a novel or a music composition.725 Therefore, 
to control the terms of the use of such a work was relatively simple. The works of the 
late 20th and 21st century may be very different, since especially concerning television 
or movie production, the efforts of the producer/investor are sine qua non to the end 
result. The division of copyright into the industrial rights–natured economic protection 
of investments, and the human rights–based moral rights could be justified at least in 
the cases where the production of the copyright protected works is no longer in the 
sole control of the original, individual author.726
IV.1.1. The Author’s Autonomy
Another important point, which relates to the issue of “impact”, is what does an 
author actually do with the rights? In the 19th century, it was conceivable that the 
author could maintain some kind of direct control over the use of his works. The 
development of the mass media has necessitated the rise of collecting societies and 
has also meant that rights management has become an industry in itself, demanding 
expertise, which is not possible for individual authors or performers to maintain. Their 
profession is not the “establishment”, but rather the actual creation. When rights are 
strengthened through legislative changes, and the author’s position is stronger, will 
the author benefit from this directly or should we monitor the totality comprising the 
author as a holder of right and the collecting organization as the manager of rights?
Collecting organizations can increase the individual author’s negotiating power, 
and may also act as influential lobbying organizations.727 When the protection of 
the author is advocated during the legislation process, it is usually the collecting 
organizations or their representatives that speak with his or her voice.728 As clear as 
it is that the author’s protection is as legitimate as ever and a widely accepted value 
of any civilized society, it is only reasonable to recognize, that the rights management 
is an industry in itself, and like any industry, willing and also capable of defending 
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its own interests. Therefore, the choice of full exclusivity, economic compensation, 
compulsory licensing, extended collective licensing or platform fees, are also strategic 
choices for the copyright organizations. It is also strategically important for the 
collecting organizations to advocate the recognition of even non-assignable (person 
related human) rights, as this improves the position of the organization as a market 
maker. The harm inflicted on economic interests can always be calculated somehow, 
but an infringement against a “sacred right” may turn the negotiations in the direction 
of compensation for additional damages. 
However, it is inconceivable that any chosen direction of the copyright legislation 
would lead to seriously questioning the existence and need for collective organizations 
of rights management, simply because the required special knowledge is substantially 
different from artistic creation, and there is a need for mass licenses and negotiations 
for agreeing on acceptable terms. Copyright organizations may also provide reduced 
transaction costs concerning copyright licensing.
IV.1.2. Artistic Creation: from Exclusivity Towards Compulsory 
Elements
When the rights of the phonogram producers and rights of authors in relation to 
phonogram production were discussed in the Rome Convention of 1928, the Italian 
representatives claimed that a copyright system based on exclusivity is not necessarily 
the only basis for the author’s economic protection, but instead the compulsory 
licensing system with economic benefits (remuneration) could be considered as the 
basis for the whole copyright system.729
Although this idea as a general basis for a copyright system was premature in the early 
20th century, the development of the information technology has brought about the 
serious challenge of the mass use of copyright protected works, and the international 
copyright system has recognized this need in allowing flexible licensing regimes to 
develop. Compulsory licensing was allowed in 1908 concerning the needs of the 
recording industry and later on this model was used concerning broadcasting and re-
broadcasting. The Nordic development of the extended collective license is an attempt 
to create a combination of the exclusivity element and compulsory license element 
with a bargaining element. This is however – from the contractually tied third parties’ 
point of view - also one step in the distancing from the original exclusivity model of 
copyright in the middle of the 19th century.
Since the major problem of the use of copyright works is the private copying, which 
should according to the EU Infosoc directive be adequately compensated, it seems likely 
that the new copyright system will be increasingly based on general compensation and 
compulsory licensing than exclusivity and individual negotiations. Hugenholtz sees the 
195
application of copyright levies for the purpose of ‘legalization’ of peer-to-peer activity 
and private copying as a “colossal expansion of the scope of statutory licenses”.730 
Thus, the choke point concerning the collective compensation of the authors will 
increasingly be a political issue in the public administration, rather than a commercial 
question between bargaining parties. However, some artists will remain more popular 
than others, and the industry around them will develop new forms.
Katarina Renman Claesson has proposed the separation of copyright into two distinct 
areas: the exclusivity of the creator, requiring originality, and the exclusivity of the 
investor, requiring actual investment in production.731 This would most likely provide a 
proper way of approaching one important deviation of the copyright doctrine, namely 
the protection of computer programs.
IV.2. Photocopying, VCRs and C-Cassettes – The Three-
Step Test on Reproduction
After the Second World War, the advent of copying with magnetophones raised new 
demands for protection against illicit copying. It became both simple and cheap to 
copy records using a magnetic tape.732
The right to reproduction was, on the one hand, a technical specification in the Berne 
Convention to expressly recognize the author’s position in relation to unauthorized 
reproduction. On the other, several developing new technologies for reproduction 
were emphasizing the urgency of the clear specification of the matter. The issue of 
new technologies for reproduction also brought the issue of mass use and how to fit 
the exclusivity doctrine of copyright into this picture.
The origins of the magnetic tape may be traced back to the invention made by the 
Dane Valdemar Poulsen in 1898, but it was not until the mid-1930s when commercial 
innovations started appear. The German company AEG introduced a voice-recording 
machine called a “Magnetofon”, in Berlin 1935. The device was originally used to help 
the voice recordings of musical performances, but developed quickly into a multi-
faceted device enabling the development of modern studio technology. Sales to the 
general public were boosted after the introduction of Philip’s C-cassette in the mid-
1960s.733
During the same period, that is, shortly after the Second World War, photocopying 
was invented and the market for photocopying equipment suddenly increased. Also, 
videocassette recorders were developed and the sales of them had started successfully, 
which necessitated urgent discussions on the fair use and reproduction technologies 
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as a whole. “The VCR, similar to the printing press and photocopiers, introduced the 
ability to reproduce a performance as easy as a book”.734. Both of these developments 
raised the need for the exact definition of the right of reproduction, which was agreed 
on in the Paris Act of 1971. The three-step test was introduced.
The question that challenged the doctrine was the following: exclusivity might lead, 
due to opportunist behavior, to blocking the use of the new technological means, 
which however provide economic benefits for the right-holders, and several benefits 
for society as a whole. Exclusivity could not be upheld, but at the same time, a balance 
had to be created to avoid a total eruption of the copyright doctrine.
IV.2.1. The Three-Step Test and the Development Motive
As an attempt to find a compromise between the pressures of the development of the 
copying technology and the exclusivity doctrine, the Berne Convention was amended in 
Stockholm to include a three step test in the context of the right of reproduction:735 
“(1) Authors of literary and artistic works protected by this Convention shall 
have the exclusive right of authorizing the reproduction of these works, in 
any manner of form. (2) It shall be a matter for legislation in the countries of 
the Union to permit the reproduction of such works in certain special cases, 
provided that such reproduction does not conflict with a normal exploitation of 
the work and does not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the 
author.”
The three-step test sets limitations or justifications to the limitations of copyright.736 
In a recent study, Ricketson has analyzed the three-step test.737 Concerning the 
interpretation of the adjectives “certain” and “special”, the WTO panel has stated that 
an exception or limitation in national law must be clearly defined. It is not possible 
beforehand to identify and define every future situation to which the exception could 
apply, but the scope of the exception must be known and particularized.738 The 
exception should be narrow in a quantitative as well as in a qualitative sense. The 
expression “case” also needs a clearly defined and narrow scope of the exception.739
Concerning the “conflict with the normal exploitation of the work”, the question is 
whether the exempted use would otherwise fall within the range of activities from 
which the copyright owner would usually expect to receive compensation. Usage that 
is presently not controlled by copyright owners might subsequently become so, as 
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the result of technological change. “Normal exploitation” will require consideration 
of potential, as well as current and actual, use or modes of extracting value from a 
work.740
An important criterion to the “normal” use is the relationship to economic competition 
with non-exempted forms of use. If such competition exists, a conflict arises as such 
use deprives the authors of significant or tangible commercial gains.741
Concerning the third step, “(...) does not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate 
interests of the author”, no wide reference for interpretation exists according to 
Ricketson. However, the requirement of proportionality clearly implies that there 
may be conditions placed on the usage that will make any prejudice that is caused 
“reasonable”, for example, where these interests are protected through a requirement 
that the usage should be done subject to certain conditions or within certain guidelines 
that here should be attribution, or even that payment should be made for the use. The 
conclusion of the WIPO study is that exceptions under Art. 9(2) may take the form 
of either free uses or compulsory licenses, depending essentially on the number of 
reproductions made.742
In his study of the three-step test, Senftleben observes that limitations to copyright 
have been adapted in the interest of freedom of expression and information, 
the dissemination of information, the right to privacy and the enhancement of 
democracy.743
We could see that these correspond to the human rights motive. Senftleben however 
recognizes, as was stated in the beginning of this chapter that limitations also have 
been motivated by industry practice and competition, which would correspond to the 
development motive. This also supports the view expressed by Cassler that copyright 
organizations tend to favor compulsory licensing as an alternative to fair use.744
We could conclude that the three-step test is an instrument for striking a proper 
balance between the different motives of copyright, mainly the profit motive and the 
development motive. The rights holder’s legitimate interests must not be prejudiced, 
but new (that is, not conflicting) uses may be allowed. A new technology should enjoy 
“the benefit of the doubt” in light of the three-step test, which would be compatible 
with the development motive.
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IV.2.1.1. Private Copying and Fair Use
A distinction between the European and common law approach to private copying 
is to be seen with the different formulations of the EU Infosoc directive and the US 
fair use provision.745 The European legislation provides for economic compensation 
regarding private use (Art. 5(2)(b)):
“(...) in respect of reproductions on any medium made by a natural person for 
private use and for ends that are neither directly nor indirectly commercial, on 
condition that the right-holders receive fair compensation which takes account 
of the application or non-application of technological measures referred to in 
Art. 6 to the work or subject-matter concerned.”
If we read this in relation to the Berne three-step test, we might notice a certain 
analogy. Private copying is, in other words, allowed when limited to individuals (first 
step). It is assumed that such uses do not conflict with the normal exploitation of the 
work, that is, must not be for commercial purposes (second step). Finally, it requires 
that the right-holder receive fair compensation (that is, not prejudicing the legitimate 
interests of the author, third step) that takes account of the application, if any, of 
technological protection measures.746
The fair use under §107 of the Copyright of the United States:
“Notwithstanding the provision of Sections 106 and 106A, the fair use of a 
copyright work including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords 
or by any other means specified by that section, for purposes such as 
criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for 
classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright. In 
determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use 
the factors to be considered shall include:747
1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a 
commercial nature or is for non-profit educational purposes;
2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the 
copyrighted work as a whole;
4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for, or value of, the 
copyrighted work.
The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if 
such finding is made upon consideration of all above factors.”
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The US legislation has left the evaluation to be worked out by the courts on a case-
by-case basis. This means that the interpretation may be more apt to change during 
the course of technological development. There seems to be, for example, a tendency 
to move away from allowing the time-shift argument to a more critical approach 
concerning the “space-shifting” argumentation that has been offered in some 
cases.748
Originally, the most infuential case in the United States in this respect was the Sony v. 
Universal Studios.749 According to Hugenholtz, contributory liability rested on whether 
video tape recorders were sold with constructive knowledge that the customer might 
make unauthorized copies of copyrighted material. The Supreme Court found that 
unauthorized home time shifting was fair use, after which it concluded that private use 
of videotape recorders for time shifting was a commercially significant non-infringing 
use precluding contributory liability.750 
The three-step test in relation to public-interest goals, such as (general) public interest, 
libraries and archives, education, assisting visually or hearing impaired people, news 
reporting, and criticism and review, are broadly discussed in the WIPO survey.751 It puts 
forward the question whether the use of legislative measures in order to safeguard 
public policy goals should be subject to the three-step test or whether the three-step 
test is more appropriate in consideration of the borderline cases between private and 
commercial activities.
Thus in principle, the modern copyright system comprises an element for controlling 
and balancing the interaction of the motives. The profit motive may be satisfied, not 
alone on the basis of exclusivity, but due to reasonable financial outcomes in other 
ways. Still, there seems to remain a difference between the European and US approach 
to platform fees.
IV.3. Cable and Satellite Distribution
Cable and satellite distribution are clear examples of the mass use problems in an 
originally analogue environment.752 The solution for the clearance of the cable 
distribution copyright was described in the previous paragraph. It is however worth 
mentioning that in the Nordic environment, the copyright solution of cable television 
raised important concerns as to the detrimental effect the extended collective licensing 
and the partially applied compulsory licensing were having on the concept of the 
exclusive right of the author.753
Cable television operations are mainly composed of four different business areas:754
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-network level: network maintenance and connection sales
-basic services: basic programming, such as national and some of the 
neighboring countries’ broadcasting channels, some major satellite television 
channels (Music Television, Eurosport, TV5, BBC World, etc)
-pay-TV services: premium movie channels such as Canal+, channel packages of 
different profiles
-Internet services and telephony
Cable television was developing in its early phase without clarity of the copyright 
treatment. The development of the cable television legislation resembles the 
development of the record production. The core issue of copyright is centered 
round retransmission of a broadcast. Although retransmissions may take place also 
terrestrially, by broadcasting stations and frequencies, it could be argued that originally 
cable television was developed mainly for the purpose of re-broadcasting terrestrial 
signals in a (coaxial) network.
The question bears certain resemblance to the issue of intermediate copying in the 
Internet networks. If the retransmission occurs at a place, which already is situated 
in the area of the original transmission, the retransmission brings basically nothing 
new to the sender – end user relation: the end user receives the signals of the original 
transmitter, regardless of the route. This “new public” or “service area principle” 
controversy has continued ever since.755
In the 1928 Rome Conference of the Berne Convention, retransmission was a side 
issue. It was originally seen merely as technical part of broadcasting, but as such, 
belonging to the scope of the author’s right to broadcasting. However, because of 
opposition, the re-broadcasting clause was not included in Article 11 bis in 1928.756
The preparations for the Brussels conference 1948 brought about one of the core 
problems that would remain key questions of cable retransmissions: whether an 
act of re-broadcasting would also be considered under a separate right, when the 
retransmission takes place within the same area, where the transmission originally was 
intended (“the service area principle”). This would lead to the obvious issue of double 
payment. The alternative would be to consider that a retransmission only takes place 
when it is targeted at an additional audience. The original proposals concerning this 
issue were mixed.757
Finally, and although the French delegation attempted to revive the “new public” 
criteria, the Belgian proposal in the Brussels conference was accepted.758 According to 
the final Article 11bis(1)(ii):
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“Authors of literary and artistic works shall have the exclusive right of 
authorizing...any communication to the public, by wire or by re-broadcasting of 
the broadcast of the work, when this communication is made by an organization 
other than the original one.”
Therefore, the decisive criterion is not whether the retransmission takes place in the 
same area, but whether the organization is the same. This looks like an attempt to 
grasp the economic interface, and to see that if one broadcaster’s network consists 
of very many transmitters, every transmission should not be seen as a subject of a 
separate right, but an act of economic importance takes place between the rights 
holder and one broadcasting organization. However, a third party re-broadcasting of 
a signal creates a new economic factor for the chain of events.759
According to Brennan’s thorough analysis, all the delegates at Brussels appeared to 
accept that every third party communication to the public of broadcast content should 
constitute an exercise of copyright owner’s rights, regardless of whether it was to be 
a “new” or already served public.760
The issue of the Internet’s transient copies was in many respects different, and so 
were the conclusions. The main difference seems to be that the issue of “third-party 
economy”, which was decisive in the case of retransmission, was overlooked in the 
case of the Internet, as no such criteria was attempted.
The regulatory case for cable television retransmission is unsatisfactory in its present 
state, and the Berne Convention rules are insufficient in such special cases as the “must 
carry” –rules. It cannot be reasonable that a cable operator with a legal obligation to 
rebroadcast certain programs has to negotiate commercially on the remuneration of 
the copyright license. This is a clear sign of over-intensified copyright protection.761
The European Union adopted the extended collective licensing model in the satellite 
and cable directive (93/83/EEC), as a solution to the conflicting interests between 
exclusivity and mass use.
IV.4. The Scandinavian Compromise: The Extended 
Collective License
The extended collective license is a solution created originally in Scandinavian legislation 
to resolve the contradiction between copyright exclusivity and mass use. The problem 
first emerged in relation to the licensing of the broadcasting right of the authors and 
performers.762 At that time however, the concept of representation of third parties 
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(non-members of the collecting organization) was not included. The early licensing 
method could be described as a collective license based on agreement.763
The mass use of copyright protected works brings about the logical but also very 
practical problem, how to grant licenses when the identification of individual use is not 
possible or requires an unreasonable amount of effort. This problem requires methods 
by which the licenses can be granted without individual consent being asked from the 
right-holders.764
The collecting organizations provide services for both the right-holders and users 
by granting licenses for the use of copyright protected works, which could not be 
negotiated individually because of the said practical reasons. After the license has 
been given by the organization to the users, the user is entitled to trust that the use 
is legal. However, there will always be right-holders who are not members of any 
particular collecting organization, but whose works will be in demand.765
Especially right-holders living in another country are in an important position, because 
the requirement of minimum protection and reciprocal national treatment oblige 
the country where the work is used to arrange sufficient protection. Right-holders 
are usually not members of organizations outside their home country, and have not 
authorized such organizations to act on their behalf. Therefore the rights management 
is dependent on the reciprocity agreements entered into by the collecting organizations 
operating in different countries. This not being the case, the foreign right-holders 
would be themselves in charge of the rights management.766
Another problem regarding mass use is that the technology does not allow, at least in 
any practical manner, the efficient separation of the foreign material from domestic, 
for example, from broadcasting or satellite distribution. It is quite common that, for 
example, a cable operator cannot know what is being distributed in the network, 
since such an obligation would in practical terms require too heavy a cost load or 
operational impossibility.767
A classic example of a solution concerning the problem of unidentified or unreachable 
right-holders is the compulsory license. The user has a free right to use the work, but 
against compensation to the rights holder. A “legal license” is a license whose terms 
of compensation are regulated.768
The extended collective licensing was applied later in the Scandinavian countries, on 
the basis of joint or at least coordinated Nordic preparation, to photocopying from the 
early 1980s. In the adaptation of the solution, the Berne Convention’s three-step test 
adapted in the Paris 1971 text was referred to.769
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It is of interest for the purpose of this study to look closely at the motivation of the 
choice of extended collective licensing, instead of the contractual license or compulsory 
license:
-the solution (the extended collective license) will enable and encourage 
agreements
-the solution is balanced for the users and right-holders; a compulsory license 
would be a weaker solution from the right-holders’ point of view
-the diverse quality of the copied material (otherwise would require a large 
number of different agreement types for different purposes)
-from the society’s point of view, the acknowledgement of important interests 
of the users (e.g. arbitration)
-consistent with the adapted Nordic preparatory work
It is quite evident that all basic motives were present in this solution. Both the profit 
and human right motives exist from the right-holders’ perspective, in denying both 
fair use and the compulsory license, and the development motive is equally clear when 
encouraging agreements and paying attention to the users’ interests are discussed. 
The public interest motive is present when the use in education is discussed.
A few years after the Paris Conference, the extended collective licensing was broadly 
discussed in the WIPO Annotated Principles for the Distribution of Programs by 
Cable.770 Principle 4 states:
 
“The authorization mentioned in Principle 1 (the authorization of cable 
redistribution of copyright protected works) may be given by an organization of 
authors also in respect of works the authors of which have not delegated to that 
organization the exercise of the right mentioned in the said Principle: however, 
this may be done only if such a power of that organization is recognized by 
the applicable law and only if, by virtue of that law, the said organization must 
guarantee the broadcaster or the cable distributor against possible claims of 
such authors, and must undertake to apply, in respect of the distribution of 
authors fees and other benefits, the same principles to the said authors as it 
applies to authors who have delegated to it the exercise of the right mentioned 
in Principle 1.” (emphasis MH)
The organization was therefore in a very powerful position, but at the same time all 
claims concerning unauthorized use were supposed to be targeted at the organization, 
which also means a broad responsibility.
The extended collective license was later adapted – or was allowed to be adapted by 
the member states– by the EU directive concerning cable and satellite distribution.771 
The highly practical solution, which tries to strike a compromise between the several 
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different motives, was widely accepted. This may be regarded as one of the clearest 
examples of the importance of the technology impact arguments in copyright 
legislation. 
The extended collective licensing solution may said to be suffering from a certain 
degree of inconsistency, as it is an attempt to combine exclusivity with a compulsory 
licensing system, that is, to mix oil and water. But regardless of whether the solution 
is theoretically correct or not, it is a practical attempt to balance between conflicting 
motives.772 From an ideological point of view, this would both maintain the exclusivity 
doctrine of copyright and allow mass licensing procedures.
IV.5. Platform Levies: Towards a Taxation –Based 
Model? 
Hugenholtz has identified the introduction of a levy on the sale of sound video 
recording equipment in the German Copyright Act in 1965 as the first solution to the 
issue of private mass use (of physical copies). The main reason for the adaptation of 
this solution was the belief that individual claims against private home taping would 
not be enforceable. Most European countries have followed the German example.773 
A similar issue exists today in relation to the Internet.
A contrary attitude would easily lead to conflicts in society. Prohibiting private use in 
these cases would require supervision and monitoring of citizens, an increase in police 
forces, etc.774
Regarding VCRs and music cassettes, in particular, the idea of platform levies has been 
widely accepted. In line with this general trend, in the European Union Infosoc directive, 
the platform levies were also seen as acceptable means to compensate authors for fair 
use, as discussed earlier. According to Hugenholtz, today there are levies on analog 
and digital recording equipment, levies on analog and digital photocopying machines, 
faxes, audio-recorders and VCR’s, levies on scanners, MP3 devices, CD writers, and - 
perhaps – also levies on PC’s. In addition, there are levies on blank media, audiotapes, 
audiovisual tapes, and all sorts of digital media including recordable DVDs. In favor 
of this development are the ease and perfection of digital private copying and the 
convergence of analog and digital equipment.775
Platform levies represent in a way a far cry from the copyright doctrine: it is relatively 
difficult to see any connection to the original copyright doctrine based on exclusivity, 
when such anonymous methods as platform fees are adapted. As there is no knowledge 
of the actual use, and it bears no relation to actual compensation, we are very close 
to the “taxation” model suggested by Friedman for city-parks and certain types of 
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highways: no tolls, no choke points.776 This would also require a publicly financed 
“artist salary” system, which occasionally appears in the public policy discussion.777 
This also suggests, that the “property” is common by nature, and cannot be charged 
separately due to high transaction costs.778
There is however a reservation concerning the development of the DRM tools; if 
such transaction costs are low enough in the future to provide a feasible alternative, 
the platform fee regime may well be re-evaluated. It is however questionable, how 
DRM solutions can compete against taxation type of solutions, since, apparently, the 
transaction costs are lower in taxation-based systems.779
IV.6. Some Thoughts on the Internet as a Challenge to 
the Exclusivity Doctrine
This study focuses on compulsory licensing and the impact of technology on copyright. 
It is one of our central theses that the most important technology-related changes to 
the protection of copyright already took place in the early 20th century, and thus the 
emphasis in this study focuses on the events surrounding the adaptation of sound 
recording, broadcasting, and re-broadcasting to the international copyright system. To 
illustrate this we shall insert a famous note from a copyright “founding father”:780
“There is hardly any area of law (…) that has as cosmopolitan a character 
and lends itself better to international codification than that with which we 
are going to concern ourselves. We are living in a century in which works of 
literary and artistic genius, regardless of their country of origin, very quickly 
spread all over the earth, making use of all civilized languages and all forms of 
reproduction.”
This quote is neither from a hyped piece of contemporary copyright literature, nor 
does it discuss the revolutionary effects of the Internet. The quote dates back to 1884. 
These were the President’s opening words in the first meeting of the preparatory 
conference to create the Berne Convention. What caused the change for the copyright 
protected material to cross national boundaries in masses was in our understanding 
first and foremost the transportation vehicles invented and successfully implemented 
in the course of the Second Industrial Revolution. This was a starting point for a chain 
of development to which the Internet and satellite distribution form interesting, albeit 
not – as it seems today - revolutionizing chapters.
It is clear, that in a manner similar to sound recording and broadcasting, both the 
Internet and mobile technology provide immense challenges to the licensing system, 
that is, to the dichotomy between mass use and exclusivity.
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IV.6.1. The Internet – From Mass Use Towards P-2-P
Both the WIPO Copyright Treaty and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty 
had the object to meet the challenge of the new uses of works and other subject matter 
in relation to the digital environment. The intention was also to provide for greater 
protection of authors and right-holders. However, this was seen to take place subject 
to maintaining the balance between these rights and the larger public interest.781
Presently, the Internet provides a great challenge to the copyright system due to 
unlimited possibilities of digital copying. Still, as we have seen, similar issues were 
confronted with the copyright community in relation to phonograms, broadcasting, 
photocopying, and copying to VCRs and C-cassettes. The major difference seems to 
be that copying done by individuals practically only requires very modest investments, 
as the prices for computers and Internet connections are within reach of most of the 
population. However, compared to the revolutionary step of recording a performance 
in 1877, copying a performance in a more effective manner can be claimed to be a 
development that is perhaps less profound.782 Enormous increase in the transmission 
capacity will not increase the emission capacity of the end-user.
IV.6.1.1. The “Hidden Economy” of Digital Distribution
From the surface and judging from public debate, the Internet is free and creates 
an environment of free activity and distribution. Looking deeper into the use of 
the Internet, it is clear that it has a sound and vibrant economy around it: telecom 
operators and equipment manufacturers are able to create important turnover by 
keeping alive the ”free Internet”. Therefore, it might be misleading to call the Internet 
the distribution of free goods, as it is the distribution, related equipment, and services 
that cost if the goods as such do not.783
The legislator’s intention to ensure that in compensation for fair use some remuneration 
should be allocated to the right-holders means that, from the legislator’s point of view, 
it is indeed economically dubious or at least unethical to make money for the free 
Internet, unless a compensation to the right-holders is taken care of.
In Europe, the role of the telecom operators has been harmonized by the e-commerce 
directive. If the operator has no other role in the actual distribution but offering access 
and capacity, it should not be regarded as an active distributor and thus not have 
copyright liability. From an economic point of view, the operator still has an important 
role in controlling the access and customer relations management system.
Concerning the so-called Internet piracy, a sound economic activity revolves around 
unauthorized downloading of music. The Internet service providers obtain customers 
and conclude agreements with them, including monthly payments and usage fees, 
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sometimes based on the time used or capacity reserved or simply a flat fee. Computers 
are bought and used for music piracy, and compact music players are sold for use of 
pirated music (MP3 –players). So, there seems to be a vibrant economy around music 
consumption in the Internet after all. We are probably not discussing so much whether 
any money is received at all from using equipment for listening music, but where the 
money is allocated.784
It looks like the consumers’ excitement for getting music for free on the Internet 
creates important business opportunities for many companies – telecom operators, 
service providers and equipment manufacturers. It looks like they are benefiting at least 
indirectly from this new type of customer activity. Since the activity – downloading 
music from the Internet – is mainly targeted at age groups below 30, or even 20, very 
many of the users may never see the bills coming from the use of the Internet or for 
the purchase of the equipment.785
Another point of view, contrary to this, is the development motive: if we agree, as 
seems to be the case to a large extent, that technological development profits mankind 
and offers new opportunities, it is important to exempt the “mere conduit” operators 
from distribution liabilities. This will clearly enable them to develop Internet distribution 
and the technology without running the risk of negotiation blocks or additional cost-
factors. This is in line with the early 20th century’s phonogram and broadcasting issues, 
with the exception concerning remuneration.
Some observers have even taken the stand that the Internet will mean a new era of 
creativity in society, as it allows a new kind of dissemination and mixing of ideas and 
materials.786
IV.6.1.2. The Right of Communication to the Public and the Three-Step 
Test
The reason for the creation of a new right was the technological “anomaly” created 
by the Internet. Copyright legislation may have been created with the intention that it 
would be forward-looking and take into consideration all new emerging technologies 
for the disseminating of copyright protected material.787 The legality principle in, for 
example, criminal law assessments (the legal rights of the accused) requires however 
clear legislation that cannot be complemented in judicial decision-making by broadened 
concepts or analogous interpretation of old rules in new circumstances.
A new exclusive right, the right of communication to the public, was introduced in 
the WIPO Copyright Treaty 1996, to cover the gap between the existing forms of 
protection and the possibility offered by the Internet to access copyright protected 
material from a place and at a time individually chosen by the consumer.788 The 
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provision leaves without prejudice the provisions of the Berne Convention in which 
the right of communication to the public is provided and which have to comply with 
the framework of the WCT. It supplements those provisions by an exclusive right of 
communication to the public for authors of all kinds of works, as far as this is not yet 
covered by the Berne Convention.789
The right of making available has been conceived as an element of the author’s broader 
right of communication to the public. The act of making available to the public for 
access covers the offering of works for access and extends to the entire transmission 
to the user. However, the mere establishment of a server, which may be accessed 
individually by the members of the public and at their choice regarding time and place, 
constitutes the act of making available. The mere provision of cables or other physical 
facilities for the purpose of communication to the public does not constitute any act 
of making available to the public.790
At the same time, the three-step test of the Berne Convention, created to draw the line 
between acceptable and unacceptable forms of limitations of the right of reproduction, 
was adapted as a general principle to offer guidance on national implementation of all 
the rights afforded in the WIPO 1996 Copyright Treaty.791
IV.6.1.3. Transient Copies in the Internet
The Diplomatic Conference debated in 1996 the possibility of limitations on the 
reproduction right in the case of temporary reproductions made for the
“sole purpose of making the work perceptible or where the reproduction is of a 
transient or incidental nature, provided that such reproduction takes place in the 
course of use of the work that is authorized by the author of permitted by law.”
Although this received general support concerning the former part, delegates had 
differing views about the meaning and scope of the second part.792
It was therefore decided that it would be preferable to leave the matter to be dealt 
with under Article 9 (the three-step test) of Berne, supplement or elaborated by an 
“agreed statement”:
“The reproduction rights, as set out in Article 9 of the Berne Convention, and 
the exceptions permitted thereunder, apply fully in the digital environment, in 
particular to the use of works in digital form. It is understood that the storage 
of a protected work in digital form in an electronic medium constitutes a 
reproduction within the meaning of Article 9 of the Berne Convention.”
209
Thus, it is clear that the interim copies are within copyright protection, and possible 
limitations have to meet the three-step test scrutiny.
There are some major differences in comparison to the other 20th century limitations 
of copyright for new technology purposes: compulsory licensing concerning sound 
recordings contains equitable remuneration, and in the case of a retransmission right, 
the exclusivity is afforded in relation to an operation carried out by a third party. The 
(telecommunications) economy of the distribution of copyright protected works may 
stay totally intact of the right-holders’ demands.
IV.6.1.4. The Internet Business Models in “Perennial Gale”
Internet business models do not seem at present separate from the current 
communication and retail businesses, but rather a complementary form of extending 
marketing and supporting logistics. Many “traditional” businesses are currently probing 
or already utilizing the business opportunities offered via the Internet as an advertising 
arm of their core business, offering, for example, search services.
In a Schumpeterian sense, the Internet business is probably in the middle of a 
“perennial gale”, a state of slow and painful establishment, as the business models 
are still developing and changing. Creative destruction takes place in, for example, the 
pricing of Internet connections, which has been subject to either perfect competition 
as such or regulation simulating perfect competition. Internet service providers as 
independent companies separate from telecommunications or media operations have 
become more or less extinct, since during the past years, they have been integrated 
with larger telecommunications companies offering a broad range of services.793 
From copyright perspective, it is therefore rather difficult to identify a business model 
that would later become an industry norm. There are however many indications of 
the direction of the development. Firstly, like a highway needs control against traffic 
violations, the degree of telecommunications control is important and will affect the 
organization of the Internet business. As a legal starting point however, the network 
operator is out of the chain of responsibility.794 Still, issues like computer viruses and 
“spam” have led to demands for the telecommunications companies to increase their 
content control. Secondly, the Internet as an advertising and search tool for established 
businesses will play an important role.
From a technical point of view, the Internet service operations may be divided into two 
distinct categories:795
-“wholesale dial-up call termination on Internet” (ISP 1); connects the customer 
to the Internet and/or to a voice/data-network. Usually provides a broad 
assortment of its own services, including platform services to other Internet 
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service providers. Also usually owns important network elements, and may be 
called a “virtual network operator”
-“retail access to the Internet from fixed networks” (ISP 2): connects the 
customer to ISP 1. May offer own services, but as a rule sells ISP1’s services.
The former category represents the major companies in the field. In the latter category, 
independent smaller companies may succeed in creating a margin from buying 
wholesale connections and selling retail, and keeping a minimal cost structure.
IV.6.1.5. Issues Regarding Music Distribution on the Internet
During the past few years, the total value of the music market has started to decrease 
after a long period of growth, and the focus in the business has shifted from selling 
physical recordings to owning and selling rights to music. Technological development 
has again brought about the problem of piracy.
A recent study estimates that out of the estimated worldwide total sales of music 
(51.6 bill. USD), nearly 39 per cent (20.1 bill. USD) was unauthorized.796 Although 
these approximations have to be approached with caution, since they investigate a 
phenomenon of which no public records exist, the effect of free distribution of music 
on the Internet is considerable.
Another problem even more difficult to control for the record companies and artists 
is the digital distribution of music. Unauthorized or even illegal activities are extremely 
difficult to control in this area, and they are increasing rapidly despite Napster’s collapse. 
In 2001, there were 500 million music files available on P2P illegal services, and there 
were over 3 million users more than in the Napster era. The estimated annual illegal 
copying is the same size as the whole global music industry sales – almost three billion 
copies.797
A major strategic problem lies in the definition of illegal versus free use. It is illegal 
to distribute copies of music for profit, but it is not illegal to make a copy for private 
use. To make this distinction is increasingly difficult, and individual customers may 
with confidence claim that there is nothing wrong in copying a product for their 
own private use and/or sending it to a friend or relative for private use.799 However, a 
company cannot create a commercial model on the basis of free use, since it would 
no longer be acting in the domain of free use but in commercial interest, and under 
copyright obligations.
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IV.6.1.6. The Role of the Network and Service Operator
In many ways, the network operator that facilitates the connection from the server to 
the user is in a critical position concerning the development of the Internet and the 
Internet business models. As an example of the Internet legislation’s logic, the basic 
assumption of the EU e-commerce directive is that the network operator is only a 
technical intermediary with no knowledge or participation in the actual communication 
with the service provider/content producer and the user.800 The directive classifies 
certain services (mere conduit, caching, hosting) as being out of liabilities, on certain 
conditions.801
The directive states in Article 12 (“Mere conduit”), that where an information society 
service is provided that consists of the transmission in a communication network of 
information provided by a recipient of the service, or the provision of access to a 
communication network, Member States shall ensure that the service provider is not 
liable for the information transmitted (on certain conditions). According to Article 13 
(“Caching”), where an information society service is provided that consists of the 
transmission in a communication network of information provided by a recipient of the 
service, Member States shall ensure that the service provider is not liable for the automatic, 
intermediate, and temporary storage of that information, performed for the sole purpose 
of making more efficient the information’s onward transmission to other recipients 
of the service upon their request (which requires certain conditions to be fulfilled).
Finally, in the Article 14 (Hosting), where an information society service is 
provided that consists of the storage of information provided by a recipient of the 
service, Member States shall ensure that the service provider is not liable for the 
information stored at the request of a recipient of the service, on the condition that:
-the provider does not have actual knowledge of illegal activity or information 
and, as regards claims for damages, is not aware of facts or circumstances from 
which the illegal activity or information is apparent; or
-the provider, upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts expeditiously 
to remove or to disable access to the information.
The providers of the above-mentioned services shall neither - according to Article 15 - 
have a general obligation to monitor the information which they transmit or store, nor 
a general obligation actively to seek facts or circumstances indicating illegal activity.
As we shall discuss later in Conclusions, it is apparent that the legislation has been 
crafted to suit the adapted business model of the telecom operators, namely the “mere 
conduit” model. The legislation reflects a strong development motive. This legislation 
may however also act as a separator of the distribution and content markets, because 
from this basis, the telecom operators probably do not see a reason to enter into the 
content business, due to both lack of know-how and the legal issues that may arise, if 
212
the “mere conduit” status is compromised. At the same time, it is absolutely clear that 
telecommunications operators’ benefit from the traffic of unauthorized or even illegal 
copies of copyright protected work. Estimations of the amount of traffic however vary, 
and are not yet reliable.802
It is relatively easy to see that similar conclusions to those regarding the Internet were 
debated in the copyright mass use solutions earlier in the 20th century. Introducing 
exclusive elements of copyright control might seriously endanger the functioning of 
the current business model of the Internet. We could even claim that the development 
motive must have been dominant in this respect. The major difference is that as 
the early 20th century compulsory licensing recognized the right to compensation – 
equitable remuneration – the exemption of the operators is complete. Retransmission 
limitation on the other hand was only in relation to retransmission within the same 
economic entity, and not third party operators.803
However, in Finland, due to the constant and enduring problem of Internet- spread 
computer viruses, which were disseminated by large amounts of spam, it has been 
proposed that the operators’ responsibility for the functioning of the telecommunications 
system be increased. This would amount to actually ciphering away spam from the e-
mail. This requires identification of spam, which leads to the question, what is actually 
the level of the operators’ knowledge of the content or quality of the messages.
According to the new Finnish Act on Data Protection in Electronic Communications, 
which entered into force on 1 September 2004, telecommunications operators and 
corporate and association subscribers have the right to prevent the reception of email 
and SMS messages and remove malicious programs from messages in order to remove 
information security disturbances and prevent infringements. The measures can be 
put to use only if communication services or the recipient’s access to a means of 
communication are endangered. In such cases, messages can be filtered out without 
the recipient’s consent. With the user’s consent, a telecommunications operator or 
a corporate or association subscriber can always prevent the reception of disruptive 
email.804
The question whether and under what conditions a network operator, 
telecommunications company, or online service provider infringes the right of making 
available or works on networks, depends upon the activity in question and has to be 
decided under national law on a case-by-case –basis.805 Whether or not this operator 
liability is recommendable from society’s perspective - could this pave the way to a 
censorship role for the operators – this will clearly mean a deviation from the principle 
in the e-commerce directive. The operator may no longer play the role of the “innocent 
bystander”, but is assumed to have knowledge of harmful communications on the 
Internet, and may - and in practice is required - to operate.
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IV.7. Computer Programming – An Anomaly to the 
Copyright Doctrine
The issue of the protection of computer programs within the copyright system was 
raised during the 1980s. A major step towards copyright protection took place in 
1980, when the Computer Software Copyright Act was passed in the United States.806 
International organizations like OECD and WIPO had already discussed the possibility 
of computer programs’ copyright protection. The International Association for the 
Protection of Industrial Property’s (AIPPI) executive committee had concluded in 
its meeting in Rio de Janeiro in 1985 that the national and international means of 
copyright protection offer a cost-efficient and immediate protection for computer 
programming.807 
The harmonization of the European legislation concerning computer programming 
was initiated by the Green Paper on Copyright and the Challenge of Technology (COM 
(88) 172 final). The Directive was adopted on 14 May 1991 (91/250/EEC). Copyright 
protection had two major advantages against sui generis – protection: first, copyright 
had been able to evolve with new technologies in the past, and secondly, it was widely 
recognized around the world.808 Later, the copyright protection was internationally 
adapted in the TRIPS agreement and the WIPO 1996 Treaty. 
The copyright protection of computer programming is based on broad exclusivity on 
copying, adaptation, and distribution. The major exceptions are related to the user’s 
right to make necessary copies (backup), to correct errors, and the exhaustion of the 
right when a particular sample of a program is sold.809
As a general remark, the exceptions concerning the copyright protection of computer 
programming are more related to the individual user’s act during the use of the 
computer program. Contrary to the changes of the Berne Convention earlier, there 
was no lobbying against the commercial exclusivity, with the exception of ephemeral 
copying on the Internet. In the computer business, the right-holders and the commercial 
exploiter of those rights is the same company, and therefore no other major conflict 
of interest existed except that of the telecom operators’ interest to be exempted from 
the liability concerning ephemeral copies created during the processes of the network 
distribution. Therefore, no general compulsory licenses or extended collective licensing 
agreements were adopted.810
The protection of computer programs within a copyright framework is a source of 
wide and endless debate which easily could fill libraries. The various problems of that 
area are not discussed in much further detail here. However, in relation to the basic 
theme of our study, there is probably no clearer example to be found on the effect and 
power of technological innovation leading to huge economic interest, which clearly 
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“overrides” any and all arguments relating to the logic and original purpose of the 
copyright system.811
IV.8. Mobile Telecommunications: Integration of Earlier 
Technologies 
Concerning the second theme of our study, the impact of technology on copyright, the 
most important current development takes place in the area of mobile communications. 
Mobility and mobile devices will most likely become a converged platform of various 
forms of content provisioning, and although past forms of media will probably maintain 
a position, the mobile technology may combine many if not all of the elements of 
previous technological innovations, among the most important telecommunications, 
sound recording distribution, broadcasting (and rebroadcasting), the Internet, and 
photography.
Mobile telecommunications812 has expanded during the past decade to become 
an important means of telecommunications, in many countries surpassing the 
importance of fixed line telecommunications measured by turnover and number of 
connections. Globally, it is estimated that the GSM-system has over one billion users. 
Telecommunications as a whole has grown to become one of the most important 
industries in the world.813 It is estimated that in 2004 there will be 1.5 billion users, and 
by 2010 2.3 billion users.814
The combined turnover of mobile operators was 426 billion USD in 2003, which is 19 
per cent more than in the previous year. The telecommunications industry is estimated 
to be highly profitable, although there is a division into highly and less profitable 
companies. There are basically only two very profitable companies, the global mobile 
operator Vodafone, and the world’s biggest handset manufacturer Nokia.815
IV.8.1. Telecommunications Evolving Towards a Content 
Distribution Media 
Telecommunications as a technological phenomena had its roots in the invention of 
the telegraph in the mid 19th century. The revolutionary effect of that innovation is 
sometimes said to be the first separation of physical matter and content. The first 
century of telecommunications was a period of a relatively slow development of the 
fixed network telephony until the last decade of the 20th century. The industry grew 
from the basis of the 19th century innovations, the telegraph and the telephone. The 
slow growth took place based on national and - in some countries - local geographical 
monopolies. Telecommunications became a commodity and a central part of society’s 
infrastructure comparable to water and electricity.
215
The slow but steady development of early telecommunications is illustrated by the 
US statistics. The number of telephones per 1000 population grew in the following 
manner:816
 -1880:   1
 -1900:  17.6
 -1920:  123.9
 -1940:  165.1
 -1960:  407.8
 -1980:  790.2
The operating revenues as a percentage of the US GNP grew from 0.60 per cent in 
1920 to 2.05 per cent in 1970 and 2.32 in 1980.817 
Mobile telecommunications were launched already in the 1970s with analog systems.818 
The mobile technology was however expensive and was reserved for special purposes 
(e.g. for the use of authorities). The expansion of mobile telecommunications started 
with the development of the GSM (Global System for Mobile Communications) standard, 
which enabled the industry to create a global system of mobile telecommunications 
allowing the handsets to work in the networks of different operators via international 
roaming agreements. GSM is an open, non-proprietary standard.819
Mobile telecommunications developed more rapidly in the 1990s based on speedy 
technical development in the mobile network and handsets technology. This was 
enabled by the international standardization of digital mobile technology (most 
importantly the GSM system).820 The development of mobile telecommunications 
was further encouraged by competitive license policies allowing several operators 
to compete in the same geographical areas, in contrast to the fixed line telephone 
monopolies.
The GSM system was originally developed within the European environment. GSM is 
a time division multiplex (TDM) system. It makes use of, and interacts directly with, 
standard telephone networks. Evolution to a data carrying service is a fundamental 
part of the specification.821 The standardization process has been hindered by the 
parallel development of complex solutions (GPRS, HSCSD, EDGE) intended for digital 
distribution.822
The quick development of digital technology has caused – in accordance with Moore’s 
law823 – an expansion in the availability of the network capacity. This revolutionary 
development has many consequences for the parties of the telecommunications value 
chain.824
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The escalation path provides several possibilities but also threats: the possibility to 
utilize more capacity gives new opportunities for developing and offering more and 
new services. Yet at the same time, it will lead the way to a collapse of prices for data 
transmission, which in turn may decrease turnovers and the ability to invest, as the 
price of a voice call may approach zero.825 At the same time, the use of mobile services 
becomes all the more interesting to different user groups.
The mobile market faces the risk of following the same path as fixed network 
Internet service provisioning, leaving little opportunity to increase turnovers but going 
more in the direction of a toll free access, that is, hyper-competition.826 Still, mobile 
telecommunications provides better chances to develop sound business models and 
revenue sources for right-holders, as mobile telecommunications billing is so far still 
based on used units rather than monthly payment. Mobile technology provides also a 
better opportunity to monitor individual use.827
From the Schumpeterian perspective, we might suggest that Moore’s law indicates a 
state of “permanent (destructive) revolution” that keeps continuously challenging the 
business strategies of the market players and may shift the balance of power almost 
overnight. – A famous example of this fluctuation is the business agreement between 
Microsoft and IBM in 1980. The agreement was a kind of “bet” between two industry 
partners on how the future was going to look: Microsoft placed its bet on developing 
the user interface.828 Another example might be the negative price development of 
mobile services (price erosion), which has, for example, in Europe been a constant 
phenomenon.829 
There are several factors that will increase the importance of copyright protection in 
the field of mobile distribution: 1. Moore’s law illustrates the development of capacity: 
there will be increasingly extra capacity for data transmission, left over from peer-to-
peer telephony, which will lead to new opportunities for content distribution and thus 
new business models. 2. Technology enables quality video and voice services for mobile 
phones. 3. Mobile transmission may contain a bundle of relevant elements from the 
copyright point of view: distribution, reproduction, broadcasting, and communication 
to the public. Ring-tones provide a special case, which may develop towards “true 
tones” and provide thus an actual analogy to phonograms.
In the following, it is not possible to offer a final answer to the problem of mobile 
implications as that is a moving target. However, we shall briefly discuss several new 
elements – copyright anomalies - that mobility brings about, and evaluate whether 
there is a need or a chance to rely on alternative approaches in relation to the classic 
exclusivity doctrine of copyright.
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IV.8.2. Mobility Impact on Copyright
It is doubtful, whether mobile technologies as such provide a similar radical impact to 
the copyright doctrine as did recording and broadcasting. The impact may well be of 
a different nature: Mobile technology seems to have the ability to combine traditional 
telecommunications (and the Internet) with broadcasting and music distribution, rather 
than creating a need for separate legal definitions. It seems more evolutionary than 
revolutionary by nature. It has not challenged the existing business models as such, but 
by creating a networked business model it creates challenges for broad cooperation. 
Content providers shall quite probably stay in their role, and develop an interest to 
provide content also for mobile purposes, whereas the telecommunications operators 
will most likely stay in their technical “mediator” role.
Telecommunications has traditionally been a medium for peer-to-peer or point-to-
point communications. As opposed to broadcasting, the “transmitter” and “receiver” 
have been individuals, and the nature of the communication has been private and 
confidential. In broadcasting, there is one broadcaster and a large number of anonymous 
receivers that are unknown to the broadcaster830. However, the development of the 
communications capacity has enabled telecommunications to develop in the direction 
of broad distribution of data in various forms – including the Internet. Mobility adds 
mainly a personal dimension to this: constant access.
Resembling the retransmission issue in cable programming, the networked business 
model may likewise require, for obtaining sufficient rights-control, a vast amount of 
contracting and large transaction costs through demanding negotiations. Traditionally, 
in the perspective of the development motive of copyright in the early 20th century, 
and also from a legal-economic perspective831, the network business case would speak 
for liability rather than property rules. 
The impact of the Internet was widely debated and basic principles were agreed in the 
WIPO treaty of 1996. The impact of mobile distribution may require further discussion 
on the principal issues of copyright. Mobile distribution needs at least as a minimum 
to be fitted into the current framework of copyright conventions and legislation, either 
directly or through legal interpretation of the norms.
IV.8.3. The Business Network of the Mobile Environment
The business environment of mobile telecommunications is highly technology related 
and technology dependent. The customers are very close to the technological interface: 
the use of the services requires technical adaptations to the mobile phone device and 
the consumer has to be able to “survive” with several service providers’ technical 
requirements. The Windows –type of system for the standardization of the mobile 
user interface has not yet emerged.
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The mobile telecommunications business may be defined in several ways, but for the 
purpose of this study, we shall use the definition in a recent economic study on the 
mobile industry’s economic impact. Mobile telephony is defined as “the manufacture, 
operation and distribution of mobile phones and any additional services that are 
directly facilitated by mobile telecommunications”. 832
Because of both the technological and commercial complexity of the mobile 
telecommunications business, the business model of telecommunications is composed 
of several partnerships and cooperation relations. We shall not discuss “ value-chains” 
in the traditional sense, as the interrelations of the companies may be more complicated 
and sometimes ephemeral.833
At least the following stakeholders or partners in the networked mobile business 
environment can be identified:834
-service provider (may be separate from the network operator): service provider 
takes care of the consumer interface and customer relations management (CRM)
-network operator (may be separate, if service provider leases the network 
capacity): takes care of the technical aspect of telecommunications, that is, the 
network operations and functionalities: operation of base-stations, transmission 
connections between base-stations and the mobile switching center, invests in 
capacity and sells it to service providers 
-network equipment manufacturer: manufacturer of the network hardware 
(base stations, mobile switching centers, transmission equipment etc.)
-mobile handset manufacturer
-customer/consumer and their associations
-governmental authorities (licensing, supervising, competition)
-copyrights holders of the content provided in mobile telecommunications 
(content providers, authors, performers, producers, media houses)
-copyright holders of computer programming: applications
The business impact of the rapid development of data processing and mobile 
telecommunications, whether we agree on the speed of development suggested by 
the Moore’s law or not, can be very different depending on the position of the different 
individual stakeholders. This creates an almost perpetual playing field for different 
operators and stakeholders, who have great risks and opportunities. For instance, if 
we assume that the price of network capacity diminishes, the media companies may 
obtain a cheap distribution route for their products. The telecommunications operators 
become mere technical facilitators without the ability to independently set prices. The 
first media company on the playing field may establish a strong position.
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Another question is which way the customer loyalty develops: will the customer identify 
rather with the handset manufacturer, or the telecommunications service provider, or 
the content provider of his or her choice? The attempt with the “Vodafone Live!” 
integrated service concept means the creation of the “choke point” at the operator 
level, whereas Microsoft managed to create immense success at the customer interface 
as a programming company.835
Mobile networks consist of the following fundamental elements:836
-mobile switches and interconnecting transmission links
-’backhaul links’ between switches and transmitter sites (either owned by the 
network operator or leased from another provider)
-’access’ part of the network comprising a multiplicity of cell sites. Each site will 
contain one or more of the following:
-base station controller: the intelligent part of the transmitter site providing 
logical control of frequency allocation, signal strength measurement, and 
backhaul connectivity, Each controller may control a number of cell sites.
-mast: may be of different types depending on location, capacity requirements, 
environmental constraints, etc.
-aerials (provides the actual radio interface): there may be several of these on 
each mast depending on the traffic demands and system dimensioning
Interconnection with other operators requires an interface through which the user 
of the other operator’s network is able to call (mobile originated call MOC) to the 
receiving network’s user (mobile terminated call, MTC).
The evolution of service provision from the first analog generation to the 3G services 
has followed a steady escalation path:837
-from local service provisioning to global roaming ability
-from analog technology to digital technologies
-from providing voice services only to voice and data
-from time division circuit switching to packet switching
From the copyright point of view, the network operator naturally has an interest to 
develop his own business and mainly keep out of the copyright field. The main interest 
is to be able to continue the networking business without messy responsibilities 
regarding Internet piracy or the like. The network operator is not interested in the role 
of a censorship authority. The risk is however the question of how long is it feasible 
220
that the network operator stays out of the chain of events in the network, when, for 
example violations of the law take place.838
The service provider sells services like phone calls (minutes) and SMSs to the consumers, 
and rents the network capacity from the network operator. The service provider can 
be completely different from the network operator.839
The service provider pays the network operator a compensation that may be at least 
partially based on the amount of traffic they are able to generate. This contains an 
incentive to actively look for new information business opportunities. Therefore, the 
service operator is keen to include in his offering almost anything that he may expect 
to increase the use of the network. The service provider may be in the role of a “mere 
conduit”, but usually has obtained a more active stance in developing and packaging 
new service offerings to the customers. This also means that the service provider, more 
often than not, has a copyright interest.840
IV.8.4. Elements of the Mobile Content Business 
We may see that the development of the mobile business is still at rather an initial level. 
The manufacturing of handsets has a relatively clear industry structure, but when we 
discuss the mobile content business, it is quite evident that business is still at the initial 
level of “creative destruction” without a clear industry organization or value chain.
The evolution of digital wireless telecommunications networks is enabling the 
distribution of larger data files, including media such as polyphonic ring-tones or 
picture messaging.841 The technical development will allow the distribution of ”true 
tones”, that is, actual digital recordings, and video clips.
Existing competitor groupings in the mobile content market can be identified in the 
following manner:842
-telecommunications operators: content packaging, service provision, 
infrastructure
-broadcasters: content creation, packaging, service provision
-publishers: content creation, packaging
-ISPs: packaging, service provision
-content creators: content creation
-software developers: packaging, service provision
There are basically two approaches concerning the position in the value chain: the 
traditional telecommunications-model has insisted that the operator keeps all control 
and leverages its position to new stages of the value chain. The other approach 
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(”facilitator” or enabler–strategy) emphasizes the importance of all players working in 
their core competence arena, and thus providing better opportunities in the creation 
of mobile content business.843
Information services offer, for example, weather services, banking and economic 
information, traveling, number and address inquiry services, route and timetable 
information of public transportation, municipal services, box office information and 
tickets, postal services, yellow pages, and a mobile dictionary. The list is not exhaustive 
but illustrates how an operator may offer mobile information services.844
Information services are commonly – but not necessarily - billed by the operators’ 
billing system, but the price of the actual telecommunications network connection 
and the price of the content are usually separated.
The recent development in the handsets technology has allowed the emergence of 
video services in the form of MMS (mobile multimedia services). This has allowed the 
use of phones to take, send and reveive still pictures. Also short pieces of videos can 
technically be distributed. 
IV.8.5. Issues Concerning Mobile Music
William Buhse has suggested four different business models concerning music 
distribution, in particular, but applicable as an example to other forms of content 
delivery:845
First is the peer-to-peer distribution. This means file-sharing between individuals 
(Napster, attempts to utilize private use). Napster in its prime had 1 billion titles and 70 
million users but ran into legal difficulties as a business model. File-sharing is basically 
beyond any control or business interest, representing music as public good, which is a 
menace to the record industry, but not least to itself as it is unable to create a sound 
economy.
In Scandinavia it has since long been allowed to reproduce works of art for private use. 
In common law, limitations of copyright must follow the ”fair dealing doctrine”, which 
means that the scope of private use is much more limited.846
The European Union’s Infosoc Directive enables Member States to allow reproduction for 
private use, subject to the condition that the right-holders receive fair compensation.847 
According to Montero and Simmons, peer-to-peer transmission between two private 
individuals is a communication to the public and is licensable as such.848
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Second in Buhse’s category is the mobile operator as a music service provider. The 
usage of the service is billed, but the value is not in the content itself but rather 
in the functionality and services. The business interest lies in the elimination of the 
motive to copy. A near future product may well be the “celestial jukebox” offering 
personalization: the customer might be able to create his or her own ”radio station” 
with the desired profile of music. Companies that could position themselves as music 
service providers should be companies with music brands, companies with strong 
existing customer relationships, or companies with strong ties to end devices.849
Third, there are different subscription models on the basis of “watermarked signals”. 
For the music industry: means a new approach in having a continuous relationship 
with the end-user.
Finally there is the super-distribution model with the basic idea of allowing free 
distribution of digital content, while controlling access to usage and changes with 
the content owner defining the terms. This would require a persistent cryptographic 
wrapper in place when digital property is used, copied, redistributed, etc., a digital 
rights management system with a tool that tracks the deals, and payment information 
exchanged by the parties.
Telecommunications companies have had difficulty in obtaining and providing 
desirable content to consumers because content owners are worried about protecting 
their intellectual property rights. Telecom companies have not yet found the right 
revenue model to enhance ARPU (see 2.4.) while respecting and protecting intellectual 
property rights.850
Needless to say, which way the development turns will also very much depend on the 
transaction costs of the various alternatives. The success of a DRM –based model will 
most likely depend on its ability to compete with platform fees as an efficient model 
for copyright fees collection. 
IV.8.6. An Example: Ring-tones
A ring-tone is a personalized alert tone that is stored on a personal mobile device. 
Ring-tones generally consist of 20-30 second extracts of the melody of a familiar tune, 
and have been partly defined by the technical limitations of GSM networks.851
The mobile music market today consists primarily of the ring-tone market, which has 
grown phenomenally during the past few years. Japan is the clear leader in terms of 
ring- tone revenues, and the ring-tone market in Europe is estimated to be € 1.18 billion 
in 2002 and to grow to € 2.40 billion in 2005.852 The telecom operators do not collect 
these revenues alone, as third party service providers are significant players in the ring-
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tone service market. The market is highly fragmented and dominated by a number of 
small players, not all of which pay royalties to the artists and their representatives. Use 
of music in mobile devices – mainly as ring-tones - is however generating significant 
revenues for the music authors even though royal-free usage is a problem.
Major record companies have noticed the opportunity in the ring-tone market, and 
are looking at the opportunities to collaborate with third party ring-tone providers. 
Sony Music Entertainment took a step further in November 2002 when it acquired a 
mobile content and technology provider RUNtones. BMG has in turn made licensing 
agreements with Jippii Group and Vitaminic about using BMG copyrights for ring-
tone service provisioning in Europe. Further, Jay Samit, SVP of EMI Recorded Music has 
predicted that cellular networks could “save the record industry”.853 
Distribution predominantly takes place via a single short message service (SMS) 
message, which contains space for up to 160 characters. This space may be used to 
include information that instructs the recipient device to play back music, by means 
of an audio oscillator through a small speaker. The small file size has limited the ring-
tones initially to mainly ”monophonic” quality (single tonal sound).854
Access points for requesting ring-tones over mobile networks include IVR855, WAP856 
and the Web. The consumer will interact with one or a combination of these interfaces 
to browse and select media. Once consumers have chosen the ring-tone they purchase, 
payment may be made either via credit card, pre-pay, or via premium telephone 
billing857, this being the common payment method.
The ring-tone request is forwarded in the form of one or two binary SMS messages 
containing the ring-tone information and the consumer’s mobile number via HTTP or 
FTP coding protocol to an SMS Center (SMSc). Where the request has been made via 
IVR, the IVR operator may have a direct connection to an SMSc, in which case the 
request is initiated in ”real time” as the consumer places his order. SMScs are access 
points to the networks for the purposes of delivering SMS.858
If the actual delivery of the ring-tone is made via WAP, then the consumer is provided 
with a link to the server of the content provider, from which he can download the ring-
tone to his device, again via WAP.859
As network capacity increases, and personal mobile devices improve, polyphonic ring-
tones are starting to become widely available on the market. The ring-tone might 
comprise up to sixteen ”instruments”. Mobile telephone handsets, which embed 
extracts of sound recordings as ring-tones at the point of manufacture, are already 
available.860
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Ring-tones may raise important moral rights issues, as to whether the song is presented 
in a way that is not disrespectful to the original composition.861
IV.8.7. Licensing in the UK
MCPS862 and PRS863 started licensing the supply of mobile ring-tones to the public 
during 2000.
The royalty that is payable under the MCPS scheme is (a) 10 % of gross revenue 
received by the licensee or any party at the licensee’s direction in relation to the supply 
of each ring-tone file or (b) 10p per work per file supplied, whichever is greater. A non-
returnable advance of 500 GBP (plus VAT) is also payable as part of the application 
process.864
MCPS license agreement contains standard restrictions on usage, such as excluding 
synchronization with visual images, arrangements, sound recording, and performance 
rights. In addition, there are some special clauses due to the particular nature of the 
ring-tones, such as the licensees’ right to make preview extracts available free-of-
charge.865
PRS licenses the supply of mobile ring-tones at a royalty rate of 5% of gross revenue 
received by the licensee, subject to a minimal annual payment.866
MCPS controls the right to reproduce and distribute musical works in its repertoire, 
and has a role in licensing since it is usual that a service which involves the transmission 
of musical works to mobile devices also involves the copying of those works in some 
form or other.867
PRS owns the copyright in musical works written or published by its members as 
regards the right to publicly perform the works, communicate them to the public, 
broadcast them, or include them in a cable program service.868
IV.8.8. Exclusivity vs. Mass Use in Mobile Solutions: Broadcasting, 
Re-Broadcasting
In modern society where copyright protected works are used in massive quantities, 
it is virtually impossible for an individual rights holder to administer their rights. The 
European Union’s Green Paper concerning copyright concludes that management 
by collecting societies plays an important role in the music industry as it would be 
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hopeless for an author or performer to try to control and manage rights in a musical 
work or recorded performance individually.879
As discussed earlier, the mass use of works protected by copyright is a well-established 
concept in the copyright literature, meaning use of works in such vast amounts that 
obtaining individual licenses is not possible. For example, in broadcasting the number 
of users of copyright protected works is limited (the broadcasting companies), but the 
number of individual right-holders who have in different ways given their creative work 
to be used in the broadcasting, may be large. At the same time, obtaining individual 
licenses for cable distribution of a broadcasting, for example, is considered not only 
impracticable but also impossible.880
The mass use of works protected by copyright, and also neighboring rights, requires 
a licensing procedure, where the work may be used without the individual consent of 
the rights holder.881 If no limitations were adapted, the individual rights holder might 
in practice simultaneously forbid the use of other right-holders’ works.882
As discussed earlier, collective licensing is a traditional way of licensing mass use. 
Collective licensing has basically two forms, either licensing by the licensing organization 
on behalf of its members (authors, composers, performers, etc) or, when certain legal 
conditions are met, on behalf of also other right-holders of that particular area of 
rights (extended collective licensing).
Mass use may also be covered by platform fees. This is the case concerning otherwise 
legal private use; EU’s Infosoc Directive requires that Member States who allow private 
copying have to regulate means of appropriate remuneration for the right-holders 
in compensation. This has been done by platform fees, for example, in the new 
government proposal for amendments to the copyright act in Finland.
As discussed previously regarding reproduction rights, in particular, licensing alternatives 
may include on a national level compulsory licensing or extended collective licensing. 
Concerning private use, the remaining alternative would be the platform fees. Platform 
fees however are in sharp contrast to the copyright doctrine developed in the late 19th 
century, and which was based on utmost exclusivity. No control or even knowledge of 
actual use is required in the case of the platform fees.
However, mobile technology may also provide more opportunities to trace individual 
use. According to a Nokia expert, the closed nature of the mobile network allows 
more individual control of the use of copyright protected material.883
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The rapid development of mobility may raise the question, if the copyright system 
were built today, would it at all be based on the exclusivity doctrine and property rules, 
or rather on liability rules. 
IV.8.9. Conclusions on Mobility
Looking at the categories of rights in the Copyright Law of the United States, §106, 
it is difficult to exclude such forms of use that might not be affected by mobility or 
carried out by mobile devices.884
Licensing practices on mobile content distribution are developing based on established 
models applied in different earlier forms of use. Solutions tend to be practical rather 
than prohibitive. The “old” content industry is participating in the network of business, 
and there seems to be no major conflicts. Prima facie, the situation does not seem to 
provide a reason to discuss forced mass licensing procedures, except in the case of 
private use. Concerning private use, a taxation model on the lines of Friedman’s earlier 
examples, is applied in, for example, EU legislation.
It is however remarkable that mobile communications seems to be integrating nearly all 
previous elements of the copyright system: some rights are handled exclusively (ring-
tones, content services, music distribution products as reproduction or communication 
to the public), some rights are within compulsory or extended collective licensing 
regimes (broadcasting, rebroadcasting), and finally, private use will most likely be 
tackled by platform fees. Whether this multi-faceted copyright management is 
sustainable in the future will most likely raise questions: after all, one single device in 
the hand of the customer would require complicated rights management machinery. 
To continue a little further, mobile use would have to deal with all the rights elements 
given by Calabresi-Melamed: property rights, liability rules, and inalienable rights in 
the form of moral rights.
As the price of the bulk product – minutes and bits – is decreasing, in order to maintain 
their level of profitability and turnover, the telecommunications industry will need to 
develop new business on the side of pure voice telephony and SMS, the present cash 
cows. The key success factor is the telecommunications operators’ ability to maintain 
a high ”average revenue per unit” level (ARPU), which will not get easier in the future 
as the free voice-over-Internet telephony spreads.885 This requires new dimensions of 
business, that is, media and communications in a broader sense.
Regardless of the decrease in the industry’s ability to invest and the collapse of the stock 
prices in 2001-2002, it looks highly likely that the industry will play a very important 
role in the development of the media and telecommunications industry as a whole, 
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and have a large impact on the everyday life of most individuals at home and in the 
office. 
As discussed before, this will lead to an important challenge not only regarding 
copyright, but also equipment and technical platforms, namely the problem of anti-
commons.886 As the networked business environment requires wide cooperation 
and open interfaces between companies, the results of the cooperation may contain 
intellectual property of several participants. This in turn may lead to the problem of too 
many right-holders, and the consequent difficulties in licensing procedures. A practical 
consequence of this might be the inability of the industry to create working interfaces 
and streamlined, standardized services. In order to be competitive, modern mobile 
services should not require several individual, service-specified settings to be inserted 
by the customer, which however is a consequence of the network –type business 
model.
As we have seen earlier, similar problems were encountered in the early 20th century, 
when the copyright models for phonograms and broadcasting were discussed. The 
issue of fragmentation was in these cases solved by allowing compulsory licensing to 
Berne Convention member states.
Copyright affects mobility however from two distinct angles: the first one concerns 
the content provision and the related problems. The other one, probably far more 
important from a business perspective, is related to the computer programming rights 
of the user interfaces. Since this interface may become much more important than 
the GSM standard itself, the question is should development interests require an open 
standard user interface, as the mobile handset most probably will be the focus of great 
service innovation in the coming years. In the case of market failures, this might require 
compulsory licensing, that is, a liability rule–based system. This would serve both the 
interests of the user (the public interest motive) and the interests of the commercial 
developers of the mobile services (the development motive).887
As the early non-proprietary standardization of mobile technology (GSM) provided a 
successful outcome, the question is will the content provision and customer interface 
develop as smoothly or will the problem of fragmentation of rights slow down the 
development. No apparent need or practical solutions for regulatory action however 
yet exist, which from the perspective of efficient resource allocation should only come 
as a second alternative to market-based solutions.
The basic “mechanism of change” described in this study for the impact of technology 
on copyright does not allow very much space for de lege ferenda –discussion, since 
one of the basic conclusions is the strong influence of economic power in legislation. 
However, concerning to what extent the legislation should have flexibility in adopting 
new innovations, there may be certain possible policy formulations. 
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Mobile related issues are at present not clearly visible in copyright legislation. 
Mobile distribution of copyright protected content is partly similar to the Internet-
related copyright issues, and partly bears a close relationship to broadcasting and 
also re-broadcasting. The new proposals put forward by WIPO concerning the rights 
of the broadcasting organization seem to address the possible mobile distribution 
of broadcasting companies signals and content in other forms (fixations).888 All 
regulation having a tendency for technological neutrality is basically targeted also at 
mobile technology. The real test of well-intended technology neutral legislation is in 
the criminal sanctions: will the court accept sanctions in the case concerning mobile 
services, when the legislation, originally, was drafted for another purpose, for example, 
broadcasting or public performance. An analogous application of criminal sanctions is 
not allowed by common criminal law standards.
All participants in the value chain should have an interest in developing it into a 
successful business and ensuring that security measures are sufficient. Therefore, the 
absence of the operators from the responsibility chain may be reconsidered, as has 
already partially been done in the case of harmful and unwanted e-mail (spam).889
IV.9. The Future of the Berne Convention?
The last amendment to the Berne Convention was agreed as long ago as 1971, after 
which the international community has been unable to agree on common changes 
to the Convention. This is the longest time in the history of the Berne Convention. 
The previous 20-year cycle of amendments has been interrupted. However, the 
WIPO Treaties (Copyright Treaty and Performances and Phonograms Treaty) intend 
to maintain some of the early consistency of the international copyright system. The 
TRIPS agreement has emphasized the importance of both the interpretation of the 
acquis of Berne, and added trade sanctions to the international copyright system.
The TRIPS connection creates an internationally interesting “collision” between the 
two distinct copyright traditions that were referred to by L. Ray Patterson, that is, 
the statutory copyright with a limitation function, and the natural law tradition with 
the self-interest aspect, flavored with a human right tone.890 The European and 
US traditions will most likely have to “converge” in order to maintain a coherent 
international copyright protection. In the terminology of Menell, the convergence 
happens between the utilitarian and non-utilitarian traditions of copyright.891
Looking at the broad lines of development, it seems that the division of the neighboring 
rights into a separate Rome Convention was not a clear-cut solution, and the need for 
maintaining a coherent international copyright and related rights system has required 
not only the WIPO Treaties of 1996, but also the preparation of the Broadcasting 
Treaty, which is underway at WIPO.
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Since the Berne Convention is a crucial document to understand the outline of 
international copyright protection, it is of course important to discuss also the possible 
future development concerning the Convention. However, the most important thing is 
to understand, also for the purpose of this study, the nature and development of the 
international copyright protection as an international system. Looking at the object of 
the study from this perspective raises immediately the question concerning the future 
of the computer programs protection.
It is evident that the protection of computer programs within the sphere of the Berne 
Convention can be criticized in many ways.892 One might say that a computer program 
is not the kind of literary or artistic creation the copyright protection, and especially 
the international copyright protection system, was originally designed for. Moreover, a 
problematic area is the authorship of a computer program: since one of the basic ideas 
of the copyright protection is the protection of an individual’s creative work, who should 
benefit from the copyright on computer programs, the programmer who designs the 
code or the one who orders and gives specifications to create a certain program? Since 
the conditions in which computer programs are made are usually set and fixed by the 
conditions and goal of the programming work – to make the computer do a certain set 
of operations to, for example, guide a technological process – computer programming 
seems to have fairly little in common with the basic foundations and especially the 
values behind the international copyright protection. Protection of computer programs 
might also create a problem concerning the authorship from another perspective – 
whether the protection is granted to man or machine.893
However, is there a value in maintaining a logically coherent and consistent copyright 
system which anyhow remains remote to practical needs of intellectual property 
protection. Companies and individuals need protection and flexible licensing practices 
in order to use and make use of their copyright protected works. A functioning 
copyright system has to change with the development of the economy and technology, 
and adapt new elements when the technological development and business models 
so require.
From this point of view, the preliminary conclusion is that the technological development 
of the 20th century has required pragmatic copyright and related rights solutions and 
also provided opportunities for important limitations to the exclusivity of the author 
and rights holder.
From a structural point of view, several problems have arisen since 1886. The former 
colonialist empires have fallen, and the movement for independence has swept over the 
globe894. This development is clearly positive from the point of view of democracy and 
profound human rights, but from a practical point of view has put an almost invincible 
challenge on the Berne Convention as a system for regulating international copyright 
protection. Any change in the content of the Convention has become increasingly 
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difficult if not impossible to make895. The Berne system cannot follow the development 
of technology as smoothly as it did in the early 20th century.
Moreover, computer programming provides not only a systemic challenge, but also a 
challenge from the structural point of view. The copyright owners and the commercial 
users of those rights have traditionally created a contradiction within the copyright 
system, forcing the legislator to adapt a compromise between these conflicting 
interests (human rights/profit motive versus the development motive). The birth of the 
development motive in the early 20th century is a direct consequence of this conflict.
On the lines of the analysis of “social lock” and “electronic lock” by Drahos and 
Braithwaite896, the technological development may lead to the dominance of the 
technological over the legal protection. This development may also lead to the 
“inflation” of the chances of national states to regulate exceptions or limitations to 
copyright in the public interest (human rights of others), if the technological lock is 
tighter than the social lock.
If we return to the table presented at the end of Chapter One, we shall see that certain 
elements and their emphasis have changed during the era of international copyright 
protection. As in the early 20th century, we can see that the development motive had 
its advocates. We might have to develop our table a little further.
From the Schumpeterian point of view, and in relation to the process of product 
development, we may conclude that the originator’s protection is important, if the 
purpose of the legislation is to protect the original and creative work (invention). 
If we however focus on the practical exploitation of that creative work, we discuss 
the protection of the innovation and the development motive in the sense of the 
commercial users’ rights. It is difficult to see, from this point of view, how the economy 
could develop without offering the protection and opportunities for the commercial 
exploitation of creative work. 
  Person related   Corporate Related
Originator human rights motive  profit motive    
  (the author’s rights)  (the investor’s right)
User   public interest motive  development motive   
  (users’ rights)   (the commercial users’ right) 
Object of invention   innovation
Protection (creative work)   (commercial adaptation)
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It is difficult or practically impossible to develop the Berne structure further due to its 
rigid decision-making structure. Furthermore, it seems probable that within the next 
decade897, we will see a major disruption of the Berne system from the inside. This is 
due to the technological development related to mobile technology. It is likely that it 
may bring not just a new element to the dissemination of copyright protected works, 
but integrate all or nearly all previous form of use and make technology-dependent 
regulations more or less obsolete.
232
Footnotes
720 Ricketson II, p. 13. 
721 Varpio, p.2.
722 ibid., references to Roland Barthes and Michel Foucault. 
723 Ricketson II, p. 3.
724 ibid., p. 11.
725 Barlow p. 531.
726 ibid., p. 31: Concerning collective management, Ricketson states: “Collective management 
will not usually be relevant at the point at which rights are initially exploited by an author, for 
example, at the time the initial publishing contract for a book is signed or the initial agreement 
commissioning a work of music or art is made”. – See also a reference to Katarina Renman 
Claesson below. 
727 On the need for rebalancing this market power, see e.g. Cassler in relation to cable 
distribution.
728 See Peters, on the abolishing compulsory licensing in digital music distribution and replace 
it with blanket license and a newly-defined music rights organization (“MRO”) to operate as an 
interface in licensing.
729 Kivimäki p. 66
730 Hugenholtz III, pp. 297-298.
731 Renman Claesson, pp. 97-124.
732 Rotkirch, p. 329.
733 Äänilevytuottajat, pp. 12-14.
734 Stoner, pp. 5-6: “Before the VCR, television broadcasts were restricted to the memories of 
the viewers, much like speeches in the ancient Greece forum.” 
735 Berne Convention, Act of Stockholm, 14 July 1967 art. 9. 
736 Berne Convention, Paris Act 1971 art. 9 (2). - For a thorough investigation of the three-step 
test, see also Senftleben. Concerning the concept of limitation, see Senftleben pp. 22-23. 
737 WIPO Study on Limitations and Exceptions of Copyright and Related Rights in the Digital 
Environment, 5 April 2003, net publication, pp. 20-28. - The case concerned is the WTO 
panel case WT/DS 160/R, concerning the US Fairness in Music Licensing Act. The case is also 
thoroughly discussed by Brennan. 
738 ibid.
739 ibid. p. 21-22.
740 ibid. p. 23: The question contains certain circularity: Ricketson cites Prof. Goldstein as 
saying, “by definition, markets for exempted uses fall outside the range of normal exploitation.” 
Another problem related to this line of thinking is, according to Ricketson, that reference 
to ordinary use tends to disregard new exploitation forms in the future, ibid. Therefore, the 
phrase “normal exploitation” should be interpreted as including “in addition to those forms of 
exploitation that currently generate significant or tangible revenue, those forms of exploitation 
which, with a certain degree of likelihood and plausibility, could acquire considerable economic 
or practical importance”.
741 WIPO Study on Limitations and Exceptions of Copyright and Related Rights in the Digital 
Environment, 5 April 2003, net publication, p. 24.
742 ibid., pp. 26-27.
743 Senftleben
744 Cassler, p. 251.
745 ibid., pp. 74-75. See Shay p. 123, the division of private copying regulations to “structured” 
and “open-ended”. “Structured” approach to private copying defines ex ante the limits of 
copying, whereas “open-ended” approach leaves it to ex post –judgments concerning the 
interpretation of “fair” or “equitable” remuneration. To structured approach countries Shay lists 
e.g. Germany, Sweden, and Finland, and to “open-ended” countries e.g. Australia, Canada, and 
Greece. 
746 ibid.: At this point, the analysis of the Directive is slightly different from the WIPO study, 
where the assumption concerning the conflict with normal exploitation of the work is not tied 
with step two, which is the conclusion for the purpose of this study.
233
747 This is sometimes called a “four prong test”, see e.g. Stoner, p. 6. 
748 WIPO Study on Limitations and Exceptions of Copyright and Related Rights in the Digital 
Environment, 5 April 2003, net publication, p. 75. Case-references: Sony Corp Of America v 
Universal City Studios, Inc, 464 US 417 (1984) (videos), UMG Recording, Inc v MP3.Com Inc, 92 
F Supp 2d 349 (SDNY, 2000), A&M Records, Inc v Napster, Inc 239 F 3d 1004 (9th Cir 2001) (the 
Internet). 
749 Sony v. Universal Studios (US 417 (1984)
750 Sony v. Universal Studios, Hugenholtz – Guibault – Geffen, p. 39. – The recent case on 
Grokster (Music & Copyright No: 300, 6 July 2005; US Supreme Court, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 
Studios Inc. v. Grokster Ltd. No 04-480) indicates a principle slightly redefined from Sony, that 
is, the harmful activity being first and foremost of a commercial nature turned the case against 
Grokster.
751 WIPO Study on Limitations and Exceptions of Copyright and Related Rights in the Digital 
Environment, 5 April 2003, net publication
752 Concerning the discussion on mass use and extended collective license as a solution for the 
exclusivity – mass use –dilemma, see previous paragraph.
753 Petri. Petri saw that the cable television regulation was a mistake based on the misconception 
of cable television activity; since the origin of the licensing practices came from the broadcasting 
arena, Petri claimed that the legislator had mistaken cable television for public service 
broadcasting, and was offering unreasonable benefits for this commercial operation by extended 
collective and compulsory licensing. Compulsory licensing is still used in cases of simultaneous 
re-broadcasting of signals within their original broadcasting area, see e.g. Gounalakis.
754 www.welho.fi, ”htv tänään”.
755 See Brennan.
756 Brennan, pp. 29-30.
757 Brennan, pp. 30-34. See also Gounalakis, Huuskonen I.
758 Brennan, pp. 35-36.
759 This is an interpretation of the author of this study. Brennan cites the 1983 Annotated 
Principles, which basically only use the legal argument, that there is no legal basis for considering 
the author’s right to authorize the communication by cable of his (broadcast) work as exhausted 
by the exercise of his exclusive right to authorize the broadcast of his work, Brennan p. 44. 
760 Brennan, p. 46. 
761 See PeV 7/2005.
762 Karnell I, p. 145: The concept appeared for the first time in an article by Svante Bergström 
“Program för Upphovsrätten”, which is included in the book “Rättsvetenskapliga studier, ägnade 
av minnet Philips Hult”, p. 74. Bergström had earlier worked as legal counsel for Aktiebolaget 
Radiotjänst i Sverige, and had in this position an important role in the creation of the first 
extended licensing agreement system. At this stage however, the third parties were not involved 
but the authorization of the license was based on membership of the author’s organization. 
When the third parties were included, the term “extended” was added.
763 Karnell I, p. 145-146. This element was added to the extended license agreement in a 
proposal to copyright in Sweden by the working group “Konstnärliga och Litterära Yrkesutövares 
Samarbetsnämnd” (KLYS), in 1969. The original task of the group was to change the present 
compulsory licenses to licenses based on collective agreements. Apparently, this attempt ran into 
severe difficulties, which led the group to present a solution for inclusion of the (usually foreign) 
third parties. – However, already in 1961 the Finnish Copyright Act contained the third party 
element.
764 Karnell II, p. 1. Haarmann, p. 160. 
765 Karnell II, p. 1. 
766 ibid., p. 2. The GESAC “Code of Conduct”, Oct. 1995 Brussels (GESAC), discusses this 
theme, emphasizing the competition law aspects. According to GESAC, the organizations are 
not prohibited from international licensing practices. For practical reasons, it does not happen at 
least to a larger extent.
767 Karnell II, p. 2. – PeV 7/2005.
768 ibid.
234
769 Bern Convention, art. 9 (2), The Finnish Committee on Copyright 1980:12, p. 111-113. 
The Committee reflected the extended collective licensing against the Berne Convention’s 
three-step test in the following manner: The collective organizations will take care that the 
agreement terms are reasonable for the authors, both for the members and non-members. 
The author must have a right to forbid copying if he wants to. A non-member has a right to 
demand individual remuneration. The user has a right for arbitration, but only concerning the 
photocopying for educational purposes. The Committee saw the solution however as temporary, 
and saw the possibility of developing reporting practices as providing a basis for returning to a 
purely agreement based solution. It is justified to say that within analog technology this never 
happened, but whether digital copying allows for a different approach, remains to be seen. 
770 WIPO: Distribution of Programs by Cable: Annotated Principles, Copyright 4/1984, p. 151. 
The annotated Principles is not a legally binding instrument, but mainly serves as a guideline for 
the national implementation of copyright regulation.
771 Council Directive of 27 September 1993 on the coordination of certain rules concerning 
the copyright and rights related to copyright applicable to satellite broadcasting and cable 
retransmission (93/83/EEC)
772 In Finland, PeV 7/2005 reflects however a contrary tendency. The Constitutional Law 
Committee of the Finnish Parliament concluded that from a constitutional rights perspective, an 
author who has not given a mandate to an organization managing extended collective licensing, 
should have a right to individual contracting. This conclusion is rather confusing, although the 
constitutional committee strongly emphasized the need for balancing constitutional rights 
within the copyright system. At least theoretically, an individual rights holder may block a 
national broadcast. This would imply that the Berne Convention’s national exceptions option on 
broadcasting are not utilized, neither is it in line with the logic provided by Hugenholtz (see later 
on human rights conflicts), and it may also produce both practical difficulties and internal legal 
conflicts within the constitutional rights system. 
773 ibid., pp. 11-12.
774 On the difficulty of drawing a proper line to society’s control, the pre-Second World War 
alcohol prohibition laws in many countries might provide an interesting parallel, although 
outside the scope of this study. – See also PeV 7/2005.
775 Hugenholtz III pp. 296-297. – Concerning PCs Hugenholtz is critical, as the PC should 
be seen as “universal” equipment without a primary purpose for use of copyright protected 
material, ibid. p. 297. – See a comparable list on Government Bill 28/2004, p. 107.
776 Friedman II. The question of whether platform levies (or copyright levies, or platform fees) 
should be compared to taxation is put forward in Hugenholtz III: “Certain exclusive rights are 
replaced by rights to remuneration, in particular in respect of private copying but also in the 
broader field of reprography. (…) If we are going to pay levies for acts of piracy, is that not really 
a tax? If it is, does the principle of national treatment apply?”
777 see e.g. Rosen p. 10.
778 Beier p. 256, concerning industrial property, states that “experience has shown that the grant 
of exclusive exploitation rights is more likely to confer on an inventor or designer the well-earner 
“reasonable reward” simply and effectively than is any government remuneration system.” 
Beier’s focus on industrial property might provide a slightly different conclusion than judging 
from the copyright mass use situations. But it is clear that platform fees represent a compromise 
rather than an ideal reward/profit motive solution.
779 Hugenholtz III on DRM as an alternative, p. 298, and the problems of “phasing out” p. 299. 
- See however criticism of Merges, who sees that systems applying compulsory licensing will 
require different transaction costs, namely those involved in influencing the authorities adjusting 
the price. – On DRM information management, see Clarck.
780 Berne Convention Centerany p. 87.
781 See e.g. WIPO Study on Limitations and Exceptions of Copyright and Related Rights in the 
Digital Environment, 5 April 2003, net publication, p. 78.
782 Hugenholtz regards the sound recording and copying possibilities as a profound change, 
comparable to the Internet. See Hugenholtz, p. 10. 
783 Some industry observers have sourly offered the explanation to this misconception that some 
of the Internet debaters represent demographic groups that enjoy the benefit of having their 
235
bills paid by parents or universities. – The expression “free” may however refer to other features 
besides “costless”.
784 This is not to suggest that the telecom and equipment industry would have been smarter 
than the music industry in creating ways of benefiting from music consumption. It seems rather 
that music consumption just falls into the hands of these new industries that happen to have an 
ideal position concerning the technological development, whereas the record producers have 
not been able to make the leap to other formats and platforms for music products. One might 
with justification agree with the subtle criticism of the Citicorp Smith Barney study, referred to 
above. 
785 Some estimations have been debated in the Finnish press, stating that the share of 
unauthorized files would amount to half of the total traffic in telecommunications networks. 
However, no reliable sources of information on this exist.
786 Lessig. This assumption is however more dubious, since human creativity is probably not very 
dependent on the quality of the technological tools available. A gifted person can create history 
with a pencil and paper, or even a mouth organ (Stevie Wonder), but very few do.
787 Concerning the right of making available, it is intended in the WCT regime that technical 
means of making the work available are irrelevant. Reinbothe – von Lewinski.
788 WIPO Copyright Treaty 1996, art 8. - On the background of the problem, see e.g. 
Hugenholtz II. 
789 Reinboth – von Lewinski pp. 104-105. 
790 Ibid. pp. 108-109. Agreed Statements concerning Article 8: “(…) mere provision of physical 
facilities for enabling or making a communication does not in itself amount to communication.” 
791 WIPO Copyright Treaty 1996, Art. 10 “Limitations and Exceptions”, 10(1): “Contracting 
Parties may, in their national legislation, provide for limitations of or exceptions to the rights 
granted to authors of literary and artistic works under this Treaty in certain special cases that 
do not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and do not unreasonably prejudice the 
legitimate interests of the author.” (emphasis MH) 
792 WIPO Study on Limitations and Exceptions of Copyright and Related Rights in the Digital 
Environment, web publication 5 April 2003 (prepared by Sam Ricketson), p. 56. – See also 
Hugenholtz II, pp. 101-102.
793 In Finland, major ISPs are Elisa, Saunalahti, Nettiportti, Sonera, and MTV3, of which MTV3 
is a media company operating a commercial television network, and all the others are major 
telecommunications operators. Source: “Suomen telemaksujen hintataso”, publication of 
Ministry of Transport and Communications, 15/2003, p. 36. 
794 See discussion later concerning the directive on electronic commerce (2000/31/EC).
795 “International Study of Telecommunication Service Operators”, a publication of the Ministry 
of Transport and Communications, 16/2004 (with English summary), p. 25.
796 Citigroup p. 4. Figures from 2003.
797 http://www.ifpi.org ; http://www.musicunited.org)
799 The industry may also be encouraged to develop an “electric lock” (DRM) instead of relying 
on the “social lock” (copyright and its enforcement mechanism). See Drahos – Braithwaite.
800 Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on 
certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the 
Internal Market (‘Directive on electronic commerce’).
801 For a broader analysis of the problem see Koelman.
802 According to Oesch, (Oesch II p. 119), knowledge of the distribution of the infringing 
material is the reason for legislative solution. This would bring about the question, which is 
however not within this study to answer, what should be the consequences, if knowledge of 
large illegal or unauthorized use exists, if not knowledge of an individual case. - See Aamulehti 
12.11.2004, where an industry specialist estimates the amount of P2P traffic to be between 50 
to 80 per cent of the total telecommunications traffic.
803 Koelman p. 49, emphasizes a balance of development, human rights and public interest 
motives: “(…) to promote the development of e-commerce, and apparently taking into account 
the fundamental rights to freedom of speech and to communications privacy, the EU and US 
legislatures have chosen to exempt access and network providers from liability to damage.”
804 Press release of Ministry of Transportation and Communication, 16 June 2004.
805 Reinbothe – von Lewinski p. 112.
236
806 Klami-Neejärvi p. 589. See Välimäki II, for a broad account of the history of computer 
programming.
807 Finnish Copyright Committee, 4th Report 1987:8 p. 62-63.
808 Ruotsalainen, p. 27.
809 ibid. pp. 35-41.
810 Ricketson’s powerful criticism on the solution will be discussed later.
811 A reader expecting a broad analysis of the current debate on whether and to what extent 
the patent protection should be extended to computer programming will be disappointed at this 
point. As such the discussion would require a wide mapping of the background of the patent 
system, it shall not be attempted within the context of this study. The early observation in Klami 
– Neejärvi, p. 602, is still pending: those who believe that copyright protection will be a long-
term solution for computer programs’ protection in favor of patent system will be disappointed.
812 – Mobile telecommunications is in a “perennial gale” and a fast-moving target for a legal 
study or scientific analysis. This means that the discussion in this chapter will necessarily be less 
of jurisprudential nature but focus more on the introduction of the problematic issues. This 
section is partly influenced by the author’s experience as managing director of the Finnish Cable 
Television Association 1990-1996, and legal counsel and vice president in charge of legal affairs 
and IPRs at mobile operator Radiolinja from 1997 to 2003.
813 A recent study “The Contribution of Mobile Phones to the UK Economy”, commissioned by 
British mobile operator mm02 and published by the GSM Association (www.gsmworld.com) 
reveals that in England, the importance of mobile telephony (2.3 per cent of the total national 
output, GDP) equals that of oil and gas extraction (2.3 per cent), food manufacturing (2.3 per 
cent), and printing, publishing and paper industry (2.2 per cent), right after construction (5.8 per 
cent) and hotels and restaurants (3.4 per cent). There is little reason to believe that either the 
present situation or the trend would be very different in other European countries or in major 
national economies globally. 
814 Alkio - Junkkari. GSM stands for Global System of Mobile Communications. GSM is 
also called the second generation (2G), to distinguish it from UMTS (Universal Mobile 
Telecommunications System or 3G). GSM was first agreed upon internationally in 1982. – see 
also Häikiö, p. 178, on the development of the world market for mobile phones.
815 Alkio - Junkkari.
816 Rubin - Huber, p. 153, table VI-28.
817 ibid.
818 Häikiö, p. 17.
819 For further information on GSM, see e.g. www.gsmworld.com/technology.
820 For a broader overview of the development see e.g. Häikiö.
821 Caves, p. 11.
822 ibid.
823 Moore’s law says that the technological development in the design and manufacturing 
of the integrated circuits will allow the complexity of any computer or telecommunications 
system to double in every 12 months. In 1965, Moore was quite confident with regard to the 
consequences of the development of integrated circuits: “Integrated circuits will lead to such 
wonders as home computers – or at least terminals connected to a central computer – automatic 
control for automobiles, and personal portable communications equipment. The electronic 
wristwatch needs only a display to be feasible today.”
824 The value chain is here not considered in the traditional sense but as a set of complex 
interdependencies, see Rahnasto page 90, ”the network-based value chain”.
825 When these words were originally drafted in 2003, this was just a more or less educated 
guess. In 2005, Skype offers free voice-over-Internet phone services (VoIP, www.skype.com). 
Several other providers are anticipated to join the competition of the VoIP market share.
826 According to the Report of Ministry of Transport and Communications in Finland (21 June 
2005), ”Prices of Mobile Calls in 2005, International Comparison”, the cost of a comparable 
service bundle in Finland had decreased by a stunning 35 per cent during the year from March 
2004 to March 2005. 
827 The Finnish operators’ billing for ADSL services is based on a fixed monthly rate. Also, 
the Finnish mobile operator DNA offers a mobile service with a fixed monthly fee, where the 
237
consequent risk for interconnection unbalance (that is, high tariffs of other operators for the use 
of their network in inter-network calls) is managed by allowing ”toll free” calls only within the 
company’s own network. TeliaSonera has been reported to consider a monthly payment only 
–mobile connection in Sweden.
828 Drahos - Braithwaite, p. 59. Drahos and Braithwaite see the agreement as a token of great 
intuitive understanding of the ways to use property in information to develop a pricing strategy. 
We would like to offer an additional explanation in the lines of “Moore’s law”: Gates quite 
probably saw the prices of hardware diminishing due to Moore’s law; a piece of equipment that 
can only do half of what a new model can do is practically worthless. So, the hardware business 
is risky and suffers from expedient lifecycles of the products. What it however enables, and what 
is also very much required, is a user interface. Since common consumers and even corporate 
users usually only can utilize relatively simple methods for using the computer, a simple interface 
(Windows) is much more important and valuable for broad customer groups than a machine 
which becomes out-dated in a year, or even plain infinite data capacity. – See also Häikiö, p. 263.
829 Ministry of Transport and Communications, “Prices of Mobile Calls in 2004. International 
Comparison”, 24 June 2004, (www.mintc.fi) p. 11. 
830 “Broadcasting” was originally an agrarian concept for scattering seed.
831 See Calabresi – Melamed on property and liability rules.
832 A study commissioned by British operator mm02, for the web address see table of contents.
833 On the organization of the mobile environment in Finland see e.g. Ministry of Transport 
and Communication Finland, report of May 11 2005, “Future of mobile telecommunications 
networks”. 
834 Modified and complemented from the basis of the Report of the Ministry of Transport and 
Telecommunications Finland, “Mobile Services Market in Finland 2004”, 21 April 2005, pp. 12-
13.
835 On the integration of different type of service to mobile phones, see e.g. www.vodafone.
com: Vodafone Spain announces Vodafone Live! devices with 3G ability has risen by 87% in two 
months to 225,000 units (a press release 19 September 2005), Vodafone Live! offers previews 
and summaries for episodes of “Desperate Housewives” TV series (a press release 20 September 
2005).
836 Caves p. 12-13 
837 ibid. p. 18
838 See earlier discussion concerning the EU Directive of Electronic Commerce (Directive 
2000/31/EC). The Finnish Law on Electronic Commerce (1.7.2002) contains notice and takedown 
provisions. 
839 The mobile telecommunications business comprises nowadays of a large amount of service 
providers, who bargain for the network wholesale prices and sell the end products. Service 
providers may have very different strategies depending on, will they simply re-brand the retail 
products of the existing networks or whether they have their own central, billing and home 
location registers allowing wider independent product development. This extreme case is 
called the MVNO (mobile virtual network operator). Among the best-known service providers/
MVNOs is the British Virgin Mobile. See e.g. “International Study of Telecommunication Service 
Operators”, a publication of Ministry of Transport and Communications, 16/2004 (with English 
summary), 
840 On the general service provider business landscape see Ministry of Transport and 
Communication report 40/2005, especially pp. 12-20.
841 Montero - Simmons, p. 159
842 ibid. p. 25
843 see e.g. Caves p. 25, and “International Study of Telecommunication Service Operators”, a 
publication of Ministry of Transport and Communications, 16/2004 (with English summary).
844 Report of the Ministry of Transport and Telecommunications Finland, “Mobile Services 
Market in Finland 2004”, 21 April 2005, p. 10.
845 Buhse pp. 50-55, with some additions by the writer 
846 Plogell, p. 107.
847 Art 5:2 (b). See also ibid p. 109. 
848 Montero - Simmons, p. 163.
238
849 Buhse, pp. 56-57 
850 O’Neill, p. 36
851 Montero - Simmons, p. 164
852 Groner-Dyson-Mayall.
853 ibid.
854 Montero - Simmons, p. 164.
855 Interactive Voice Response; a software application that accepts a combination of voice 
telephone input and touch-tone keypad selection and provides appropriate responses in the 
form of voice, fax, callback, and e-mail. IVR is usually part of a larger application that includes 
access. (Montero - Simmons, p. 177)
856 Wireless Application Protocol; a specification for a set of communications to standardize the 
way that devices, such as cellular telephones and radio transceivers, can be used for Internet 
access, including e-mail, the World Wide Web, newsgroups, and internet relay chat. (Montero - 
Simmons, p. 177)
857 Montero - Simmons, p. 164. 
858 ibid., p. 165.
859 ibid.
860 ibid.
861 A case in the Finnish Copyright Council (under Ministry of Education), 2000:12. The case 
however concerned more the relationship between a copyright organisation and its member, 
and the actual moral rights issue was left open. 
862 Mechanical Copyright Protection Society Ltd
863 Performing Rights Society Ltd
864 Montero - Simmons, pp. 166-167
865 ibid., p. 167.
866 ibid., p. 167.
867 ibid., p. 163
868 ibid.
869 Meyer, p. 116
870 ibid.
871 ibid. p. 117, gives as an example the Swiss Trademark Law.
872 Meyer, p.117-118, TRIPS Art. 15, par. 1.
873 Meyer, p. 118, TRIPS Art. 15, par 1.
874 Meyer, p. 118, Art. 4 Council Regulation (EC) no 40-94 on Community Trademark 
(20.12.1993)
875 Meyer, p. 118. ”This is bad news for the growling of Metro Goldwin Mayer’s lion: this unique 
sound cannot be converted into musical notations.”
876 Meyer, p. 119, General Electric Broadcasting Co., 199 USPQ 560 (TTAB 1978). According 
to TTAB, unlike traditional trademarks, which create a visual and lasting impression upon a 
purchaser or prospective purchaser, a sound mark depends on aural perception of the listener 
which may be as fleeting as the sound itself unless, of course, the sound is so inherently 
different or distinctive that it attaches to the subliminal mind of the listener to be awakened 
when heard and to be associated with the sound or event with which it struck.
877 Meyer, p. 121
878 Erben, pp. 68-69
879 Verronen, p. 1145.
880 Haarmann, p. 163. Karnell II p. 1, The Finnish Copyright Committee 1980:12 p. 129, The 
Finnish Governments Proposal to the Parliament 235/86 p. 4. WIPO Distribution of Programs by 
Cable: Annotated Principles 1984, p. 150: Principle 3, par. 73: ”It has been recognized that as 
regards certain kinds of protected works, the clearance of rights through program-by-program 
negotiations with every copyright owner concerned is impracticable.” European Union Council 
Directive 93/83/EEC, 27.9.1993, on the coordination of certain rules concerning copyright and 
rights related to copyright applicable to satellite broadcasting and cable retransmission, recital 
10: ”Whereas at present the cable operators in particular cannot be sure that they have actually 
acquired all the program rights covered by such an agreement”. – The Finnish Ministry of 
239
Transport and Communications is currently planning to allocate one digital multiplex to mobile 
datacast.
881 E.g. Karnell II, p. 1
882 The Satellite and Cable Directive 1993, recital 5: ”Whereas this means that holders of rights 
are exposed to the threat of seeing their works exploited without payment of remuneration or 
that the individual holders of exclusive rights in various Member States block the exploitation of 
their rights”.
883 Ollila, Heikki.
884 The Copyright Law of the United States, 106§: the owner of copyright has the exclusive 
rights to do and authorize any of the following: 1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in 
copies or phonorecords 2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work 3) to 
distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other transfer 
of ownership, or by rental, lease or lending 4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and 
choreographical works, pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the 
individual images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted work 
publicly, and 6) in the case of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted work publicly by 
means of a digital audio transmission.
885 O’Neill, p. 34.
886 Rahnasto, pp. 196-202, on the problem of the fragmentation of rights.
887 See Beier p. 260 on compulsory licensing in patent law: “It appears as though the institution 
of the compulsory license has outlived itself and – at least in industrialized countries – has lost 
its practical significance. However, it is generally assumed that in many cases the mere existence 
of a provision on compulsory licenses is sufficient to cause a patent owner to grant a voluntary 
license on reasonable terms to a potential compulsory license applicant.”
888 WIPO Standing Committee on Copyright and Related Rights, Tenth Session, Geneva, 
November 3 to 5, 2003, “Protection of the Rights of Broadcasting Organizations”, p. 29: 
European Union suggests a formulation of Art. 7, “Right of Making Available of Fixed 
Broadcasts”, which contains wireless means “in such a way that members of the public may 
access them from a place and at a time individually chosen by them”. 
889 Ministry of Transportation and Communication, “Uusia keinoja tietosuojan ja –turvan 
parantamiseksi”, press release 16 June 2004.
890 See Patterson.
891 See Menell.
892 See Sam Ricketson’s quite powerful criticism of the computer program solution in the essay 
”Man or Machine”, which is discussed thoroughly in the final part of this study. – Välimäki II on 
criticism towards copyright protection of computer programming.
893 The Finnish Copyright Council has given several statements on the problem of originality 
of copyright programming as a threshold for copyright protection, recently in e.g. 7/2005. – A 
recent decision in Vaasa Court of Appeals had approached computer-generated programming as 
lacking originality,17.5.2005, R 03/1245.
894 Berne Convention original text of September 9, 1886 Art. 19: [1] Countries acceding to this 
Convention shall also have the right to accede thereto at any time on behalf of their colonies or 
foreign possession (…). Berne Convention Centenary p. 228.
895 The decision-making is unanimous: Art. 17 [3] of the 1886 text: “It is understood that no 
amendment to this Convention shall be binding on the Union except by the unanimous consent 
of the countries which are members of it.” – Art. 27 [3] of the Stockholm Act 1967 maintains 
the same, with the exception relating to articles 22 to 26 (articles on the Berne administration). 
Berne Convention Centenary.
896 See Drahos – Braithwaite. - According to Rajala, neither legal nor technical protection will 
suffice alone, without the other.
897 This is the author’s anticipation based on the current speed of global adaptation of mobile 
technologies and its media possibilities. 
240
241
CHAPTER FIVE: 
Concluding Remarks
242
When phonograph was invented, and producing phonograms became a business, the 
main effect it had on listening to music was that it made music more easily accessible 
and enabled music to be listened to in individual homes. This reduced the transaction 
cost of listening to music. Going to a concert became at least partly an unnecessary 
or at least an optional transaction cost898 against which the purchase of phonograms 
could be measured. Concert halls allowed access against payment for only a limited 
number of people, especially in the era of no electronic sound amplifying systems. This 
reduction of transaction costs created economic opportunities for new businesses. 
The use of phonograms became so wide, that after the law’s initial ‘surprise’899, the 
activity had to be incorporated into the copyright system.
Broadcasting had a similar effect on the record and movie industries. Enabling direct 
reception of signals containing music and movies, purchasing records and cinema 
tickets became an unnecessary transaction cost to listening to music.900 Paying for 
a license fee to the state for permission to watch national broadcasting companies’ 
programmes became an unnecessary transaction cost, when cable companies started 
to retransmit satellite broadcasting. The law was “surprised” and tried to prohibit 
it.901 Finally, through sector-specific legislation and compulsory and extended collective 
licensing schemes in the copyright legislation, the status and rules of transactions were 
established for this field.
The electronic reproduction on the Internet offers a similar analogy: the increase of CD 
piracy is not only an indication of the difficulty of making legal rules, but all the more an 
indication that the physical element of music distribution has become an unnecessary 
transaction cost, as electronic distribution is far cheaper costing practically nothing. 
The law is again surprised, but it will have to move to the “second act”.
After a technological breakthrough, how will the legislator react? Considering the 
motives, one might see a clear economic dependency in the legislation. As Edelman 
has described it when discussing photography and movies:902
“Indeed, if there is no doubt that it is the capitals committed to the cinema 
and photographic industries that have brought about this radical reversal (that 
is, granting copyright protection, MH), it is no less doubtful that the juridical 
reversal – euphemistically called the ‘veering of jurisprudential opinion’ – has 
given industry the ‘means’ of its production.”
It is in society’s interest to protect by legislative means efficient methods of production. 
In a similar fashion, efficient production enables the development of powerful 
corporations that may have important momentum in changing the course of legal 
regulation.903
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V.1. Compulsory Licensing and the Development 
Motive
If the era of 18th and 19th century could from the perspective of copyright ideology be 
described as the era of the great literary geniuses, in the spirit of the Enlightenment, 
the early 20th century might be described as an era of strong belief in the development 
of technology. It is also shown in the copyright solutions concerning technological 
development that the tendency was to guarantee that such new forms of exploitation 
shall be allowed to develop and should not be harmed by excessive copyright protection. 
Further, the 21st century and even the late 20th century, might be regarded as the fall 
of the genius, as today’s scientific development has greatly reduced man’s belief in his 
own flawless rationality and the uniqueness of an individual’s ideas. This disbelief is 
very telling in Russell’s essay on “the springs of human action”, as discussed earlier.
The profit motive, understood as the protection of the investment in copying 
technology, has prevailed from the start of copyright protection and during the whole 
20th century. In the 1990s, it has probably even gained in importance in relation to the 
protection of computer programming.
First of all, the human rights motive may be recognized in the development of the moral 
rights. These rights have a clear status of protecting human values, the protection 
of individual personality and dignity. What is going to be an important question for 
future legislation is to have a clear relationship between the international human rights 
protection and its relationship to copyright’s moral rights’ component. It is clear that 
copyright and the related rights are protected as property rights in the international 
human rights documents, but it is less clear, what is the status of the moral rights in 
those instruments and national constitutions. A problem that the economic analysis 
of copyright has to face is the at least partial non-transferability of the person-related 
moral rights, with a strong human rights nature.904
The public interest motive was clearly present when the broadcasting rights were 
decided in the Rome Conference of 1928. Even before that, several voices during the 
development of the copyright protection have emphasized the need to have a balance 
with society’s and the right-holders’ interests.
Concerning the development of the public interest motive, there is a clear departure 
from the censorship needs that were present in the early phases of copyright protection, 
towards protecting more general interests of society: protection of minorities, education 
for all, and access to information for all citizens.905
As the development motive was clearly vivid in the decisions concerning the phonogram 
rights, one could even claim that the international community – in the Berlin Conference 
of 1908 – was close to accepting a form of copyright ‘piracy’ as a business model to be 
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either protected or at least not harmed by the copyright legislation. The compulsory 
license exception was, as discussed earlier, later made in the case of broadcasting.
A clear indication of the development motive in copyright legislation was also the 
exemption of the interim copies in the Internet distribution, as well as the electronic 
commerce directive’s exemption clauses. No monetary compensation was suggested.906 
The platform fees approach is also a relatively straightforward solution for new 
technologies, which shall not be burdened by complicated individual dealing. 
According to Ricketson, it is conceivable that uses that are presently not controlled by 
right-holders might subsequently become so, as the result of technological change. 
An example of this might be private copying where the transaction costs involved 
in monitoring such uses might now be reduced because of the new technologies.907 
Another example might be the protection of television program formats.
It will be left for further studies to evaluate, whether and to what extent the copyright 
solutions concerning the development of new technologies merit to successful 
lobbying of the respective industries. On the other hand, one could claim that just 
as creative work or performance were regarded as values in themselves, especially in 
the early 20th century the engineering inventions such as recording and broadcasting 
were also respected as results of human creativity for the benefit of mankind. The 
“protection” of those inventions and their commercial adaptations (innovations) was 
justified to a certain extent and comparable to the author’s exclusivity. This suggested 
the emergence of a fourth motive, namely the development motive.
V.2. Copyright and Market Structures
The mainstream of the development of the copyright and related rights manifested in 
the international copyright instruments has been a constant series of compromises, 
mainly creating reservations concerning exclusivity and towards economic remuneration 
as the necessary and often only compensation for the use of the copyright and related 
rights protected works and other matters. One might say that this was the era of the 
development of the analog mass media. This could also, in short, be claimed to be the 
impact of technology on copyright on the 20th century.
The early forms of copyright protection were targeted at exclusivity basically and 
simply because exclusivity as a pattern was feasible, that is, the author or in practice, 
the publisher, could de facto control the distribution and further use of the work, as all 
these events happened either near the artist or otherwise within his immediate control. 
The choke point existed and the copyright could be enforced. The development of 
technology especially in the analog era removed this possibility for immediate control 
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and created the need – also in the economic interest of the artists and authors - to 
develop copyright and related rights protection in a new direction. This development 
led away from exclusivity towards economic compensation forms different from those 
receivable in negotiations. The ultimate threat of negotiations is overcome, namely the 
right of the party not to contract. 
The introduction of the three-step test in the Berne Convention 1971 Paris text as a 
general criterion for limitations and exceptions to copyright is an important approach 
in order to try to create reasonably flexible instruments for licensing. However, the 
three-step test also bears an important similarity to the discussion on when and under 
what circumstances it is possible to create limitations and exceptions to general human 
rights, which may be seen as an indication of the human rights nature of copyright 
and related rights.
The development of media technologies has divided the copyright field perceived from 
the party perspective. Great industries have been built on both the creation/ownership 
and on the other hand the use of copyright protected material. The copyright business 
models can be divided in two: first a model where the creation of copyright protected 
material and the utilization of it in the end-user market are done by the same entities. 
This was the case in the early printing industry, and later in the computer programming 
industry. The creation and the commercial utilization are done by the same entity 
(company), and this entity deals in the retail market. 
The second is a model, where the selling of rights and the selling of products take 
place in different markets. This is the traditional divide between creators and media 
companies or producers in, for example, the recording and broadcasting industries. 
The division is also apparent between creative work and its broadcasting and re-use in 
different forms such as re-broadcasting or the Internet distribution.
In the first model, there is no commercial need for any compulsory licensing. In the 
second model, compulsory or extended collective licensing has been used as a legislative 
tool, if exclusivity were to provide a potential threat for the new media. A similar issue 
may arise if an author’s veto based on exclusive right were to endanger freedom of 
speech.908 In the second market, where the use of rights and the ownership of rights 
collude, highly exclusive protection follows as is the case in computer programming. 
This will also inevitably lead to the conclusion that unlike in the 1880s, exclusivity 
no longer represents undisputed core content of copyright. The basic outcome of 
every major technology-related modification of copyright legislation during the 20th 
century was that maintaining exclusivity was not required from the Berne Convention 
member states if right-holders were economically compensated. Importantly, this has 
taken place without any deeper scrutiny as to the human rights nature of copyright. 
The compensation has become the core. Although not attempted here, it would be 
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feasible to outline a copyright system with compensation as the core and exclusivity 
as an exception. 
It is likely that the development towards compensation was partly facilitated by the 
US staying outside the Berne Convention until 1989. As the strongest exporter of 
content goods did not participate in the rulemaking, those who did were nearly all net 
importers. Therefore, the interests of the commercial users were clearly present.
Concerning the development in the 1990s, Drahos and Braithwaite, in particular, has 
expressed concerns over the major net-exporter of information goods in the world, 
the United States of America, being active and successful in changing rapidly the 
rules of the game in the international setting: “The institution of intellectual property 
has globalized without some set of shared understandings concerning the role that 
institution is to play in the employment, health and culture of citizens around the 
world.”909
More importantly, we have seen that the existence of contradictory commercial 
interests in the early 20th century copyright law resulted in balancing measures. The 
business logic of computer programming industry is very different, since both the 
rights holder and the commercial exploiter of the rights operate usually within the 
same company. This means that there are no contradictory interests present in the 
legislation process, and as a result, the legislative process automatically leans towards 
maximal exclusivity.
Concerning TRIPS, the intention to balance third party interests currently concerns 
the exceptions to trademark (Art. 17) and patent rights (Art.26.2) but not mentioned 
in relation to the copyright three-step test (Art.13). The role of balancing measures 
– among them compulsory licensing - should be re-evaluated not only from the point 
of view of economic balance of the interest parties, but also from the point of view of 
the human rights motive and the public interest.
V.3. Motives and Understanding Copyright
Completing our construction of a balanced set of copyright motives, not only the 
users’ rights perspective but also the perspective of commercial use must be added to 
the totality of copyright legislation, that is, to recognize the development motive.910 
We could finally end our discussion on the motives of copyright legislation in the 
following simplified manner:
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  Person Related  Corporate Related
Originator Human Rights Motive Profit Motive
User   Public Interest Motive Development motive
From the point of view of this result, as an example, another and final look at the legal 
judgment in the Magill –case (EEC High Court 6 April 1995) (inserts and emphasis: 
MH):
“28. However, the Court of First Instance took the view that, while it was plain 
that the exercise of an exclusive right to reproduce a protected work was not 
itself an abuse, that did not apply when, in the light of the details of each 
individual case, it was apparent that the right was being exercised in such a 
ways and circumstances as in fact to pursue an aim manifestly contrary to the 
objectives or Article 86 (balancing of interests suggesting on a general level the 
public interest motive). In the event, the Court of First Instance continued, the 
copyright was no longer being exercised in a manner which correspond to its 
essential function, within the meaning of Article 36 of the Treaty, which was to 
protect the moral rights in the work (the human rights motive) and to ensure a 
reward for the creative effort (the profit motive), while respecting the aims of, in 
particular, Article 86 (the development motive).”
As stated earlier, the insertion of the motives may not be entirely correct, but serves 
as an indication of the mainstream of copyright argumentation. The main motives of 
the copyright field may with reasonable accuracy be reduced to the said four, which 
should help the interpretation of various complicated legal positions, and also work 
as an aid in the legislative process in analyzing the necessary positions of concerned 
parties. The Magill –case illustrates, too, that if the copyright regime does not maintain 
balancing functions, the balancing effect may be imposed on copyright field from the 
direction of other legal regimes, such as competition law.
Another example, regarding the history of compulsory licensing, is open to “institutional 
interpretation” within the motives framework in a similar manner:911
”The proposal by the Austrian Delegation thus submits to the Conference 
for consideration the system of “compulsory licensing” or “legal licensing” in 
connection with the application of a musical work to mechanical instruments. 
Three arguments are put forward in support of the proposal: 
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(a) the first is general, based on the social necessity, in the interest of culture, 
of permitting wider dissemination of musical works; (MH: the public interest 
motive)
(b) the second is of a more restricted nature, being based on the supposition 
that the exclusive right of the author to agree to mechanical-musical 
applications could be a threat to or a restriction on the development of the 
phonomechanical industries, in which so many economic and financial interests 
are involved; (MH: the development motive)
(c) the third is of private character, being used on the assertion that the 
compulsory or legal license system would dramatically increase the profits of 
authors and their successors in title. (MH: the profit motive)
Interpreting copyright from the perspective of institutional analysis - revealing the 
economic, historical, and ideological multi-layered structure of the copyright motives 
– gives as a result a more transparent approach to copyright law. “Rules do not 
themselves have purposes, except in the sense that people may ascribe purposes to 
them.”912 
V.4. Impact of Technology on Copyright
As a hypothesis, technology challenges and economic power disturbs the existing 
balance created by legal rights. Copyright protection is guided by mutual beliefs having 
their origins in the historical events of copyright development913. The utilitarian profit 
motive was already present in the 15th century the human rights motive appeared in 
the late 17th century, whereas the development motive was a consequence of the 
Second Industrial Revolution and made its mark on the Berne system during the 20th 
century. The public interest motive as censorship was already present in the early 
printing privilege arrangements, to disappear and transform later into the discussion of 
the user’s rights, which is a central theme in the 21st century’s copyright debate.
Copyright protection, as developed from the late 15th century until the late 19th century, 
has changed during the 20th century from exclusivity-based models towards utilizing 
various forms of compulsory licensing. This has been caused by the need to adapt to 
technological development especially in the analog mass media. This direction has 
been further strengthened by the use of platform fees concerning compensation for 
private use. Applying the comparison to the tort law concepts, it could be claimed 
that the copyright system has evolved from a property rules emphasis towards a 
liability rule emphasis. This development established the technology-economy related 
development motive.
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The “mechanism of change” in this respect seems quite convincingly to be the 
uncertainty before a new technological phenomenon, yet understanding that it 
represents economic significance. The legislator is indeed “surprised”, and will not 
want to decide in favor of any party to avoid too strong market positions.914 This 
typically is a pattern leading to compulsory licensing.
Digital distribution requires cost-efficient technologies to trace the users’ billions 
of relevant activities in the digital networks; whether and when these will succeed 
along with platform-based fees as a simple and low-transaction cost solution is 
questionable.915 Returning to Friedman and Thurow, digital technology has created too 
many choke points for the exclusive copyright contracting and protection to be cost-
effective. This has changed the nature of the traditional copyright exclusivity model 
to become cost-inefficient. The copyright “parks and highways” may not be financed 
cost-efficiently by exclusive arrangements alone. This also raises the issue of taxation 
analogies, and the national character of the decisions concerning copyright levies.916
Compulsory licensing, although disputed from several angles, means in practice an 
obligation for the parties to contract917, and to accept remuneration equivalent to the 
market rate, and to reduce the transaction costs of dealing. Platform fees, which were 
adapted later in the history of the international copyright protection, already represent 
a remuneration method comparable to taxation in several respects.
Technology oriented change is usually sudden and surprising and has required a certain 
deviation from the traditional doctrine of exclusivity.918 A change in technology could 
be characterized as a brute fact, that is, not a conventional fact created in the society. 
The technological challenge has established the development motive as part of the 
copyright agenda.
Technological development has emphasized the importance of the development 
motive in the copyright system. The strength of the economy-based argumentation 
in the conflict with right-holders enabled the commercial users of new technologies 
to gain a position in the copyright system. We could state that the vital interests 
of economic production had for a moment changed from the ownership of rights 
(printing) to the use of rights (phonograms, broadcasting) due to the consequences of 
the Second Industrial Revolution.
As to the “direction” of the change, it seems evident that the institutionally initiated 
change in copyright, - creation of the author’s right in the 18th century, integration of 
different forms of artistic production within the copyright regime in 19th century, the 
development of the performer’s rights in the 19th and 20th century, and the introduction 
of moral rights into the international copyright system - has had a strong human rights 
or “natural law” tendency. The technologically initiated impact has required limitations 
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to this tendency, ensuring the ability of the industry to function, and therefore having 
at least seemingly a link to the “statutory law” tradition of copyright.
V.5. Conclusion
Realizing the difficulty in predicting human behavior919, we could formulate our 
conclusion of the impact of technology on copyright legislation in the form of the 
following hypothesis. Any technological change, enhancing copying, and having the 
momentum to cause confusion in the market is followed by a legislative resolution 
maintaining the incurred business balance between the right-holders, commercial, 
and individual users’ interests. This will be the solution rather than restoring the 
earlier balance for the sake of maintaining an “old school” legal framework based 
on exclusivity. These resolutions have as a rule taken place in a form of compulsory 
licensing. The development motive has become an essential part of the copyright 
system.920 
Exclusivity remains the theoretical and logical starting point of copyright legislation 
and nearly any analysis of copyright, scientific or within legal practice. Anyhow, the 
20th century development has introduced a new set of regulations attempting to limit 
overly powerful legal positions and thus protect interests relating to development of 
new technologies and businesses by compulsory licensing. The broad use of platform 
fees is an illustration of this development in its extreme. The origin of this development 
is in the belief to scientific progress and innovation in the early 20th century (the 
development motive).
Therefore, it is suggested that a more coherent approach towards copyright may be 
reached by studying copyright as a system of compensation, rather than a system 
of full control of the use of copyright protected matter. This also corresponds to the 
evolving set of beliefs of the copyright ideology. Exclusivity has not disappeared from 
the overall picture, but shall be reserved to those forms of use where it is applicable. 
That is, where copyright is directly controllable by the author or other copyright holder 
without prohibitive overall consequences as to other right holders, users, businesses, 
or the society.921
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Footnotes
898 Of course, regardless of the existence of the widest variety of electronic media, huge masses 
still go to concerts for the experience; music as such can be heard from many other alternative 
sources. The text refers to the situation in the early 20th century, when no alternative way of 
listening to music existed besides concerts – at concert halls or homes of the educated.
899 Edelman p. 44, using the concept of “surprise” in the context of film.
900 Needless to say, comparison of television and a movie theater experience is not totally 
appropriate. New forms of media and transmission rarely replace old ones totally, but both 
will rather co-exist. As is the case with music concerts, also the movie theater experience still 
enjoys wide popularity. -The term used by Edelman is “denial” of the law, but the basic idea is 
comparable to Schumpeter’s idea of the social pressure confronted by the entrepreneur. 
901 The concepts used by Edelman in relation to photography and film, p. 44. One could refer to 
the well-known, lengthy, and gradual liberalization of the cable television business in the Nordic 
countries in 1970-1990s, which was opposed for decades by the dominating and politically 
powerful broadcasting companies. Since viewers could now see their favorite soap operas also 
directly from the satellite channels, the broadcasting companies were in the early 1990s worried 
about the ‘legitimacy’ of their license fees, as some of these foreign and mostly US soap operas 
were also their most popular programmes. Most broadcasting companies are now relying on 
their mission of preserving and maintaining national cultures. 
902 Edelman, pp. 50-51.
903 See discussion on Schumpeter above.
904 Concerning the topic see Rose-Ackerman.
905 See e.g. PevL 7/2005 on the need for balancing the human rights interests within copyright 
legislation. Broader approaches on the fundamental criticism, see e.g. Lessig, Mylly, Torvalds, 
Välimäki.
906 Oesch sees also the Magill –case (EEC High Court, 6 April 1995) as an indication of the 
interest to ensure the development of certain information technologies (Oesch III p. 29).
907 WIPO Study on Limitations and Exceptions of Copyright and Related Rights in the Digital 
Environment, net publication 5 April 2003, p. 23.
908 See Hugenholtz above.
909 Drahos-Braithwaite, p. 368.
910 According to Rahnasto, compulsory licensing has been wider in the copyright area than in 
patents due to the threat of fragmentation of rights (p. 156), which problem is also related 
to the question of “anti-commons”; property in which no single entity controls large enough 
bundle of rights that would enable it alone to make a product. Peukert, p. 16, sees that the 
discussion about the economic and social pros and cons of non-voluntary licenses as a solution 
to the digital dilemma is extremely important and has to be continued and intensified especially 
in Europe. Contrary point of view, see Merges, who regards compulsory licensing as potentially 
inefficient due to costs relating to lobbying, that is, influencing the authorities in their handling 
of the compensation levels. As an indication of contrary lobbying, the EBU Memorandum 
on Digital Copyright Management stresses the need to maintain the benefits of copyright 
exceptions and limitations granted to broadcasters. The document remains however quiet on 
this point when the position of listeners/viewers is discussed. The EU Report “The Management 
of Copyright and Related Rights in the Internal Market” requests a balancing policy requirement 
to DRM solutions, p. 10. 
911 Berne Convention Centenary p. 166, Report of the Sub-Committee on the Mechanical 
Reproduction of Musical Works.
912 MacCormick – Weinberger p. 74.
913 This describes the historical “layers” that form the inner structure of copyright law. On the 
inner structure, see Tuori e.g. p. 203.
914 Besides Edelman, a reference can be made to Niemi p. 4, discussion on the impact of 
“meddling” factors on legal doctrine.
915 Regardless of the optimism for DRM solutions reflected in e.g. Hugenholtz III, the statement 
in the text contains a mild reservation concerning the DRM’s cost-effectiveness.
916 Hugenholtz III.
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917 Calabresi – Melamed, p. 1110, on the application of liability rules: “(…) a very common 
reason, perhaps the most common one, for employing a liability rule rather than a property rule 
to protect an entitlement is that market valuation of the entitlement is deemed inefficient, that 
is, it is either unavailable or too expensive compared to a collective valuation”.
918 Technological change is ”unknown to the players originally”, North p. 94.
919 See Lagerspetz, p. 36. Predictions of the human behavior include the problem of the rational 
actor being aware of the prediction, and thus being able to act against it. However, in the case 
of the international copyright protection, it is probably not highly likely, that the international 
copyright community would adopt a different course of action just for the reason of trying to 
falsify the above statement of this study.
920 Koktvedgaard, p. 48, sees that the history of intellectual property law reflects mankind’s 
cultural and technological development, and offers views to the values of the cultural society 
at a certain point of time. “Immaterialrettens historia afspejler menneskeslægtens kulturelle og 
tekniske udvikling, og den driver en række interessante øjebliksbilleder af den almene vurdering 
af de værdier, der udgør den egentlige bestand i vor kulturkreds.” The intention in this study has 
been to further analyze this description, concentrating especially on the technological aspect, 
and analyze the factors of change, that is, the legal-economic mechanism of that development.
921 Similar conclusions have been suggested from the viewpoint of competition law analysis, see 
e.g. Kuoppamäki p. 850.
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